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Seldom has   the nation been so preoccupied with an individual's 
personal decision  as   it was   in   late   1955  and early   1956 with  the 
personal dilemma of  President  Dwight   D.   Eisenhower.     In  September, 
1955,   he  had suffered  a "moderate coronary thrombosis" which  almost 
everyone took to signify his  exclusion   from the next year's   race 
for the Presidency.     Then with his rapid recovery,  the President 
seemed   to  take  on  an   intense  interest   in what was  going on around 
him and his   candidacy became  more  and  more  of   a monopolizing 
possibility. 
President  Eisenhower's  decision   to  run  in  1956   involved 
more   than  just  his   own well-being.     He was  dealing with the   fate  of 
his  country,  his  party  and in  great measure  the entire world.     While 
recuperating in  an  imposed  inertia at  his  Gettysburg  farm in  the   last 
two months   of  1955,   he experienced  a political   renaissance.     He had 
almost   lost   his  life   and now he had it   back again.     He had a second 
chance  at   the Presidency and he  suddenly  recognized  that he could not 
let  it  pass.     For politics was now synonymous with  life  itself. 
Even  if  the heart  attack had not   occurred Eisenhower might 
have been persuaded   to  run  for a second  term merely   for  the  reason 
that  there  simply was no other Republican who could win.     But   he 
would have   been  an unwilling candidate.     With the experience of  the 
heart   attack he  realized  that  he had not  done  all he had set  out   to do 
nor had he  done it   in   the manner he should have.     Now he had  a  zeal 
to try it again.    In short,  the "New Eisenhower" of  1956-1961 can 
be  dated  from  the heart   attack, crisis  of   1955-1956. 
Eisenhower's  failure  to bring results  to his  fervent desire 
to  rebuild the   Republican Party  into one  of moderation and youth 
was  dramatically emphasized to him during the coronary crisis. 
The  party had had only him in 1952   and now - when  at   first he  felt 
he should  retire  - they  again  came   to him saying he was   all  they 
had.     They had  not   learned;   they had depended  on only   one  man,   in 
spite  of his  repeated warnings.     And he,   too, was  partly  to blame. 
All during his   first   term he had  been   "above politics"  and had 
expected  to accomplish   this   goal.     With   the Second Chance tie was 
offered after the illness,  he set  about his tasks with renewed 
determination   and exhibited   the qualities   and  accomplishments   that 
embody the entire case  for his present-day defenders.    The heart 
attack,   then,   rather than excluding a second   term,   almost  neces- 
sitated one. 
Yet there were also other failures  - failures  to which even 
the  cardiac accident  did not   give   perspective.     And   these passed 
without notice.     They were  ignored  not  by  Eisenhower  - but by those 
thousands  of Americans who  felt that  they had  almost   lost him and 
now they had him back.     He had not  blundered  - the  fault was with 
others.     This,   too,   is   attributable to the heart   attack which  is   the 
single  dramatic  event  that   goes a very   long way  in explaining many 
of  the  other enigmas  of   the  Eisenhower  Interlude. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A well-respected historian  once told  this writer  that   there 
were   "two Eisenhowers."    One was   the public  figure who carefully 
maintained an  image   of   "wholesome   Americanism," who measured his 
words   and actions   in  public - who was  in short   content   to preserve 
the status  quo.     The  other was  the  private  man who was   just   as  apt 
to  use blistering profanity  in  describing General  Douglas McArthur 
as  he was when  he missed a golf ball.     To a  large extent,   the professor 
was   correct.     But what  made  the Eisenhower  ambivalence significant  is 
that   the private self was just   the  opposite  of  the public self.     This 
duality  goes  deeper  than just  a matter of  images;   it is a contrast  of 
Presidents.     There were   two Presidents  Eisenhower.     The  first was  the 
First  Term Eisenhower;   the second  was  President   Eisenhower the 
Cardiac Victim.     This work  is  an   attempt   to provide some  insight 
into  the origins of what political  analysts   termed the  "New Eisenhower" 
(i.e.,   the second Eisenhower)   of   1956-61. 
While  many  question  that   there was  any such  thing as   a  "New 
Eisenhower" their position is  dubious.     The very   facts  of the heart 
attack,   the death of  Dulles,   the  advent  of Nixon   and the entrance 
into  the  age  of  intercontinental ballistic  missiles,   could not  allow 
even   a man  as  static  as  the so-called  political scientists   claim 
Eisenhower  to have been,   to remain unchanged. 
More   than anything else,   however,   it  was   Dwight  Eisenhower's 
attack   that   changed him.     It provided,   in short,   the difference between 
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a particular President's views  of political power  and his  purpose. 
This was   the second   (or  "new")   Eisenhower.     Had he not suffered  the 
attack  it  is highly possible   that  Eisenhower would have   retired  after 
one term.     Had he  died  during the  crisis   it  is  interesting to  speculate 
as   to what   kind  of President   might have  been  revealed by  accounts 
similar  to  those   in  Emmett   John Hughes'   kiss-and-tell  Ordeal  of Power 
or  in  at-the-elbow accounts   of  a dead President   like  Arthur M. 
Schlesinger,   Jr.'s Thousand  Days. 
Had President  Eisenhower's   life  been  taken by  the  coronary, 
it would have  rendered unlikely,   if not   utterly  improbable John  F. 
Kennedy's   election in  1960  and death  in  1963,   the   rise   to the  Presi- 
dency  of  the United  States   of   Richard M.   Nixon,   the  probable 
ascendancy  of  the   center of   the  Republican Party,   and  the main- 
tenance  of  the  theretofore  persistent bar between   Lyndon B.  Johnson 
and the  White House.     After   that,  who can say? 
An attempt has been made  to reconstruct what  has  heretofore 
not been   comprehensively   reported,  with  attention   to  detail,  yet 
without   being overly  microscopic  in  the manner of Jim Bishop or 
William Manchester.     One  of   the  difficulties   in compiling this  work 
has been  the source  material.     It  has   almost   all been  Republican- 
oriented  and  distinctly   favorable  to the Eisenhower performance. 
The national press  of  the   1950's was   overwhelmingly  Republican   and  the 
liberals  and/or Democrats  believed,   as   Rexford G.   Tugwell was   contending 
as  late   as  June  1967,   that  Eisenhower   "had not wanted very much of 
anything done;   but   anyone who  says   that  now  is  attacked   furiously by 
vi 
his partisans."      Believing that Eisenhower's were years of  "do- 
nothingism"  they wrote   little  of  a constructive nature  on them 
insofar as  source material goes.    The problem is compounded seriously 
by  difficulties   in interpretation of memoirs.     The  accounts  of  a 
certain highly   important   luncheon meeting by Sherman Adams  and  Richard 
Nixon,  for instance,  will vary widely.    An example,  in translation, 
of   Adams  is witnessed by   the  following: 
WHAT ADAMS SAID 
Eisenhower's  conscientious  sense  of  duty  and his  deep 
personal pride made  it  impossible  for him to leave 
his  work until he  could do so with  a feeling of satis- 
faction that he had  it   finished  or  that  he had  given 
all he had to give  it. 
WHAT ADAMS MEANT 
Eisenhower's   consciousness   that   there was no other 
Republican who could lead  the party to victory in 
1956   and vindicate  and continue his   policies,   made 
it impossible  for him to retire  in spite of his heart 
attack. 
After the heart  attack,   virtually everyone counted  the 
President  out  of  the  1956   race.     Then with his   rapid  recovery  his 
candidacy seemed to be more  and more  a probability.     It was  at that 
press  conference  that  the   theme  of this  paper was discussed 
1 Rexford G.   Tugwell,   "The President  and His Helpers," 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY,  LXXXII   (June   1967),   255. 
2 Sherman Adams,   FIRSTHAND REPORT   (New York:     Harper 
and Brothrs,  1961),  p.  220. 
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when  the   following exchanges   took place summing up  the major  concerns 
of   this  paper: 
Q. MERRIMAN SMITH, UPI: Mr. President, could you tell us, 
sir,   when  you   arrived  at   a  positive  decision? 
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have tried so - I will say this one 
thing: ...I will say that I was arguing about it yesterday 
morning.      [Laughter] 
Q.     WILLIAM S.  WHITE,   NEW YORK TIMES:     Mr.   President can 
you   tell   us,   sir,   what  the most  decisive   consideration was 
for  you   in the  decision you  have  reached? 
THE PRESIDENT:     Well,   that   is   very difficult   ...   But 
it's   - when you  come  down   to  comparisions,   I  am not 
certain what   influences   a man   most   in this  world. 
Q.     HAZEL MARKER,   NBC:    Mr.   President,   can you tell   us 
had  you made  up  your mind   previous   to   your heart   attack 
that  you would  run for a second term? 
THE PRESIDENT:     You   know,   Miss  Marker,   that   is  one 
secret   I  don't   think   I will   ever tell   anybody.     Possibly, 
in  my papers,   that   can be opened  25   years   after   I  have 
passed on,   why,   it  will  be   to Id. 3 
Thus,   as  was   typical   of most   Eisenhower replies   at   press 
conferences,   the   President   did not   answer any of   these   important 
questions  directly.     The   author has   therefore attempted   to do  so. 
Briefly stated,   he has   concerned   himself with seeking answers   to   the 
following  problem areas: 
1)     What  were   the  circumstances   surrounding  President 
Eisenhower's  heart  attack? 
3     PUBLIC  PAPERS  OF   THE PRESIDENTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
DWIGHT D.   EISENHOWER,   1956   (Washington:     Federal   Register Di- 
vision,   National  Archives   and Records   Service,   General   Services 
Administration,   Government   Printing  Office,   1958),   pp.   267   and 
271-72. 
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2) What was the nation's reaction to it? 
3) To what extent was the country subsequently governed 
by a White House clique during the crisis? 
4) Was Vice President Nixon systematically excluded from 
the inner workings of the government by any combination 
of high-ranking Administration officials? 
5) To what extent did Eisenhower's associates play politics 
with the heart attack crisis? 
6) What were the most important factors in persuading 
President Eisenhower to seek re-election? 
7) What effect did the heart attack have on his decision 
and on his conception of the Presidency? 
The time period herein covered is a range from September 
1955, when the heart attack occurred, to February 1956, when the 
President announced for re-election.  This paper is concerned only 
with the President's heart attack and its effects and does not consider 
any of the President's subsequent illnesses, such as his ileitis attack 
of 9 June 1956.  Neither does it attempt - because of the material 
researched - to present a national consensus of the problems herein 
discussed, except insofar as it is reflected by the national news 
magazines and the New York Times. 
Believing that the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower had 
some creditable and valuable contributions, that these were more than 
eight years of "stale, dank air of normalcy" as John F. Kennedy charged 
in 1960, and that the failures of the Eisenhower Administration were at 
least not cardinal ones, the present author has sought to find the 
origins of those contributions that were made.  Those origins cannot 
be found in the first term.  Only after the experience of the 
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heart attack - when Eisenhower got a second chance, as it were - did there 
emerge a "New Eisenhower."  For there was something more than unique 
about the Eisenhower interlude.  While it was true that Uwight 0. 
Eisenhower was unique, so were the times.  Something bade the people 
to trust a priori - even in the awareness of the perils inherent in 
a policy of returning to normalcy.  They did not want to slow down - 
but to continue at a steady postwar pace.  They were somehow persuaded 
to let the Times be handled by those in wnom greatness was assumed, 
even if not proven altogether.  The failures of the Eisenhower Era 
were therefore covered up - not by those in the Administration as 
much as by those in the country who had wanted so much for him to 
succeed in everything.  And this too is attributable to the heart 
attack.  Somehow they knew that they had nearly lost him and that 
things would have been worse if they had.  What follows here is an 
account of why the people believed this and how they came to be 
convinced of it. 
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CHAPTER 1:  MYOCARDIAL BRINKMANSHIP 
Since July and the meeting of the Big Four chiefs of state, 
the warmth of the "Spirit of Geneva" had permeated the political 
atmosphere of the globe.  That aura was augmented in the United 
States by the peace and plenty of the late summer and autumn of 1955. 
President Dwight 1). Eisenhower was at the height of his popularity 
just before an election year and the Republican National Committee 
was inspired to proclaim that "Everything is booming but the guns." 
The President was entering his sixty-fifth autumn and was taking 
care of himself as well as a man possibly could with his responsibilities 
and burdens.  As soon as he finished up his work in Washington, he 
planned to fly to Denver, Colorado, for one of his many "working vaca- 
tions."  Press Secretary James C. Hagerty announced prophetically 
that the vacation was for complete rest and would last "longer than 
several weeks."  Vice President Richard M. Nixon was due to join 
the President on 26 September in Denver for a conference of education, 
sports figures, government officials and civic leaders, to launch 
a national physical-fitness crusade.  And in the late fall Nixon 
would take advantage of the "era of good feelings" to embark on a 
2 
good-will tour of the Near East.   All in all, it was a good time for 
1 "66 and '56: Ike's Thinking Now," NEWSWEEK, XLV1 (15 Aug. 1955), 
17-18 and Russel Baker, "President Begins Denver Vacation; Plans Work, Too," 
NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Aug. 1955, pp. 1 and 8. 
2 Earl Mazo, RICHARD NIXON:  A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 188-89. 
the Adminstration.     It  was   at   its peak popularity,   there  were   no 
elections   to   face   that  year,   Congress   was  not   in session,   there   were 
no   immediate   great decisions   to  make,   and  the   President  himself   appeared 
in  a prosperous   state of   health to match that   of   the  national   economy. 
Eisenhower  arrived   in  Denver  on  Ik August  and  by  late  September 
the   first   snow of   the  year was   sparkling on the   12,000-foot mountain 
slopes  of   the  "mile-high   city."    The   air was  crisp  and  cold  and   the 
temperature  dipped  as   low as   13 degrees  above   zero.     The  Eisenhowers 
enjoyed   Denver perhaps  more   than any other place  save Gettysburg 
where  their  496-acre  farm was   located.     Denver  was   a  second home 
to  them.     Mrs.   Eisenhower  had   been   born there   and  grew up  there   and 
when  they visited  the   city  they always stayed  with her mother,  Mrs.  John S, 
Doud.     There on the front  porch of   the unpretentious  eight-room gray 
brick house   at  750 Lafayette,   Eisenhower had  courted Mamie Doud when 
he was   a  young officer.     After  their  arrival,   the  President  gradually 
settled  down  to  the  kind  of   life he   most  enjoyed  and he   regained   in 
the modest  home of his  mother-in-law,   some of   the privacy and naturalness 
that he  had  reluctantly  surrendered   to the  Presidency.3 
A  "Sunnier White  House" office  was conveniently at  hand   at 
nearby Lowery Air  Force   Base  and Cherry Hills   Country Club afforded 
3    Marquis  Chi Ids,   EISENHOWER:     CAPTIVE HERO   (New York: 
Hartcourt,   Brace  and  Company,   1958),   p.   214  and  Russel   Baker, 
"Eisenhower   in Hospital   with   'Mild'   Heart Attack;   His   Condition 
Called   'Good,'   NEW YORK TIMES,   25 Sept.   1955,   pp.   1   and kl.     See 
also Dorothy Branon,  MAMIE DOUD EISENHOWER:     A   PORTRAIT OF A FIRST 
LADY (New York:     Scribner,   1954),   p.   33. 
ready opportunity for  the  President to   take  exercise   in his   favorite 
sport of  golf.     In  addition there were mountain fishing  streams 
in  the vacinity.     Eisenhower  particularly enjoyed  trout  fishing,   for, 
as   President Hoover  said,   "All   men  are equal   before   fish." 
Also   in  Denver,   in early September,   a  national   conference 
of   the   forty-eight  state   Republican Chairmen was   to   meet.     On 
10   September  they were   unanimous   in asking the  President  to   run 
for   the  second  term for which he   had  not   yet   declared himself   a 
candidate.     They were  hoping  that when he motored   into   town from 
his   fishing  retreat  to   address   them  th«t   he would  announce or  give 
some   indication of  his  candidacy.     Eisenhower  spoke   to   the   group 
at   a   breakfast  meeting on  the   10th  and   among other   things  he warned 
them against   complacency concerning their  plans  for   the  coming 
presidential  election.     "...   |H  umans   are  frail   -  and  they  are 
mortal," he  said.     "Never  pin your   flag so   tightly  to one  mast 
that,   if  a ship  sinks,   you  cannot   rip   it  off   and nail   it   to   another. 
It   is  sometimes   good  to   remember  that.     While  this   message   brought 
about  a   "noticeable   letdown"  it  was   at   least   in part  good  news   for  the 
state chairmen.     If   Ike's  health held   up,   they reasoned  (or  rationalized), 
he  would   run.     And  they had  never  seen him  looking  healthier. 
4    See   the  NEW YORK TIMES,   Russell   Baker,   "48  G.O.P. 
Chairman  to   Fly   to   Parley with President,"   1   Sept.   1955,   pp. 
1   and 6;   Alan  Drury,   "G.O.P.   Unanimous   In Asking President 
To   Run,"   10 Sept.   1955,   pp.   1   and  9  and  Russell  Baker,   "Pres- 
ident Warns  His   Party To   Shun One-Man Outlook," 11   Sept.   1955, 
pp.   1   and   10.     See  also   "Happiness Through Health,"     TIME,   LXVI 
(19  Sept.   1955),   19-20  and  PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   cit.,   p.   16. 
Except  for occasional bouts with  bursitis  and  the tensions 
of high  office,   the  President's   general health picture  at mid-term 
seemed satisfactory.     He always   looked healthy and  those who knew 
and worked with  him testified  that  he   retained an  amazing ability 
to  recuperate  rapidly   from fatigue.     During his   first   term he  had 
suffered  from nothing more  serious  than  a mild  case   of   food poisoning, 
a sore  elbow,   and occasional  colds.     His heart   - the most  important 
heart   in  the world  - was  pronounced   "sound" after  a  comparison   by   the 
White House physician with electrocardiograph  reports   dating as   far 
back  as   1945.     There was   "no diversion"  in  them whatever. 
The   rest  of  the month  in Denver went  much  like  the usual   routine. 
By  the  third week of   that month  the President was   spending most   of his 
time high   up in  the  thin air of  the Rocky Mountains   at   the Byers   Peak 
Ranch   owned by his   friend Aksel Nielson.     There he passed  the   time  angling 
in his   favorite   fishing streams.     On  the morning of  Friday,   23  September, 
the President was  up before  dawn  and by  5:00  a.m.  had  cooked his   own 
breakfast   of hot   cakes,   fried  mush,   pork sausage  and beef bacon.     He 
headed  for his office  at 6:45.     By  8:40  he  had  arrived at  Lowery where 
he spent   the next   couple of hours working on   correspondence   (including 
a recently-received  communique'   from Soviet  Premier Bulganin),   and de- 
parted shortly  after   11:00   for the  golf  course  at   Cherry Hills. 
5 "Eisenhower Stays Healthy," U. S. NEWS, XXXVIII (19 Mar. 1955), 
36. See also Merriman Smith, MEET MISTER EISENHOWER (New York: Harper & 
Brothers,   1955),  p.  232. 
6 Robert  J.   Donovan,   EISENHOWER:     THE INSIDE  STORY   (New York: 
Harper & Brothers,   1956),   p.   359  and  Dwight  D.   Eisenhower,   MANDATE  FOR 
CHANGE   (Garden  City:     Doubleday  & Company,   Inc.,   1963),  p.   536.     See also 
"Before  the Heart  Attack - What  the President  Did,"  U.   S.  NEWS,   XXXIX 
(7 Oct.   1955),   67. 
On the golf links the President was always surrounded by 
a crowd.  In addition to his usual foursome, there were eight 
to twelve other "golfers" around him.  His usual average in the 
low eighties is impressive when one considers that he was always 
the center of attention.  If most of the group seemed distracted, 
that was why they were there.  They were in actuality members of the 
White House Detail of the Secret Service and the game they played 
had a par of zero and did not allow for bogies.  Although outwardly 
appearing as golfers they carried only one "club" in their bags: 
a high calibre (.351) rifle with the best long-range telescopic 
sight available.  Ahead of the Presidential party there were six 
to eight other agents, all observing the rough, high places, bunkers 
and other "traps" on the golf course which might hazard the President 
more than the sand or water - the potential assassin.  The Chief 
Executive was trailed by two other agents, one on a golf cart and the 
other on foot.  Each carried a high-power machine gun in his golf 
bag in order to deal with several possible assassins at one time. 
All agents carried a walkie-talkie apparatus to call back to the control 
in the clubhouse, revealing the President's exact position at all times. 
All of this was logged into a permanent record.  In addition, the 
local police constantly patrolled the roads surrounding the unfenced-in 
course to dispel any lingering or suspicious individuals.   All this 
so the President of the United States could shoot a round of golfi 
7  U. E. Baughman, with Leonard Wallace Robinson, SECRET SERVICE 
CHIEF (New York:  Popular Library, 1962), pp. 132-35.  The superb competency 
of the Secret Service in this unobtrusive patrol is evidence by the fact 
that they never interfered with or bothered the President, obviously, since 
he made no mention of these precautions whatsoever in his memoirs. 
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The  President's   party had hardly  finished   the   first   hole 
before  word was   relayed   to   the  President   that   Secretary of   State, 
John Foster Dulles,   was  on  the Washington   line   and  wished   to   speak 
to  him.     The  President  went   back to  the   clubhouse  only to   be  told 
that   there  was   trouble  with the  lines   and   he would have to   return 
later on   in  the  match  to  talk to Dulles.     On  the   second  trip  the 
President was   told  that   Dulles had   left   for an  engagement   and would   call 
back.     He  finally  talked with Dulles  on   a   third   return to   the   clubhouse. 
By 2:30  the  Presidential   party had  concluded  the first   eighteen 
holes  of  golf,   with  the   President  having  shot   an  eighty-four.     But 
because  the morning's   golf   had  been   so   badly  interrupted  the   President 
decided   to play  a   few more  holes   in  the   afternoon..    His  choice   for 
lunch,   as  he   later  recalled,   "was  probably not   too  wise."     It   consisted 
of   a   huge hamburger with generous  slices  of   Bermuda onion and  coffee. 
Once  again on the course  the   President   was   recalled   for  another 
communication  from Dulles only to  find  that   it  was   a  false  alarm because 
the operator had not   learned   that   their   business   had  been   concluded. 
The   President's   disposition  thereupon   "deteriorated   rapidly."     After 
an   interrupted   twenty-seven   holes of  golf,   his   attitude was   not   improved 
by  the  ensuing effects  of   lunch and he  was  developing an   uneasiness 
in his   stomach.     On  the   eighth hole   the   President  was  heard   to   remark, 
"I  guess   I   can't   eat   these  onions   anymore.     They  seem to   be   backing 
up on me."    His   score on  the   last  nine  holes,   however was   a 
low forty.8    For Eisenhower,  the exercise of the day,   including 
the successive  trips  back to the  clubhouse,   had not been particularly 
strenuous. 
By  5:10 p.m.   the  President,   accompanied by his   friend  George Allen, 
had  arrived back at  the   Uoud home.     They  did not  eat  dinner,   as  they 
were still  feeling the   after affects  of  lunch.     Instead Eisenhower  and 
Allen  played billiards   for a while   in the  basement.     Both declined  a 
9 
drink explaining that   they were   tired and expected  to  go to bed early. 
After dinnertime Allen   complained  of being slightly  ill.     The 
President   gave him some  milk of magnesia  and  Allen soon  left   for his 
room at   the  Brown Palace  Hotel. 
The  President went   to bed  about   10:00   and   fell  asleep 
immediately.10     Shortly   after 2:00   a.m.   on the morning of 24  September, 
Mrs.   Eisenhower,   from her  room across  the  hall,   heard   the President 
thrashing  around in his   bed.     She went  immediately  to  see what was   the 
trouble.     She   found   the   President   asleep but   restless   and awakened him. 
8 Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   pp.   536-37  and  "Before   the Heart 
Attack - What President   Eisenhower  Did,"  op.   cit.,   p.   67.     One  or 
two doctors  later guessed that   the  President was  at   this  point 
undergoing the   thrombosis,  mistaking it   for  an  upset   stomach.     Id. 
See   also   "President  Played 2 7 Holes  of Golf,"    NEW YORK TIMES, 
25  Sept.   1955,   p.   45. 
9 Another ex post   facto medical  opinion  suggested  that had 
the President   accepted   the drink he might not  have had  the  attack at 
all.     One   doctor  told him that  people over sixty  should take one  drink - 
no more   - each   evening before  dinner.     Such  a small amount  of alcohol tends 
to dilate   the  arteries   and aid  circulation,   preventing blood  clots which 
result  in   thrombosis.     Id_.     See also W.   H.   Lawrence,   "President   Set 
Exhaustive  Pace  During  His Colorado Vacation,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   2 7  Sept. 
1955,   p.   27. 
10     "Before  the  Heart Attack  - What  President  Eisenhower Did," 
op.   cit. ,   p.   67. 
"What's   the  matter,   Ike?"     she  asked.     "Are  you having a 
nightmare or   something?" 
The  President   explained   that   he  was   all   right   and Mrs.   Eisenhower 
went  back to  her   room.     Shortly thereafter  the   President  experienced 
an   intense  piercing  pain   in  his   chest.     He  arose  and  walked with his 
hand over  his  heart   to Mrs.   Eisenhower's   room  and   asked  for  the milk 
of  magnesia  he  had  given Allen earlier,   thinking  that he  was  suffering 
again from   indigestion.     Mrs.   Eisenhower  was not   satisfied  with   this 
cursory  remedy and called   the   President's   physician,   Major  General 
Howard McC.   Snyder,   who   was   staying  at   the  BOQ   at   Lowery,   four 
miles   away.     It  was  2:30  a.m. 
"Ike  has   a pain  in his  chest," she   told   the  Doctor.     "You'd 
better  come   right  over."     It   is  possible  that Mrs.   Eisenhower had   just 
saved  the   life of   the   President of   the United   States. 
Dr.   Snyder   immediately  called  the   airbase dispatcher  for  a 
car and   instructed  the   driver   to   pick  up   a medical   kit  at   his 
office on  the   second  floor of   the  administration building.     Hurriedly 
the   physician  -  nearly ten years  Eisenhower's   senior  -  slipped on his 
clothes  over his  pajamas   and   rushed out  to  the   waiting car,   driven by 
Airman 2  c.   Jacob Judis. 
"Seven  hundred  fifty  Lafayette  Street   and   step on  it," Snyder 
ordered.     Judis,   disregarding   traffic   lights,   sped   through   the overcast 
morning  streets  of   Denver on  the  most   important   mission of   his   career.11 
11     Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   362-6i». 
Dr.   Snyder was  not only the  President's  official   physician, 
but   was  also his   intimate  friend.     He had   received his M.   D.  degree 
from Jefferson Medical   College   in Philadelphia  and   served  his 
internship  in  Presbyterian Hospital   in  that  city.     Commissioned 
in the  Medical   Corps   in   1908,   he  had met  General   Eisenhower when 
the   latter was   commanding  the   invasion of  Northern Africa   in  1943. 
He   became fast   friends   with  the  man who  was   to   become  Supreme Allied 
Commander,   and was   called  from retirement   to  follow him  as  he   became 
12 Commander-in-Chief   in   1953.   '     As   the official White House   Physician, 
he,   of   course,   accompanied  the  President   at  all   times wherever he  went. 
His   concern,   therefore,   was   for more   than  a  patient,   or   a   patient 
who  was   President of  the  United  States.     It was  most   for  his  friend 
Ike.     His   later  actions  would   indicate   this   emphasis. 
Judis  wheeled   Snyder   up  to   the  Doud  house   at   3:11   a.m.   and 
the   General went   immediately  to   the President's  room.     He   found 
Eisenhower perspiring  and flushed  and   tossing   in bed with  a  severe 
pain   in his  chest.     Snyder   listened to   Eisenhower's  heart with  a 
stethoscope   and  took his   blood  pressure   and pulse:   high   and  rapid. 
The  President's  face  was   rapidly becoming palid. 
Dr.   Snyder  was   seized with the  terrifying  realization that   the 
President of   the  United   States  was   suffering  from a   heart  attack 
of  unknown causes   and proportions. 
12     "Ike's   Decision Depends on Word  From Old  Friend,"    U.   S.   NEWS, 
XL  (20 Jan.   1956),   61-3  and   "President's   Doctor  Long An Aide  to  Him;   Was 
Recalled  From  Retirement   to   Post," NEW YORK TIMES,   25  Sept.   1955,   p.   46. 
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With   lightning-quick   instinct   and professional   sagacity, 
Dr.   Snyder   broke out   an ampoule of   amyl   nitrate  and  had  the 
President   sniff   it.     Following this  he  gave  him  several   injections 
at   intervals   from   3:45   a.m.:     one   for dilation of   the arteries 
in   the  heart,   one   to   ease   the pain and  shock,   and one   to   increase 
the   liquidity of   the   blood   to  prevent   clotting.     He  did  not  tell 
the   President  of  his   grave   diagnosis   and Mrs.   Eisenhower was   sent 
back  to   bed  under   the   impression that  her husband  was   suffering 
from nothing more   serious   than  indigestion. 
As   the medicine pried   loose  the  grip of  pain the  President 
sank  slowly  into   a  deep  sleep   induced   by a  shot of morphine.     Dr.   Snyder 
looked  at  his  watch:     4:30   a.m.     The   President  was   passing now  through 
an  intense  physical   crisis.     So was   Howard Snyder.     He  sat 
professionally calm  but personally panicked  as  he   watched the   President 
of   the  United   States   -  just   twenty days   short of  his   sixty-fifth 
13 
birthday  -   beginning   the   struggle   at   the  brink of   death. 
Howard McC.   Snyder was   facing   the crisis of  his   career. 
Before  him   lay a  man  for whom he had   unbounded  affection  and  respect. 
Yet  not   only was   he   the President  of   the United  States   -  he was   the 
President   in a nuclear  age.     Even  in  those days   before   intercontinental 
ballistic  missiles   it   was   unthinkable   that   the Commander-in-Chief 
13     Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   362-64.     See  also  Richard M.   Nixon, 
SIX CRISES   (Garden City:     Doubleday  & Company,   Inc.,   1961),   p.   136. 
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should  be secretly under  sedation  and   totally  incommunicado   for 
eight   to  ten hours.     Dr.   Snyder  grappled  with the  problem:     Should 
he spread the  word of   the  President's   heart   attack or keep   it   to 
himself?    Should  his  concern be  primarily for his   patient  and   friend 
or for  his  Chief   and nation?     It was   shortly  after   three  in  the 
morning   in Denver;   it   was   just   after  six   a.m.   in Washington.     A 
communication with  the White House  might   result   in  the  diffusion 
of  the   crisis   all   over   the world,   Snyder  reasoned.     This might 
seriously shock Mrs.   Eisenhower   - who   suffered herself  from a 
valvular heart   condition -  and  her  seventy-seven-year-old mother. 
The  excitement   could  even endanger   the   President's   chances  for 
14 recovery -  whatever  they might   be. "It was  difficult   for me   to 
assume   the   responsibility of  refraining  from making public   immediately 
the  diagnosis  of   coronary  thrombosis,"  Dr.   Snyder   wrote   later   in his 
report   to   the White House. Yet  he  pre-emptorily  assumed   that 
responsibility.     He would   let   the   rest of   the  world wait while 
he did  his   best.     As   Saturday dawned,   Dr.   Snyder  sat  at   the   bedside, 
his   fingers on  the Administration's  pulse,   and waited. 
The  President had  slept peacefully  for  seven hours with 
General   Snyder  constantly  checking his   blood pressure  and pulse. 
No  word of   her  husband's   illness   had   yet   been  given Mrs.   Eisenhower. 
14 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   137   and  Donovan,  op.   cit.,   p.   364. 
15 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   137-38.     See   also   Adams,  op.   cit., 
pp.   183-84. 
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Snyder was   sustained   in his decision as  he  noted with satisfaction 
that   the pulse was   slowing  and   the pressure  coming down.     A  premature 
announcement of  a   Presidential   heart   attack -  of whatever  proportions   - 
could  have  very undesirable  national   and political   results.     More 
importantly   it was   imperative   that   the   President   be prepared for  a 
16 
calm  and  unhurried   transfer  to   nearby  Fitzsimmons Army Hospital. 
An   announcement of   any sort of   serious   Presidential   illness   would 
turn  the   area   into   what  might   be   fatal   bedlam. 
After   7:00   a.m.,   noting  that no   complications  were   arising, 
Dr.   Snyder   called   the   Summer White House  and   in  accordance  with 
his   set decision,   left word  for Assistant  Press   Secretary Murray 
Snyder   (who  was   not   related   to   the Doctor)   that   the  President had 
"indigestion"  and   would not   keep  his  morning  appointments.     This 
would  allay press   suspicion.     Dr.   Snyder's  role  as White House 
Physician was   taking on  expanding proportions.     Not only was   the 
public  to   be  kept   entirely  in   ignorance   for  fear of   the  President's 
condition,   but  also  were   to   be  his  wife,  mother-in-law,   assistant 
press   secretary  and  his   entire Administration  -   including  the 
Vice President of  the United  States. 
At   Lowery Air Force  Base   the press  was   routinely gathered 
near  the   President's office   to   get  a  story on  his   activities and 
appointments   for  the day.     At   8:00  a.m.  Murray Snyder appeared and 
made   the   relatively unexciting   announcement   that   "The President 
suffered  a  digestive   upset   in  the night,   and,   if   he  comes   in,   it  will 
16     Id.,   and  Ezra Taft  Benson,   CROSSFIRE:     THE  EIGHT YEARS WITH 
EISENHOWER  (Garden City:     Doubleday &  Company,   Inc.,   1962),   p.   66. 
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not   be  until   considerably   later.     Dr.   Snyder was  summoned   in  the 
night.     He   is   therenow."    He   told  the  press   that   the   President 
had   suffered   his   illness   before he  had   retired.     When  asked   if   it 
was   his   impression   that   the  President  was   in  "serious  condition, 
or  fair  condition,   or poor" Snyder quite   truthfully  related, 
"I   haven't  anything on which  to   base  an   impression   beyond what 
I  gave out." The  reporters  were only  slightly aroused.     Dr.   Snyder's 
security  strategy was working. 
The   President   began to   stir from his   drugged  sleep  at   about 
11:45  a.m.     When he   awoke he  was   still   very weak and  numbed  from 
the morphine.     Shortly  after  noon Dr.   Snyder  secretly summoned 
General   Bryon  E.   Pollock  from Fitzsimmons  with an   electrocardiogram 
machine.     Dr.   Pollock  arrived   at   12:30 with Major  General  Martin E. 
Griffin,   commanding  general of   the  hospital.    Mrs.   Eisenhower  was 
then told  for   the   first   time of  the  seriousness of   her husband's 
condition.     Snyder   also   telephoned another  deliberately false 
report  to  Murray Snyder with  which he  could  stave  off   the  enquiring 
reporters.     Dr.   Snyder's  control   of the   situation was  meticulous. 
At   1:00  precise   tracings of  the   President's   heart   impulses 
were  taken  as  he   lay  in  bed. The  reading of   the   electrocardiogram 
was   taken downstairs   and   laid out on the  dining room   table as   the 
17 "When  Ike's  Heart Faltered,"     U.   S. NEWS,   XXXIX (7 
Oct.   1955),   66. 
18 "Chronology of   Illness,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   26  Sept.   1955,   p.   15 
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doctors   pored over   it.     It   confirmed  Dr.   Snyder's   initial   diagnosis: 
a blood   clot  had  caused  a   lesion blocking an  artery in the  front  wall 
of   the  President's  heart,   cutting off   the  supply of   blood  from  that 
part of   the heart muscle   and causing   it   to  collapse  -   a myocardial 
infarction or   coronary thrombosis,   in medical   terms.     Snyder and  Pollock 
returned   to  the  President's  bedroom  and   told  the  Chief   Executive   that 
his  heart had   "suffered  an   injury." 
"We would   like  to   take  you to  Fitzsimmons,"    Snyder  told  him. 
The   President made   no  response  to   the diagnosis.   "All   right, 
Howard,"  he replied   to   the   request   for  removal   to   the   hospital,   "call 
Jim and  get  my car   and   let's  go  out." 
Snyder   agreed  that   the   President   should   go   to   the hospital 
in his own car  rather  than   in  an ambulance  since   the   latter method 
would  certainly be  noticed  and   the commotion might   further  endanger 
the   President.     Sergeant  John Moaney,   the  President's   valet,   helped 
the  President   into   a   bathrobe  and   the   three doctors   supported him as  he  walked 
down   the   stairs.     Again the  doctors   felt   that  the  walk would  be   less  of 
a strain on  the  President   than   if he  had  been  strapped  to   a   stretcher 
and  carried  at   a steep  angle down  the  narrow stairs.     The  Presidential 
limousine had   been  backed   into   the driveway by the   indefatigable 
1 9 Secret   Service.     On  the porch   two  agents,   Jim Rowley       and   Deeter  B. 
Flohr,   the  President's  chauffeur,   took over from the  doctors.     They 
aided  with  the  short  walk   from   the porch  to   the   limousine  and helped 
19     Rowley   is  at  the time of   this  writing  now Chief of 
the  Secret  Service,   having   succeeded  U.   E.   Baughman   in   1961. 
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the  President   into   the  back seat.     General  Griffin  and General 
Snyder  slipped   in on either  side of  the  President   -   to  be   at  hand on  the 
nine mile drive  to   the  hospital   incase of   a  relapse  in which  seconds 
would matter  - while Rowley  rode   shotgun and  Flohr drove   at  a moderate 
speed.     History might have  been   changed  drastically at   any moment  on 
that  short  drive  and only  seven  people   in the   entire  world  were   aware 
of   it.20 
At  Lowery,   Press   Secretary Murray Snyder   reappeared  at   12:15  - 
still   in total   ignorance  of   the   fate of  his  Chief  -  and   told  the   press 
that   he  had   just  received  a  second  call   from Dr.   Snyder   at   the Doud 
home   saying  that   the  President  was   resting.     The  President's   "indigestion", 
he  was   told,   was   "not   serious"   since   it  was   "the same  type of   indigestion 
that many people  have had."    Repeating,   he   said   "It   is   not   serious 
...   He   ["the  President]   won't   be out here   today."21     It   looked   like 
another dull   day for   the  white House press  corps. 
The Presidential   limousine  arrived at  Fitzsimmons   shortly 
before   1:30  and  drove past   the   guardhouse,   through the gate and   up 
to   the   front  of  the massive eight-story concrete  building.     The  car 
rolled   up  underneath  a  portico   where   a wheel   chair was waiting  to 
carry the   President  to   the   uppermost   floor.     Eisenhower  smiled at   the 
20 Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   365-66;  Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   184-85 
and  Baughman,   p.   154. 
21 "When  Ike's   Heart  Faltered," op.   cit.,   p.   68. 
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attendants   in   the   corridor   and had   a  friendly greeting  for Charles 
Adams,   the   elevator operator who  brought  him  up  to   the  eighth   floor 
to   room 8002.     The  special   suite  had been  prepared   in  advance   for   the 
President.     It  had  cream-colored walls,   light   green furniture   and 
green drapes.     It  was   a   typical  hospital   suite   for   a most atypical 
patient.    Army guards  from  Fort  Carson,   Colorado,   were on their way 
to   throw up  a security net   around the  640   acres  of   the  hospital's 
grounds while  four G.   I.'s   and   a  secret   service   agent   secured   the 
main  elevator  to   the   eighth  floor.     From now on,   only authorized 
persons  could  go   past  the   seventh  floor.     As   the   President slipped 
into   bed  an oxygen tent was   immediately placed over  the   upper   portion 
of  his   body. 
Dr.   Snyder   informed  Agent   Rowley of   the  details  of  the   night 
drama   and  called  Murray  Snyder  at  Lowery,   finally   to   inform him of 
the   true situation.     Secretary Snyder   immediately called his   boss, 
James   C.  Hagerty,   who  was   vacationing  in Washington where   it   was 
past   three o'clock   in  the   afternoon.     What  should   he  do?    Hagerty 
ordered  that   the  news   should  be   "played  straight,   with no details 
held   back."    Hagerty would   fly   immediately  to  Denver to   take   charge 
of   the   situation. 22 
At   2:08  p.m.   -  more   than  twelve hours  after   the   initial   phases 
of   the  President's  heart   attack - Murray Snyder   grimly  announced 
22     "Benson,  op.   cit.,   p.   269;   Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.    365-66; 
Baughman,  op.   cit.,   p.   154  and Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   184-85.        See 
also   "Hospital   Called World's  Largest,"     NEW YORK TIMES,   25   Sept.   1955, 
p.   45   and   "4 G.   I.'s Man Elevator," NEW YORK TIMES,   27  Sept.   1955, 
p.   20. 
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at  the  Summer White House,   that   "The   President  has   just had   a 
mild   ...   coronary  thrombosis.     He has   just  been driven to   the 
hospital   in  his own car   and  walked  from the  house   to   the   car." 
The   result  was   pandemonium.     Snyder was  battered with a  torrent 
of questions   that were   a mixture of  dismay and   irritation.     Snyder 
calmly told   them  that he  knew no  more   about   it  than what   he   had  just 
announced.     Not until   after 2:30 was   the  full   report  broken 
to   the  world  with  thoroughness   and candor.     After examination 
of   the   President   at  the  hospital   the   next  day,   "mild" was   changed 
23 to   "moderate   ...   without   complications." 
"Tell   Jim  to   take  over   ...   "   the   President   had  said on 
his brink-of-deathbed.     Dr.   Snyder   later quoted   the President 
as  having  added,   "and  handle   the   story."    Previously the   conclusion 
was   that   it   was  Chief of   the White House  Detail   of   the  Secret   Service, 
Jim  Rowley  to   whom   the   President was   referring.     Others   thought he 
meant   for  his   indispensable  press   secretary Jim Hagerty  - who would 
not arrive   until  Sunday  -   to   take over  and  run  the  Executive   Branch. 
This  was   also   inaccurate.     Although  for several   days  Hagerty was   the 
only official  Administration   spokesman on the  scene  and  his   authority 
was   indisputably  greater   than   is  customarily  exercised  by a  press 
23     "When Ike's  Heart  Faltered," op.   cit.,   p.   68.     Emphasis 
added.       See   also  Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   366.     When  the  news  hit   the 
New York  Stock Exchange   the  ensuing panic  grossed   a  loss  of   some 
$14   billion on the  market.     See  "Stock Prices  Decline  Sharply," 
NEW YORK TIMES,   27   Sept.   1955,   pp.   1   and U9. 
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secretary,   certainly any   such  statement   of   the President's   if taken 
literally   (which would have been highly unrealistic) would have been 
much more   reasonably applicable to Hagerty's  public   relations  duties 
in  the Administration.     Hagerty has   since   insisted that   this was  all 
the President   meant:     that  the  Press   Secretary should  do his  job   - 
"handle  the  story"  - with  accuracy  and  candor.     In short,  he was  to 
24 be   truthful with   the American  people. This  Hagerty   insisted was 
typical of the   President.     Everyone  on his   staff was  expected  to do 
his   job  - and  especially   in a situation  of   this   gravity   that   job 
must  be done with  complete honesty   toward  the public.     One need only 
remember the  secrecy  of   the Wilson  illness,   the suspense of  the 
Garfield  lingering,   and   the mystery  of   the  Harding death   to see  that 
this  must have  been  the   case.     Yet   Eisenhower's  penchant   for honesty 
would  cost him   later on.     By being open  and  above board  about his 
condition the   President   made his  physical  health   readily available 
for exploitation as  a partisan  issue  in   later months. 
The  reporters at   Lowery were  in bedlam.     And  they were  irritated 
at  Murray  Snyder  for what they thought was   deliberate  deception  in 
announcing a Presidential coronary  thrombosis,   already   twelve hours   old, 
as   "indigestion."     Snyder,  however,   like   any good subordinate official, 
acquiesced in   the decision of his  superiors   - even though  that 
24    Adams,   op.   cit.,  p.   216.     See   also Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   367. 
In  relation  to  this matter of Hagerty's   authority,   Donovan  noted  that 
"   ...   it  is  difficult   to  think of   anyone whose  authority  in  those  first 
couple of  days   exceeded   that   of Hagerty,   a very sure-footed  official with 
a  large  capacity and a  readiness   to make  decisions."     Id. 
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decision  caused  his   own   "deception" which was  nothing more  than innocent 
ignorance  and  even though it  opened him up   to this barrage  of criticism. 
One  exchange between Snyder and  the press went: 
Q.    We  are  getting some  queries   about why,   if  this 
attack occurred at that early hour - first of all 
why   it was   called  digestive upset,   and,   secondly, 
why  the announcement   of  the heart   attack or  coronary 
thrombosis was held up  so  long?     Can you say  any- 
thing on   that? 
A.     No.25 
Murray  Snyder was,   then,   one of  the unmerited  and  unthanked victims 
of the  coronary crisis  of 1955. 
The reporters,   however,   had  a point   and it   is  probable 
that   Murray Snyder -handling the  most important  story  of  his   life 
as  a stand-in  - knew it.    Dr.  Snyder's  concern for his patient 
was   of   course   commendable.     But   there  is   room for  criticism of his 
analysis  of the situation.     The distinction he drew between Eisenhower 
the   Friend and  Eisenhower the President was   lopsided.     Certainly  rousing 
the  Secret Service  and Washington  officialdom during the   first  few  hours 
after the  attack at   one  and  four o'clock in the morning would have  produced 
little beneficial   result.     First   of all  there were  very   few prominent 
officials  in Washington  during  this  period  of  lull in international 
activity  since   the Geneva conference.     Secondly  the excitement would 
certainly have  permeated  the Doud home  and,   as Dr.   Snyder correctly 
deduced,   probably would have  endangered   all its  occupants.     Yet   Mrs. 
Eisenhower was   informed  of  the President's   true  condition  sometime   close 
25    "When Ike's Heart  Faltered," op.  cit.,  p.   74. 
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to  noon  Saturday and Murray  Snyder was   informed  shortly after  noon. 
By that   time  ten hours had  elapsed since   the   President  had  been   stricken. 
Still   no  one   in  a  policy-making post   had   been  informed.     Vice  President 
Nixon was   not   informed  until   late Saturday  afternoon.     Jim Hagerty, 
who   received  the   news   before   Nixon did,   did  not  find out   until after 
three o'clock Washington  time.     Meanwhile  during  the   first  stages, 
the  President  of   the  United  States  was   under   sedation,   completely 
unable   to  have   received  any communication.     And  forcing  a major 
decision   upon him would have   been unthinkable.     Yet   had one  arisen 
who  would  have  made   it?    Who  would have decided even  at  the   least  that 
no decision had   to   be made?     The Vice  President was   not   in the   position 
to   have   been confronted with   the President's  heart   attack  and  a   decision 
of major  proportions   in  immediate  sequence.     And  the   fact  that  most of 
the Cabinet  were  out of   the   capital  made   the  situation worse. 
The   conclusion emerges   that  Dr.   Snyder overplayed his   hand. 
True,   his   initial   actions   probably saved   the   President's   life.     Yet 
more was   involved   in his decision than merely not   wanting  to   "spread 
the word"   for  fear of  the   President's   health whether  Dr.   Snyder   realized 
it or not.     In answer   to  that   important  question  as   to who would have 
made   the   decision  - who,   in  fact,   did  make   the decision -   the  answer by 
default   was  Howard McC.   Snyder.     Dr.   Snyder  had  for   all  practical     purposes 
out of  comprehension dulled   by the   imminent  death of   this  dear   friend  - 
assumed   the entire   breadth  of  the prerogatives of   the   President   of the 
United   States.     National   security might  have   been  at   stake   and   there   is 
no  way of  telling  what  might   have  been  the consequences  had other factors 
entered   the  picture.     The  world was   fortunate  that   they did not. 
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After  the  official   announcement  of  the   "mild" or   "moderate" 
heart   attack the   word  spread   all over   the  globe within hours.     What 
follows   is   an account of   the  political   and  personal   reactions   to 
that  news.     Meanwhile Doctors  Snyder,   Pollock and Griffin  and  a 
score of hospital   personnel   launched   into   action  around  the  form 
of   a   sixty-five-year-old man  under  an oxygen  tent on  the   eighth 
floor   in Fitzsimmons Army Hospital.     The Administration and   the 
nation was   in  a   state of  total   paralysis,   completely  cut  off   from 
its   isolated Chief.     And Dwight  D.   Eisenhower,   a man already destined 
for   immortality,   was  almost   there. 
CHAPTER  2:      GOD  WAS  TOO  HIGH  AND THE CZAR 
WAS  TOO  FAR  AWAY 
As   the   lights  dimmed   in Denver,   the   intense  beam of 
international   attention focused on Washington,   D. C.     It   was 
a   unique   situation   in American history.     Never   before   had  an 
incumbent  American President  suffered  a heart   attack.     While a 
specific method had  been prescribed   and  followed  in  the   event 
of   the   instant death of   the   Chief  Executive,   there was   no  set 
procedure   for   transfer of   power  -  be   it  temporary or permanent   - 
from one  who   lingered   in a   touch-and-go  contest  with the  Grim 
Reaper.     Certainly  there  was  no   policy established  for decision-making 
during  the   complete  physical   incapacitation of   the  President,  much 
less  when   the   insistance on   any major decision might  result   in 
his   death.     The   response  to   Dr.   Snyder's  policy of  secrecy and 
deception  concerning the   incapacitated presidency,   although filled 
with   intrigue,   was   swift   and   immediate.     The Constitution prescribed 
that   that  policy be   fulfilled by  the  Vice President  of   the United 
States,   Richard Milhous  Nixon. 
Hardly  anyone of   any major prominence was   in  the   nation's 
capital   city.     In addition  to   the  President  and Congress,   the 
Secretary of  State had meanwhile   left  to  go   to   New York   to 
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address   the  United Nations on further U.   S.   disarmament  proposals. 
The  nation's   chief   legal   officer,   Attorney General   Herbert   Brownell 
was   taking  a   holiday  in   Spain,   the Assistant   to  the   President, 
Governor  Sherman Adams   was on  a  rare vacation fishing   in Scotland, 
and  Press  Secretary Hagerty was   at   that moment   absent     from  the  city. 
Vice  President   Nixon seems  to  have  been   the only member of   the  President's 
policy-making   "Team"  in  Washington.     Whether this was   by prearrangement 
or  coincidence  has  not   been determined. 
Saturday,   2k  September, started out   as  a  usual   day for   the 
Vice  President.     Except   for  the  fact   that  he was   at   home  rather   than 
working   in his   office,   catching   up on  the  week's   accumulated 
correspondence,   his  normal  activities  during  the  day had  been 
interrupted only by his   attendence at  the   wedding of one of  his 
secretaries   to   the  son of a Senator   from Idaho,     This   event  had 
been  the high  point of   the day. 
By the   time the  Vice President  and Mrs.   Nixon  returned home 
it  was  after  three   in the afternoon.     In  Denver   it  was   past   12:30   and 
the   press  had  not  yet   been informed of  the   extent of   the  President's 
illness.     Mr.   Nixon picked up  the   afternoon  newspaper   as  he  walked 
into   his   living room  and   began   to  scan the   uneventful   headlines.      It 
was Vice  President Charles G.   Dawes  who once remarked   that  he had  only 
two  duties:     one was   to   sit   in  front of   the  Senate  chamber   and   listen 
to   Senators   talk and  the other  was   to   check  the  newspaper  every day 
to   see  if   the   president   was  still  healthy.     Nixon dutifully noted   a 
small   item on  the  front   page   that   reported   that   President   Eisenhower 
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was suffering from a slight case of indigestion in Denver.  He hardly 
gave the article a second thought.  He was checking the baseball scores 
when the telephone rang. 
"Dick," said the familiar voice of Jim Hagerty, " ... I've got 
some bad news for you.  I've had a call from Murray Snyder in Denver. 
The President has had a coronary." 
"Oh, my God'." gasped Nixon.  The Vice President went dead inside. 
The news and the shock were so unexpected that he could think of nothing 
to say for several seconds and Hagerty thought they had been disconnected. 
"Are they sure?" Nixon insisted.  "There are many times when 
people have indigestion," he said remembering the news article he had 
just read, " and it is erroneously diagnosed as a heart attack.  Doctors 
can make mistakes.  I don't think we should announce it as a heart attack 
until we are absolutely sure." The extent of Nixon's shock was evidenced 
by his unusual lack of grasp of the intensity of the situation.  His 
subconscious made him insist quite contrary to what he knew to be untrue, 
that it was possible for the White House Physician to be mistaken on a 
matter of such grave import as a presidential coronary thrombosis. 
"No," replied Hagerty slowly, "we are absolutely sure." He went 
on to tell Nixon that the press would be informed shortly and that he 
was flying to Denver immediately.  His final warning was for Nixon to 
expect anything and that the Vice President should let him "know where 
you can be reached at all times." He would not follow Dr. Snyder's policy 
of keeping out of touch where the matters of administrative continuity 
and national security were concerned. 
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"I don't see how  I  could describe  those  first   few minutes 
except  as a complete shock," Nixon  later recalled.    He went into 
the living room and sat   down  on  the edge  of  a chair  "without  saying 
anything  or really  thinking  for at   least   five  or ten minutes.      For 
quite a while I didn't even think to tell Pat  [his wife] who was 
upstairs."    During the past  three years he had lived with the stereo- 
typed status   of being the  proverbial   "heartbeat   away"   from the   office 
for which he so earnestly  yearned.     But  not  this way. 
Presently Nixon  returned to the  telephone  and called his 
intimate  personal   friend  and  fellow Californian,   Deputy and now 
acting Attorney General William P.   Rogers,  who had  already heard 
the news.    The Vice President   asked  Rogers   to come   to his house. 
Rogers   arrived in   time   for  dinner.     Soon  the  telephone  began  to  ring 
constantly and reporters began invading the  Spring Valley section of 
Washington and massing outside the modest  Nixon hone.     With   television 
floodlights bathing the  house,  Nixon was   intent  not  only on being 
totally   unavailable  to  reporters but   also on not  being photographed. 
The clamoring did  not   allow  for Nixon and  Rogers   to  grapple with 
history  with  the energy  and  attention  that bout   deserved.     The 
Vice President suggested  that  they   go to Rogers'   house  in nearby 
Bethesda,   Maryland.     Mrs.   Rogers  was   called  and directed  to drive 
over and pick them up  at  a side street.     While  one  of Nixon's   little 
daughters  drew the  attention of  the  reporters at   the  front  door,  Rogers 
stealthily accompanied  the man who might  at   any moment become  President 
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of  the  United   States,   as   they stole out of  the  house and down  a back 
alley   to   the waiting car.     Now the  capital  was  officially deserted. 
On  the drive  to  Rogers'   house Nixon  faced eternity.     His plight 
was   lonely and   uncertain,   and,   like  the  Russian peasants  of   the 
previous  century,   for him  too,   "God was   too  high   and  the   Czar was 
too   far   away."    With the   exception of Andrew Johnson,   probably 
no other American Vice  President   was  faced  with   a  greater   certainty 
of  succession than was   Nixon.     With   Eisenhower  gravely ill,   the eyes 
of   the   entire  world  would   be  focused on him.     Nixon faced   the most   serious 
crisis  of his   life   as   these  realizations  began to materialize   in his 
mind.     During what  many  later described as   his   "finest  hour" he would 
have   to   act with   caution.     Like   the man who  occupfed  the office  to  whose 
threshold he  suddenly found himself being pushed,   every action,   every 
word  would  be more   important now  than  anything he  had  ever   said or done 
previously.     For   Richard  Nixon was  the   immediate  concern not only of 
the members of   the Administration  in his  plight  between God  and the 
Czar,   but   also   of   the  people of   the  United  States,   its   allies,   and   its 
enemies.     As  he   later   recalled,   "   ...   even   the   slightest   misstep  could 
be   interpreted   as   an attempt  to   assume power."    Such  an   impression had 
to   be   avoided  at   almost   any cost.     For  years   now  the political  pundits 
had  been stressing Nixon's  youth,   questioning  his  ability   to   assume 
1     Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   131-32;   Mazo,   op.   cit.,   p.   189;   and 
Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   367-68.     See  also   "Nixon Gets News   Ahead of 
Public," NEW YORK TIMES,   25 Sept.   1955,   pp.   1   and 49  and  William M. 
Blair,   "Team to   Continue  President's   Plans,   "NEW YORK TIMES,   26  Sept. 
1955,   p.   17. 
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the  duties  and  responsibilities  of   the  Presidency should he be 
required  to  do   so,   and  throwing  at   him the   barbs  which   partisans 
had been hesitant   to   fling at  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower.     With all   eyes 
concentrated on  the  sickbed   in  Denver,   Richard Nixon was   undergoing 
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a  brutal   re-examination   in the   back of   the   nation's mind.       As   the 
Lonjp_D. Economist noted   later,   Nixon would   "be given many opportunities 
of proving  that  he   is   a   statesman.     He   long  ago   proved himself   a 
politician,   although  not  always   a   tactful  one. 
2 For  a  description of   Nixon's  feelings   see   Nixon,   op.   cit., 
pp.   133-35.     The  controversy over  Nixon's   character   continues   to   this 
day.     For favorable opinions   contemporary to   the  coronary crisis  see: 
"Nixon   is Making Sense   and Friends,"  LIFE,   XLI   (16  July  1956),   32; 
'Vhat   Ike  Says About  Nixon Now,"U.   S.   NEWS,   XL (23 Mar.   1956),   36; 
"Nixon Story," U.   S.   NEWS XL  (11  May   1956),   68-72;   "Salute   to   Dick 
Nixon,"  LIFE,   XL  (19 Mar.   1956),   41   and "A Gain for Nixon,"  NEWSWEEK, 
XLVI   (18 Nov.   1955),   34.     For   negative and   highly critical  opinions 
see:     William Lee Miller,   "The  Debating Career of Richard M.   Nixon," 
REPORTER,   XIV   (19 April   1956),   11-17;   "Nixon:   The Old  Guard's  Young 
Pretender," NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXV   (20 Aug.   1956),   9-16;   Irving Howe, 
"Poor   Richard Nixon,"  NEW REPUBLIC,  CXXXIV   (7 May   1956),   7-9;   Gene 
Marine,   'What's Wrong With Nixon?     Public  Life of   a Cardboard Hero," 
NATION,   CLXXXIII   (18 Aug.   1956),   131-34;   R.   T. McKenzie,   "Ike: 
Stuck With Dick,"  NATION,  CLXXXIII   (1   Sept.   1956),   170-72;   "Some 
Quotations  from Nixon's   1954  Campaign," REPORTER,   XIV   (19 April   1956), 
16;   "The  Young  Pretender," NEW  REPUBLIC,   CXXXV  (17   Sept.   1956),   4; 
William Lee Miller,   "Some  Selected Footprints of  Richard M.  Nixon," 
REPORTER,   XIV   (16 May   1956),   48,   and   the more  recent   comments   by 
Arthur M.   Schlesinger   in his   partisan campaign document,   KENNEDY 
OR NIXON?    DOES   IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?     (New York:   The Macmillan 
Company,   1960).     For objective   accounts see:   R.   Coughian,   "Debate, 
Pro   and  Con.   Subject:   Richard M.   Nixon," LIFE XLI (16  July  1956), 
92-3;   "Man Who Might  Be   President,"  U.S.  NEWS,   XXXIX  (7  October   1955), 
30-2;   "Why the  Vice  Presidency   is   In the Spotlight,"  U.S.   NEWS,   XXXIX 
(9 Sept.   1955),   48;   and   "Nixon   in   '60?" NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXVI   (27  Jan. 
1957),   2.     For Nixon's  own views  on major   issues  see his THE CHALLENGES 
WE FACE   (New York:     McGraw-Hill   Book Company,   Inc.,   1960). 
3 Quoted   in  "Ike's  Illness:     Europe Was   Stunned,   Confused, 
the Prayerful," NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (10 Oct.   1955),   55. 
28 
A resolution of  tact   in  a  situation of   this   nature  was   a major burden 
b 
for Nixon.     He did  not   sleep  that   night. 
II 
Jim Hagerty arrived in Denver at ten minutes past noon on 
Sunday, 25 September.  Dr. T. W. Mattingly, heart specialist at Walter 
Reed Army Hospital in Washington, had arrived twelve hours earlier.  They 
immediately went into consultation with Doctors Snyder and Pollock.  The 
three army leaders then went in to examine the Commander-in-Chief. 
With each successive medical bulletin the President's condition 
seemed to worsen.  After "mild" became "moderate" it was all too clear 
that the President was not yet out of danger. Mrs. Eisenhower moved into the 
room next to her husband's after being told that a recurrence within the 
next few days would be fatal to him.  Cots were set up in the corridors 
adjoining the press room where reporters could keep a death watch. 
In the meantime a delicate decision was in the process of being 
made by Administration officials.  In Washington it was felt that a 
civilian should be added to the team of army doctors ministering to the 
President, to improve the "public relations aspects of the President's 
illness." As with so many other factors in the President's condition, this 
policy had to be implemented with thoughtfulness and tact.  An arbitrary 
k     Even had Nixon been in a disposition to sleep, Brownell's teenage 
son, with a callous disregard for a possible future President of the United 
States, kept Nixon awake all night with his short wave radio in the room 
| above Nixon's . 
1  Baughman, op. cit., p. 155 and Childs, op. cit., pp. 217-18. 
29 
addition of  a   civilian might   reflect   upon Dr.   Snyder  and   Dr.  Mattingly's 
competence.     General Wilton   B.   Persons,   the   President's   Congressional 
liaison,   was   chosen  to  make  Administration views  known  to   the  doctors   since 
he  had   long  been a   friend of  General   Snyder.     This   understandably touchy 
subject  -  the  mishandling of  which  might have  endangered   the   President   -   was 
competently facilitated  by General   Persons,   due   in no   small  part  to   the 
wisdom of   the   broad-minded White House  Physician.     Later  on Sunday  a  special 
Air Force  plane   brought   to   Denver   from Boston Dr.   Paul  Dudley White,   a 
pioneer   in cardiology and  founder of  the National   Heart  Association.     He  was 
one  of   the most   emminent   cardiologists   in the   nation and  although  he   assured 
the   country that   the medical   staff   attending  the  President was  "among  the 
very best" of   heart  specialists   in  the  United  States,   it   was   Dr.   White,   rather 
than the military   insiders,   who   became   identified   in  the   public mind   as   the 
2 major  factor   in  the  President's   case. 
At  i*:15  p.m.   the   four doctors   released   a  statement   saying that   the 
President   "has  had  a moderate  attack of coronary thrombosis  without  com- 
plications.     His   present  condition   is   satisfactory."    Dr.  White   immediately 
took the   lead   in  explaining  that   "moderate" meant  neither   "mild" nor   "serious" 
and  that   the  words   to   be   stressed were  "without  complications." 
The  President was   kept   under  an oxygen  tent  for   three  days,   visited 
only by his  wife   and his   son,  Major John Eisenhower,   who   had  been  flown 
2 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   138-39   and page   144. 
3 John D.   Feerick,   FROM FAILING HANDS:     THE STORY OF  PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION  (New York:     Fordham University Press,   19     ).     See   also W.   H. 
Lawrence,   "President's Attack Found   'Neither Mild  Nor Serious';  Condition 
Satisfactory',"     NEW YORK TIMES,   26  Sept.   1955,   pp.   1   and   15. 
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out  to   Denver  from Fort   Belvoir,  Georgia,   on receiving  the  news.     When 
John first  visited  his   father,   the President  asked  for  his wallet   and took 
some money out  of   it   in order  that John might  buy the   President's 
daughter-in-law  a   birthday present  for  him,   since her  father-in-law 
U 
had been otherwise  occupied on her birthday. 
As the days wore on it became apparent that the heart attack had 
run its course and that the President at least would live. It was not 
yet apparent however, to what extent his life would have to be altered 
because of it, although practically everyone felt this would preclude 
his seeking re-election. In the meantime a saga of political intrigue 
and highly subdued struggle for suddenly liberated power was under way 
in Washington. 
A  tight   security net  was   kept  around  the  President   and  a 
regular  schedule   adhered  to.     Each morning,   the moment he  awakened, 
usually  about   six or  six-thirty,   the nurse   in   the room  set   in motion 
a daily  routine   that   involved  thirty people,   including,   in  addition  to 
the Secret   Service,   five doctors,   nine  nurses,   four  dieticians,   two 
medical   corpsmen,   and  three   cooks.     For   the  first  few weeks  the   President's 
day was   short.     After  breakfast he was   to  have   complete   rest.     He  was 
not even  allowed  to   read.     His  dinner was   taken  to  him at   about   six- 
thirty   in  the  evening  and he was ready to   sleep  by eight-thirty. 
39. 
i*  Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 537 and Baker, op. cit., p. M. 
5 Vide infra, pp. 72-1A5. 
6 "Ike's   Life   as   a  Patient," U.   S.  NEWS,   XXXIX  (1H Oct.   1955), 
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From the   beginning newspapers  were   kept  from  the President 
and he  did not   insist   that   he  should have   them since he "did  not 
want   to   worry over  speculation  about  me,   my work,   and my future." 
Recorded   albums of   five  books were  brought   to him  from a nearby 
library  for the  blind,   and  John brought   tapes of   some of his   father's   favorite 
musical   selections.       As   time passed  he was   allowed   to work  crossword 
puzzles   and cryptograms   in  a book purchased at   the  hospital   newsstand. 
While  he  was  not  permitted   to   read or write  them,   a  nurse  would   read 
the directions   aloud  and   the  President would guess   at   the words  which 
she would write   down.     "Sometimes he   guessed the  words even   before 
I  told  him how many  letters   there were,"  said one of   the  nurses.    He 
followed   the World  Series   eagerly,   although because   of  the  excitement 
it  would  engender,   he was   not   allowed   to   watch   it on  television or 
listen  to   it  on  radio.        It  was   apparent   that   the   heart  attack had 
produced no  permanent  physical   or mental   impairments.     Not so  politically, 
as will   be seen. 
Meanwhile  hundreds of   thousands  of   letters   and telegrams 
poured   in.     The  effect of   the  President's   stroke  was world- 
wide.     Significant  was   the message  from Soviet  Chairman Nikita 
Khrushchev:     "Remembering our  personal  meeting   in Geneva,   I  have 
7 Political   cynics might have  sneered   at   the  fact   that one 
of  those  musical   pieces   was   "The Funeral   March  of   a Marionette." 
Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   337n. 
8 As   the  New York Yankees went down in defeat   in  seven games 
to   the   Brooklyn  Dodgers,   it was  reported   that  the  President was 
disappointed   since he was   an American League fan.     Eisenhower,   op. 
cit.,   p.   539   and   "The  President:     Our Hopes Rose,"   NEWSWEEK,   XLVI 
(10 Oct.   1955),   32-3. 
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learned with   grief  of  your   illness.     I  wholeheartedly wish you 
a  speedy recovery."' 
On  30   September -  six days   after the   attack  -  an  amazing 
occurrence  took place.     The   President   resumed  partially his official 
duties   by signing  several   papers.     Bringing  them  into his  patient, 
Dr.   Snyder  said,   "Mr.   President,   you only have   to   initial   these   ...   " 
The   President   looked   up and smiled.   "Well,  Howard," he   said, 
"I   think  I  know more  about   it than you do," and   signed his name   in 
full.     Although   this   action wrought headlines,   the   papers were 
relatively unimportant,   except  for  the   177   Foreign  Service Officers 
for whom  they meant   a raise   in pay.     Their major  significance  was 
twofold.     First  they demonstrated  Eisenhower's   incredible  resilience 
in  the  face  of  cardiac   illness.     Second his   action helped  to   demon- 
strate   that   the nation was  not going  to remain   in a   state of   paralysis 
and  that  the  President was   capable of   performing  in a clutch   situation 
if  the  need   arose.     His   action also,   as will  be  seen  later,   staved  off 
9     "Russians  Sympathetic," NEW YORK TIMES,   27  Sept.   1955, 
p.   27.   Eisenhowers'   old   friend  and military colleague Marshal   Zhukov 
of   the   Soviet  Union wired  a   similar message.     See   "Waiting,"   TIME,   LXVI 
(10 Oct.   1955),   28.     For  messages  from other world   leaders   see  "World 
Leaders  Express  Concern,"  NEW YORK TIMES,   p.   15;   "Queen   Elizabeth Cables 
President,"  p.   43 of  26   Sept.   1955.   At home  former   President Herbert 
Hoover   said   that   "the whole  country was praying"for  the   President's   re- 
covery.     Former  President  Harry Truman said he was   "terribly sorry" 
about  his   successor's   condition and Adlai   Stevenson was   similarly 
"terribly distressed"   [ A decade   later  a heart   attack was  to   take 
Stevenson's   life.]     Then  Senate Majority Leader Lyndon   B. Johnson, 
recuperating  from  a   similar  attack which had  stricken him on   2  July   1955, 
wired  the President   to   "take care of   yourself."     See  "Hoover,   Truman 
Express  Concern," NEW YORK TIMES,   26   Sept.   1955,   p.   42. 
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any legal decision as to whether constitutional powers should have 
been delegated.  Two days later the President was reported as feeling 
"a little tired" and the news shook the stock market, resulting in a 
drop from one to five points, or the loss of four billion dollars 
on the New York Exchange.  But the President bounced back and so 
did the market, and as days passed he began to devote more and more 
of his time to his governmental duties.  By this time the Cabinet 
and the National Security Council had met and Sherman Adams had 
joined Hagerty in Denver. 
The first time the doctors had been available to the press 
was on the Tuesday after the attack when Dr. White, now spokesman 
for the physicians, held a news conference.  As Secretary Hagerty 
read the medical reports, Dr. White would interpret and explain 
their meaning.  It was the first time that the entire story was 
told in detail.  One analysis went as follows: 
Hagerty (reading): |The President) had a good bowel 
movement. 
Dr. White:  Now I put that in - which I insisted 
be put in, and I am sure the others agreed to it 
because it is.  I said the country will be very 
pleased - the country is so bowel-minded anyway - to 
know that the President had a good movement this 
10  "Waiting," op. cit., 28; "The President:  Our Hopes 
Rose," op. cit., pp. 32-3; Donovan, op. cit., p. 377.  See also 
Russell Baker, "President Better But Doctors See a "Long Way To 
Go'," NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Oct. 1955, p. 1 and "Eisenhower Takes 
Back the Reigns," U. S. NEWS, XXXIX (28 Oct. 1955), 25. For an 
account of the Cabinet meetings see below, pp. 55TOZ. 
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morning  and   it   is   important.     It   is   good   for  the 
morale of   the people   for one  thing.11 
It would  take  three weeks   for  the scar on Eisenhower's  heart   to 
heal   and  two or  three months  for  the  President   to   recover,   said 
White.12 
With  the  close of Dr.  White's   comments,   the  first question 
was   already spilling forth:     Did  the   Doctor  think the   President 
would  recover  enough to   run  for   a second term?    White   said   it  was 
"quite   conceivable" that he  would but   that  having seen the strain, 
he would not   recommend   it.     Later he was  pressed on  the matter.     Did 
he mean to   say that he  would  recommend  to   the President   that  he  should 
11 "The   Doctor's Report," TIME,   LXVI  (10 Oct.   1955),   28.     If 
Dr.   White's   syntax was  that   typical  of one   in the   sciences,   his  analysis 
was   effective.     As  to   precisely how much of   a  boost   the  President's 
bowel   movement   gave  to  the   country's  morale,   we  do  not  have   accurate 
indications,   but   as  Dr.  White   later   explained  to   Eisenhower  himself, 
when   the President wryly remarked that  he  and Hagerty were   carrying 
the   "realism" possibly a   little   too   far,   "That may not mean much  to 
the   general  public,   but  to   doctors  everywhere   it  will   tell   a 
revealing  story."    Eisenhower had,   after  all,   instructed  them  to 
"Tell   the   truth,   the whole   truth;   don't   try to   conceal   anything." 
This,   the   President  said,   was  because he   "had   been one of   those 
who   during  President Wilson's   long  illness wondered  why the  public 
was   kept  so much   in the dark about  his   real  condition and thought  that 
the  nation had   a   right  to   know exactly the  status of   the  President's 
health."     Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   538. 
12 "Noted Heart Specialist   Is   Flown From Boston to 
Denver  by U.   S.   Air Force   Plane," NEW YORK TIMES,   26   Sept.   1955, 
p.   15. 
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not run again? Advised by Hagerty to clarify this statement, White 
explained, 
I   indicated  that   I,   personally,   as Paul  D.   White would 
have   no   great   desire  to   undertake  such  a  strain as  that 
imposed   upon a President of   the   U.S.A.     This   remark 
would   be   interpreted   as  meaning   that   I would  give   such 
advice   to   the  President.     Far  from  it.     If   the President 
has   a   good  recovery,   as  he   seems to  be on  the  way to 
establishing,   and   if  he  desires   to  continue   in his 
present   career   -  which could  be,   of  course,   to  the 
great   benefit of   this   country and the  world  at   large  -   I 
would  have  no  objection whatsoever to   his   running  again. 
But   that  remains   for  the  future   to decide.™ 
White  called   the President's   chances   "reasonably good"  for recovery 
sufficient   to   allow for   a second  campaign and  said   it  was  probable 
that   the President  would be   ready to   confer   fully with his   associates 
in   two weeks. ^    The  question of   a  second term was   still   in doubt.     While 
it  was  Eisenhower's decision to make,   though,   there  was   little  doubt 
of   the outcome of   the  convalescent's  decision. 
Meanwhile  the  President's  psychological  condition presented 
more of   a problem  to   the doctors   than  did his   physical   condition.     The 
major setback of  a heart   attack   is   not   the   initial   effects  but   the de- 
pression of   the  aftermath.  More often   than not   this  depression  is  what   in- 
curs   another  attack.     It  was   soon apparent   that   Eisenhower was   lying  in 
bed worrying  about   the  government.     After visits   by officials   later on, 
this   became  more  and more obvious.     It   was  vital,   therefore,   that   the 
13     Id.,   and   "The Doctors'   Report," op.   cit.,   p.   29. 
Ik     Russell   Baker,   "Eisenhower   Is  Improving;   Chance of Full 
Recovery Called   'Reasonably Good',"    NEW YORK TIMES,   27   Sept.   1955,   p.   1 
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President's   morale be   kept   up.    After   a  slow start,   the   President's 
work  schedule,   under   Dr.  White's suggestion and   direction,   was 
gradually but   steadily  increased.     The   President   spent   most  of his 
time   in bed  mulling over Administration business   and decisions   and 
was   given as  much official   work as possible.    The goal   was   to make 
him feel   less   of  an   invalid. 
This   psychology was made effective  by the  visits of  Cabinet 
and Administration officials.     Brief   conferences   were  set  up   in order 
of  seniority   in the Cabinet,   starting with the Vice President on 
down.     Press   Secretary    Hagerty and   the Assistant   to   the  President 
Sherman Adams   were  to   be   there  at  all   times. The doctors   impressed 
upon each visiting dignitary that  the  President   must not   be  treated 
as   an  invalid   and  that the  conversations   should   be  as   normal   as  possible. 
In  the  early  phases   their   talks were   confined to   problems of   a   less 
exacting nature  but   as  time passed,   visiting officials  were   buttonholed 
by doctors   and   told   to   speak to  the  President straight  from the   shoulder 
and   "not  to   act   as   if  they were  addressing someone on his  deathbed." 16 
15 For   an account  of Adams'   conduct see   below. 
16 Adams,  op  cit.,   pp.   188-89   and  Donovan,   p.   377.     So  concerned 
with  Eisenhowers'  morale were  the physicians that  they constantly  put 
such  things   as   children's   letters   and particularly letters   from  the 
President's   grandchildren   into   the official papers  brought  him  in   later 
weeks.     One   such   letter  from John's  daughters,   Susan   (age   3)   and   Barbara 
(age 6j)   and  his   son  David   (7§)include   some  samples  of   their  art   work 
on  get well   cards  and  some  bubblegum.     See   "To  Grandfather With Love: 
Some  Bubblegum," NEW YORK TIMES,  6  Oct.   1955,   p.   1. 
. 
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Vice  President  Nixon's  visit  was   the first  time   a  Vice  President 
had  been at   the  bedside of   a conscious  and  seriously stricken President.   ' 
Dulles   spent   twenty-five  minutes  with Eisenhower and   "found the  President's 
mind  fresh  and vigorous."     He was   satisfied  that the  President   "was   ready 
1 ft 
to  apply himself   to  any problem  that might  become  acute." Ezra Taft 
Benson,   the   Secretary of Agriculture,  visited   the President with  Sherman 
Adams  and Milton   Eisenhower,   the  President's  younger   brother.     Though he 
was  not   in  any official   position  in  the Administration,   Dr.   Eisenhower 
(who was   at   that  time President of  Pennsylvania State  University and 
later President of  the  John Hopkins University) was one of the President's 
19 
foremost   advisers.     The  President   gave  them a   "cheerful   and hearty 
greeting."    As   he  looked  Benson over,  he   said,   "Ezra,   you  look  tired. 
17 Mazo,   op.   cit.,   p.   193.     Andrew Johnson had visited  his 
stricken Chief,   but   Lincoln never  regained  consciousness   from  the   time 
of his   attack.     Arthur never visited the   lingering  Garfield,   and 
McKinley died within hours   before   Roosevelt,   who was  half  a continent 
away on a hunting trip,   could  be  contacted.     Lyndon Johnson,   while   in 
the same  building wherein  Kennedy died,   was  not  allowed   by the  Secret 
Service   to  be   in the open near  him.    For   the  results  of Nixon's   con- 
versation with the  President   see  pp.   46-51* 
18     Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   381-82. 
19  The 
full extent of 
President woul 
had it that hi 
Milton became 
Denver during 
Vice President 
the President, 
be allowed to 
See President; 
pp. 1 and 20. 
initial assumption before the doctors' report of the 
the President's injury was understandably that the 
d not run for a second term in 1956.  Persistent rumors 
s brother Milton would therefore run for the nomination, 
so sensitive to these stories that he stayed away from 
the early weeks and he did not see his brother until the 
and the Secretary of State had visited and conferred with 
and then not until he specifically asked that he should 
see Milton.  Adams, op-cit., p. 187.  See "Humphrey to 
Milton Eisenhower a Caller," NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Oct. 1955, 
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Don't   let  these  Doctors   fool   you.     They  told me   I  was   in perfect  health 
20 before   this   heart   attack came." He was  not,   however,   concerned   about 
his own health  and  had said  earlier  to   Sherman Adams,   "Funny  thing,   if 
the doctors  heredidn't  tell me  differently,   I would  think  this heart 
attack  belonged  to   some other  guy."    Dr.   White  told   the  press   that  he 
expected   the   President  back   in  the White House  by New Years'   day.21 
At   any rate   it was  apparent  that   the   crisis  had passed  and  that 
the President was out of  danger.     This  much was   indicated   by Eisenhower's 
directives,   which  came   incessantly from Room 8002,   the  temporary  capital 
of the  nation.     One  of  the  things   the   President  had   been   insistent   upon 
all along was  that   "all   regularly  scheduled meetings of  the  Cabinet  and 
National   Security Council   should  be held  under   the   chairmanship of   the 
Vice President."22 
Ill 
On  the  drizz/ly and  gusty  flight   back from  Scotland  Sherman Adams 
began  to   think of   how the President would want  the   "Team"  to   carry on. 
Although Adams had  never been given any orders   for   such  an eventuality 
by Eisenhower,   this   was  not   atypical.      Eisenhower never gave Adams orders. 
Adams   came   to  the   conclusion -   as  did   several  other members  of   the official 
family  -  that  the  President's   illness,   if   it had   to  happen,   occurred  at   a 
20 Benson,   op.   cit.,   p.   274. 
21 Adams,   op.   cit.,   p.   188  and   Russell   Baker,   "Physician Sees 
President  Back   in Capital  by Jan.   1,"   NEW YORK TIMES,   6  Oct.   1955,  p.   1 
For a  pictoral   account  see   "Flock of Visitors  as   Patient Gains,"  LIFE, 
(14  Nov.   1955),   70-4. 
22 Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   538. 
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fortunate time.     Congress was not  in session,   there was a minimum of 
problems, no  imminent  Communist   threat was poised on  the international 
front,   the Administration's  program for the coming year was   in  the early 
stages  of preparation,  there was no pending legislation and while several 
long-range programs  such   as  the State of  the Union  Message  and  the Budget 
were   in preparation,   they  did not   demand immediate  attention.     Everyone 
was  hurrying back  to Washington  anticipating the problems   that  would  arise 
and how they   could be handled  or staved off during  the  crisis. 
On his way home  the next morning Vice  President Nixon noticed  for 
the   first  time   that  an enlarged  detail of Secret  Service  agents  was 
guarding him.     This was but  a vanguard of the  increased and intensive 
public attention  that would  follow him in  the weeks  and months   ahead. 
His   every word and  action were  doggedly  given a beady-eyed  examination 
by   reporters,   politicians,   average   citizens  - and Administration  officials. 
In  addition   to  the increased  guard,   a bevy of   reporters   followed him where- 
ever he went and camped on the street in front  of his house until he had 
his  basement   fixed up  for   their  use.     Even  the  ventures  outside   the house 
of his   famous  dog "Checkers" were   faithfully   recorded. 
After  church  that   Sunday Nixon invited  about   ten of  the   reporters 
to his house.     Saturday night he had predetermined  the exact  strategy of 
1    Adams,   op.   cit.,   p.   181 and Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   141-43. 
See  also Joseph  A.   Loftus,   "Adams,   'No'  Man of  the Administration 
Returns,"    NEW YORK TIMES,  27  Sept.   1955,   p.   21. 
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such  a meeting with  the  press.     He  did not  want  to   give   the   impression 
that  he was  holding  a  news   conference or   taking advantage of his   new 
articifically bouyant  position.     The  keynote of his  meeting with  the 
reporters  was   informality.     Otherwise  the whole Washington  press   and 
television  corps  would have   been attracted  and   it would   seem as   though 
Nixon were  making  a  move  toward center stage.     On the other hand Nixon did 
not want   to   avoid   the  press   altogether,   lest  he  give   the   impression of   a 
lack of   confidence   in himself   and  the members  of  the  entire Administration. 
He was,   with the  President,   the only other man elected   by  all  the   people 
and   they had  a right   to   expect   leadership.     Yet   an  upsetting of   the delicate 
balance  would  cause   national   dissention,   a  rift   in  the Administration,   and 
perhaps   even a danger   to  the  President.     A  feeling of   drift  had   to   be 
avoided,   leadership  established  and  the  vacuum  filled without   any of  these 
2 
motions   being apparent.       It   seemed  an  impossible  dilemma.     Nixon had  to 
lead  in order  to   fulfill  his   duty,   yet  remain  static   in order to 
demonstrate  his   loyalty.     Letters   and advice  poured down  upon him.     Senator 
Styles   Bridges,     the  senior   senator  from New Hampshire,   wired  him,   "You 
are  the   constitutional   second-in-command  and  you ought   to   assume   leadership. 
Don't   let   the White House  clique take command."      There  was   no   doubt   that 
they would   try to  do   so. 
2 "Acting Captain,"  TIME,   LXVI   (10 Oct.   1955),   25;   Ferrick, 
op.   cit.,   p.   222.     See Also  Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   143-44   and   139. 
3 Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.   222   and  Nixon,  op.   cit.,   p.   149. 
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Nixon  told  the reporters  gathered In his   living room,   "The business 
of the  government will go on without delay  ... Under the President's 
Administration  a team has  been set   up  in Washington which will carry  out 
his well-defined plans."* 
After the meeting with  the  Press  Sunday afternoon,   Nixon  met   again 
that  night with Deputy Attorney General Rogers.     This  time  they were   joined 
at   Rogers'   home by  the President's   Congressional   aide,   General  "Jerry" 
Persons.     Nixon took  the   lead in urging that   the  Administration  should 
follow  "a business-as-usual" policy,  with the members  of   the Cabinet 
and  Staff  going on with   their daily  routines.     Yet   it would not  do  to 
act   as   if  it  didn't make   any difference whether  the President were  there  or 
not.^     In  order that   this   impression  be averted Nixon  suggested   that   a 
Cabinet  meeting be  called   to dramatize   the President's   absence  and also to 
demonstrate  that the  government  and  the Team could  carry  on  in  the  frame- 
work  of the  policies  already  established by  President  Eisenhower.     After 
checking with Hagerty and  other officials via   telephone,   the three  agreed 
on  this  course  of action. 
4 Quoted  in  Donovan,   op,   cit.,   p.   368. 
5 Indeed,   some years   later  a witticism was bantered about  to   the 
effect   that   FDR proved  that you could be President  as   long as you wanted 
to;   Harry Truman proved   that  anybody  could be President,   and Eisenhower 
proved we didn't   really need  one. 
6 Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.   217  and Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   368-69. 
Although  a NSC meeting had been scheduled  for the  following Thursday, 
a Cabinet  meeting was not   on the week's agenda. 
42 
But even though  the Administration might   carry  on,   it was 
confronted with a  rather obvious  problem:    who was to be boss in 
Washington?    Only two men presented the logical choice for the exercise 
of authority.    The  Constitution suggested in a round-about way  that Nixon 
was   the  man;   the set  policies  of   the Administration  called  upon Adams. 
Nixon's   dilemma has  already been  explored.     As  for Adams,   he  later wrote 
that,   "If   I knew Nixon,  he would be wary  of appearing  to  assume   pres- 
idential  prerogatives before he became  constitutionally eligible   for them." 
Adams  systematically  excluded Secretary of State Dulles  as  senior member of 
the  Cabinet,  because   "Dulles had  enough problems  in  the   foreign   field without 
taking on  domestic ones,   too."     That  left   Sherman Adams   foremost   on  the dim 
horizon. 
The Assistant   to the President  arrived  in Washington Monday morning 
as   the New York Times was  postulating that   "the  Eisenhower  Republicans will 
make every effort   to keep power  in the hands   of  Sherman Adams  and away 
from Vice President  Nixon."'     Immediately Adams ret with Nixon,   Persons 
and  Rogers  for three hours  over lunch at  the   conspicuously empty White 
House.     The subject  of  delegation   of  powers was not  approached  and Adams 
agreed   that   the  Cabinet should meet.     He was  equally  insistent,   however, 
that   if   any decisions  had to be made,   the Cabinet   as  a  group should make 
them.     Nixon's   reply  to  this is  unknown.     He was not  yet,  however,   in a 
position   to disagree very strongly.     Adams  on   the other hand had nothing 
to lose   - or everything to lose,   depending upon how one viewed   the situation. 
7     William S.   White,   "Johnson,   Rayburn  to Give  Support," NEW YORK 
TIMES,   26   Sept.   1955,   pp.   1 and   17. 
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If  Eisenhower died he  would be out of   a   job anyway,   but  while   the 
President  was  still   alive he would not   risk his own personal   unpre- 
cedented  power  being diminished   in the  slightest.     After   lunch Adams 
and Nixon  communicated with  several  Cabinet  members   and   it  was   agreed 
that  the  Cabinet  should meet on Friday,   30 September.     Not   since  the 
Administration of Woodrow Wilson had  a  President's  Cabinet  taken   it  upon 
itself   to  meet  of   its  own accord  when the  President   was   incapacitated. 
Word  from Denver the   next day that Dr.   White had  announced  that   the 
President  was  capable of making decisions   and would  be   able  to   take 
part   in  conferences   in two  weeks   effectively killed   any  concrete   plans 
for  going  ahead with   actual   delegation of  powers   to   Nixon. 
Nixon's   account of  the Monday White House   Luncheon differs  only 
slightly  from that of Adams.    He   described his   relationship with Governor 
Adams   as   "somewhat  formal   rather  than friendly."     They worked well   to- 
gether,   though,   he pointed  out,   with a  mutual   respect   for  their   authority 
and  abilities.     Of  the meeting,   Nixon stated  that   "Adams   said   little   ...   but 
for him  that  was  not   unusual or   surprising."    Nixon's main concern was  that 
the Cabinet   members   should  be  kept   in harmony   and  kept   up-to-date  on the 
President's   progress   and decisions   in the  government.     This was   an   im- 
portant   point.     Adams  was  notorious   in Washington  for  being,   as   Lincoln 
was  described,   "the  most  shut-mouthed man"  in government.     In  a   situation 
such as   this   it would not  have   been unusual  for Adams   to  have   kept  others 
deliberately  in  the  dark.     Nixon   insisted  that  the   impression should be 
avoided   "that  any one  clique of   Cabinet  officers   was   running   the   government.' 
He   said he   "wanted  to make   sure   that  no   jealousies   arose within   the 
Cabinet"  as   a  result  of his  having conferred with  some   and not   with 
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8 others.       What  he  meant was   that he did  not want Sherman Adams   to  become 
Acting  President of   the United  States. 
Yet   another meeting was   arranged   for Monday night,   again at 
Rogers'   home.     This   time the   subject  was  politics.     It must   be 
remembered   that   at   this  time   the  President was   still   in grave danger 
and   it  was   naturally  assumed  that he would  not   run   again even   if  he 
recovered   fully.     For men whose   business  was   politics   it  was   not 
improper  for them  to  meet   and  discuss   the political   implications   and 
possible  eventualities of   the   President's  heart  attack and what  would 
be  the official   reaction to   them. 
Nixon met   for  four hours   that  night with Adams,   Leonard Hall, 
the  Republican National Chairman,   and  his   press  aide,Lou Guylay,   along 
with Rogers   and  Persons.     Thus   there were   two   Eisenhower men,   two  Nixon 
men and two   representatives  of   the  Party.     While the   rest  of   them  talked 
politics  Nixon remembers   that Adams   "volunteered nothing."     Leonard Hall 
later described Adams'   attitude:     «AEvery time we  asked,   «Sherm,   what   do 
you  think?* he would   talk about  fishing   in Scotland.""    After  receiving 
such evasive and  noncommittal   piscatorial   replies  to   three or  four more 
questions,   the   Republicans   realized  that Adams was   not  going to  discuss 
any political   future   that  did  not   include his   boss.     It  thus   becomes 
apparent   that Adams'   actions  were not  based  solely on  jealous   guarding 
of  his   own  position.    As  Nixon explained,   "Adams'   sole   loyalty was  to 
8     Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   185   and   192;   Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.   217, 
and Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   147.     See  also William M.   Blair,   "Nixon Meets 
with Top Officials;   Ruling on Powers   Deferred," NEW YORK TIMES,   28 Sept. 
1955,   p.   1. 
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Eisenhower and  ... he did not want to take part in any  action before 
he knew his  chief's  inclinations."9 
One   of the most  admirable and  remarkable  facets   of the  American 
Constitutional System is that it precludes a struggle for power in 
the   case  of  a  fallen  or stricken chief of state.     But  it  cannot  provide 
for steps   to be  taken against  party jealousies,   personal   antipathies, 
individual   ambition  and blind,   intensive  loyalty.     Although Eisenhower 
was   proud  and confident   that his  "Team" could  carry on   under   the   "chair- 
manship"   (but not   "direction")   of his  Vice President,   friction in  the 
face  of this   impending crisis was   inevitable.10 
It would be unrealistic to suggest  that  neither  Adams  nor Nixon 
realized  the  potentialities   of this situation.     By Tuesday it was 
tentatively  assumed  that  Eisenhower was  out  of   iminent   danger and  so it 
was  not   a game  of  morbid politics  or ambition.     James  Reston   lost no 
time  in  concluding two days  after the  attack  that   "Vice   President  Nixon 
today   fell heir to one  of the  greatest   responsibilities   and  political 
opportunities  ever presented   to so young a man  in  the history  of  the 
Republic."     Reston   further observed  that  it would be difficult to  oppose 
Nixon  openly,  since he  might  at any  time become President.   1     It  did not   take 
an  astute  politician   like Adams  to realize  this  much.     For Adams   it was   a 
9    Nixon,  op.  cit.,  p.  147. 
10 See James   Reston,   "Problems  of the  G.O.P.     'Team',"NEW YORK 
TIMES, 27 Sept.  1955,  p. 24. 
11 James   Reston,   "Nixon Is   Considered  in  Forefront  For   '56," 
NEW YORK TIMES,   26  Sept.   1955,   p.   1. 
<46 
matter of  preserving   the  status   quo.     For Nixon,   who had  been  under 
fire  since   1952,   it  was more   than that.     First,   and  foremost   it  was 
a time of  perilous   trial.    He  could  ruin his own future or  add 
immeasurably to   his  opportunities   for  a promotion.     Second,   it  was 
a  time of   proving himself.     If  he   could handle   an   almost   impossibly 
delicate  task,   assert  himself,   provide   leadership,   allay suspicion, 
maintain harmony  and   exhibit   loyalty,   his   creditials  for  that  promotion 
would  be  established.     So   the  angling  for  authority and  power  boiled 
down to   an   invisible   contest  between  the Assistant  President   and the 
Assistant to the President. 
Soon  after Adams   left  for  Denver   the  appointments with   the 
recovering President   were  arranged  and Nixon's  was   first.     When he 
arrived he visited the President   in Adams'   presence  and  the  President 
told  him of the  decision they had  come   to  on  the  delegation of   powers. 
It did  not   surprise   Nixon. 
Before  Attorney General  Herbert  Brownell  was on  the  ground  from 
his flight   from Spain,   the decision he was   called   upon to  make  was   already 
made.     Almost  every prominent   Republican and Administration  spokesman 
had   issued a  statement   to  the  general   effect   that   the Eisenhower Team, 
now back  together,   would be  able   to   carry on almost  exactly  as   before. 
Accordingly,   on Tuesday,   27   September,   after  the White House   luncheon, 
while   Rogers ordered   a   study of   the problem of   delegating presidential 
non-constitutional   functions   by  executive order,   Brownell   announced 
that   there were   "sufficient   legal   arrangements   to   carry on   'the day-to- 
day operations  of   the   government   ...'     I don't   know that  it  will  be 
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necessary  to deliver a   legal opinion" on the subject  of  immediate 
delegation.     None was  ever rendered.12     Meanwhile  the government was 
run by  a  committee   consisting of the Vice President,   Dulles,   Brownell, 
Secretary of  the Treasury George Humphrey,   Persons   - and Sherman Adams. 
"As  I expected." Adams wrote   later,   "Nixon   leaned  over backward to avoid 
any appearance of  assuming presidential  authority."13    Nixon himself 
said that he had  "leaned with   the wind"14    but  if he were pushed  over 
backwards   it was   from  the  gusts   provoked by   the high  pressure  area, 
Sherman  Adams. 
None  of  these  actions were,   of course,   publicized.     As   far as  the 
general public knew,  Nixon might  still become  President  in  fact by 
succession  or by  temporary appointment.     The whirlwind of  attention 
therefore   continued  around him.     The  Democrats were   frantic over any 
possibility  of Nixon's   ascent   to   the highest   office   in the  land by 
any means whatever.     The Democrats  voiced  the  thoughts  of Harry  Truman. 
"No President   can  delegate his  powers   to others,"  snapped Truman.     He had 
contended  this with the   "do-nothing"Eisenhower all  along.     The only precedent 
for such   a case,  he said,  had been when President   Wilson  fired his   Secre- 
tary of   State   Robert   Lansing  (who,   incidentally,  had been John   Foster Dulles' 
12 See "U.   S.   Ruling Asked on Shifting Tasks," NEW YORK TIMES, 
26   Sept.   1955,   p.   1.     See also,  William M.   Blair,   "Cabinet Meeting Called 
by Nixon," NEW YORK TIMES,   17  Sept.   1955,  pp.   1 and  26 and  "No Pressing 
Business   Facing President;  Doubts  Need to Delegate Powers," NEW YORK 
TIMES,   27  Sept.   1955,   p.  21. 
13 Richard H.   Rovere,   THE EISENHOWER YEARS   (New York:     Farrar, 
Strau,   and  Cudhay,   1956),   p.   321;   Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.   217;   and Adams, 
op.  cit.,  pp.   155-56. 
14 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   143. 
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great-uncle)   for  calling Cabinet  meetings   during the Wilson   illness. 
15 
"President  Wilson fired Lansing  and   he   should  have," observed  Truman. 
The Russians,   lulled temporarily  into   a harmonious   attitude by  Eisen- 
hower's   efforts   at Geneva,   distrusted  everyone   in the American government 
except   the  President.     Pravda   thus  saw Nixon as  a  spokesman for   "re- 
actionary circles" which were   trying  to  replace  the   "spirit of  Geneva" 
with one of   "intolerance." The most  noticeable   effect of   the   sudden 
emphasis  upon the Vice  President was  the   tendency of   the  politicos 
in Washington   to   "play the winner."     Lobbyists   and men who had  hardly 
tried   to  conceal   their  antipathy for  him before the   President's  attack 
now paid him  courtesy calls or  sought   to   give  him  advice,   expounding 
upon his  brilliant  future.     But  as   the President's   health   improved, 
and  as   the   trial   balloon of delegation of  powers was   slowly but  de- 
liberately deflated,   the   "Nixon band  wagon"  chugged   to   a  conspicuous 
17 
halt. 
Nixon  was  still   intent on playing his   role  to  the   fullest 
extent  possible   and   in maintaining harmony   in   the Administration. 
He  called  upon Cabinet  members   in  their own offices   to  avoid   the   impression 
that he was   summoning them upon the   basis of   new found  authority.     Even 
here  the  change was  noticeable   as   the conventional   address  of   "Dick" gave 
way to   "Mr.   Vice  President."  Nixon's   initiative,   there can  be   little doubt, 
15 "President Can't Delegate  Powers,   Truman  Says," NEW YORK 
TIMES,   28  Sept.   1955,   p.   1. 
16 Quoted   in Leon Volkov,   "Men in  the  Kremlin:     Suspicious 
of Most  Except  the  President," NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (10 Oct.   1955),   55. 
17     Nixon,  op.   cit.,  p.   150. 
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made it possible for the small group of the Eisenhower Team - himself, 
Adams, Persons, Dulles and Humphrey - effectively to continue to carry 
on the Eisenhower policies, in spite of his ostensive and initial 
reaction that no group of Cabinet members should form a clique to run 
the government.  As Adams later recalled, however, this was made possible 
also because "There was never a move on the part of any of us to 'seize 
power' or to take an unwarranted action that Eisenhower would have dis- 
approved ." Also the group, of course, was never recognized as any official 
governing agency IS 
Yet Adams' reasoning here leaves part of the story unsaid.  Actually 
he did not have to move to 'seize power'; power fell into his lap.  He 
inherited it by default.  His actions were motivated by a determination 
not to let anyone else (i. e., Nixon) in on the inheritance.  It must be 
pointed out, however, that the actions of Adams and the Inner Circle 
may not necessarily have been motivated by any personal dislike or distrust 
for the Vice President.  They would have taken place in much the same 
manner no matter who was constitutionally second in command.  As had 
been noted, Governor Adams had nothing to lose by insisting that the 
status quo be rigidly maintained, a good deal to lose if it were altered 
in favor of Nixon, and everything to lose if Nixon succeeded to the 
Presidency.  In a Nixon Administration there would have been no room 
for an Assistant to the President, for General Persons, and perhaps 
several more Cabinet members.  Most obviously Brownell's days would have 
18    Feerick,  op. cit.,   p.   222   and Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   185-86 
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been numbered  by his   Deputy,   Bill   Rogers   - Nixon's   long  time  confid'mit. 
The handling of   the  situation of delegating powers was,   then,   motivated 
by a desire  to   serve  the   nation and   the Administration only   insofar  as 
those  in policy-making positions   felt  that   the  nation  and the Administra- 
tion could  best   be   served   under   the  present   circumstances   by themselves. 
But  as  Richard  Rovere pointed out on  the  matter of a delegation of   powers, 
The most  elementary kind of prudence  would appear  to  call   for 
the  establishment,   though not of  course the   immediate   applica- 
tion of   a policy,   and  the unwillingness of Mr.   Brownell   and 
his   colleagues  to   go   through with  his can only  suggest   that   all 
of   the men  around Mr.   Eisenhower  do   not  wish to   take   any step 
that   could  result   in giving Mr.   Nixon greater authority or   even 
in giving Mr.   Nixon the   impression that  greater  authority was 
soon  to   be  his. 19 
As had   been  pointed out,   however,   the target  was   not  Nixon,   per se;   the 
target  was   the   uncertain fear   that   a  reshuffling or even a  diffusion of 
power would   result   inevitably  in a  diminishing of   their own  status  on the 
part of   the men   in  question.     It  was   this   uncertainty   that   prevented   these 
men from acting   in complete  good   faith  either with the   President or  the 
Vice President.     It was   still   entirely possible  that   the  President  might 
pass   away or   suffer  a  relapse.   This   being the  case,   the situation might 
not  be  so  fortunate now   as   it  had  been earlier when  there were  no   pressing 
demands   and when   the  principles of   the Administration were   scattered   around 
the world.     There   simply was  no   active  spokesman - either for  it   or  the 
nation. 
Then,   too,   there  was   the  factor of   the political   reality of  the 
situation.     Cabinet members  and other Administration officials  were  faced 
with  a  choice  between Adams who was   in fact  the  inside  man  and Nixon who 
was   in a position of   tremendous  potential   but  questionable   authority. 
19     Rovere,   op.   cit.,   pp.   322-23. 
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If  Nixon  lost   the  contest  and  showed  up  poorly then  those who   had 
showed  an   allegiance   to   him would  be  in dire   trouble with  the   "no" 
man of  the Administration.     If on  the other hand  Nixon succeeded 
they could  not  be  blamed   for   showing  a degree of   loyalty which   a 
President  Nixon  might  quite  properly expect of his  own subordinates.    And 
if Eisenhower  survived   then  nothing would be  changed  at  all. 
The   actions of the   Inner Circle  were,   then,   based upon a  series 
of   possible hypothetical   situations,   and   the  short-sightedness  of 
Governor Adams   and his   colleagues   in this  situation   is  explained only 
by  the stark  realization  that  their jobs  were on the   line and  unless 
theyware  jealously guarded  they would  be   lost. 
Thus   when  Nixon arrived   in  Denver  for his  conference  with 
Eisea'iower   (and Adams)   it was  not news   to  him that   the President   had 
long   since   come   to   the  conclusion that   it was   "neither necessary nor 
,,20 
desirable   to   surrender  temporarily any of  the  President's  powers. 
Yet  Nixon was   to   be   "chairman",   the  ringmaster,   the   playing   captain 
(but  not   the manager)  of  the Team  in Washington. 
IV 
Those who   accused Nixon of  being overambitious  were   still 
watching  to   see   if he   would  make   any  attempt   to   climb over  Eisenhower's 
20     Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   5H1.     In all   fairness   it   should  be 
pointed out  that   arguing   in  terms of   "what might  have  been"   is  a very 
thin  basis on which   to   found   such a severe  criticism of  the  Adams  clique. 
Yet   the   very fact   that   the  President  had suffered  a   heart   attack,   the   causes 
of  which  could   not be   traced   and had  suffered   it   after  being pronounced   in 
"excellent  health"  serves   to   sustain   it.     Nixon's   conduct  was,   in  short 
impeccable,   and was  not matched  by that  of  his  colleagues  for  the  most  part. 
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stricken   body and   "move   in."     Nixon disclaimed   later that   "...   I   had  no 
desire or   intention  to   seize   an   iota of presidential  power.      I was   the 
Vice   President   and  could  be   nothing  more."       Precisely how much of   this 
attitude  was  by reason of   loyalty and how much was   by reason of   im- 
passibility cannot   be determined.     For  by now Sherman Adams   and other 
prominent Administrators  had  made   it virtually  impossible  for Nixon to 
receive   any such  power.     He  was   to   "preside"  and   "co-ordinate   "  - vaguely 
appear  to   lead  with  token authority  and  no  power. 
In guaging   the  actions  of Adams  and   the  Insiders   it  must   be noted 
that   at   this   time   (and  for many months   afterward)  Nixon was   the   heir 
apparent.     They acted out of   ignorance.    Would   Eisenhower run again?    Could 
they persuade him  to  do   so?     If  such was   their plan,   how was   the  time   to 
start   to   convince   the  President   that  he should  attempt  another  term. 
Thus   began  a   long  campaign   to make   Eisenhower  believe   that   the  country 
and   the  world  needed him -   a  campaign,   as   it   turned out,   that  was   both 
highly successful   and  equally unneccessary.     Whatever  Nixon   intended 
to do,   it   would  have   been  unlike his   Haual   political   astuteness   to   attempt 
any political   coup or   inclination  toward self-aggrandizement.     If  Eisenhower 
refused   to   run,   Nixon would   be  the man to   beat   and   the Vice   President 
knew   it.     If  the   President   eventually determined  to   seek another   term, 
it would  be  foolish  to  duel   with Sherman Adams  or to   give  any reason for 
1     Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   143-44. 
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Che President   to ask Nixon to step  down.     Accordingly Nixon sat 
tight   and  flatly refused to do anything "that   could possibly be 
construed  as  political so long as we  had a President who conceivably could 
run  for a second term"2    It  is entirely possible  that even at this early 
date Nixon - who had just witnessed  firsthand  the high-pressure  tactics 
of the President's  official advisors   - had already  guessed that   Eisenhower 
would be  persuaded  to   run again,   if   for no other  reason than  to  defend 
his   record  against  defeat with  another Republican  candidate who  ostensibly 
wore  the  "can't win"  label. 
It would be  inagurate  to  leave   the impression that Nixon 
was   preempted  from the  picture by   the  awesome power of  the Adams   Clique. 
That   Nixon was  pushed  aside by Adams   is  true enough,  but  it  is   also 
true  that  the Vice President offered  little personal resistance.     As 
has been seen,   there was   little  to gain by a duel with Adams.     His  efforts 
were   concentrated not   on  gaining power  for himself  - that would  come any- 
way   if worse  came to worst  - but   rather in keeping Sherman Adams   from 
becoming Acting President.     This was   the  intent  Behind Nixon's   insistence 
that  the  Cabinet   (including him)   should be kept   fully   informed  of 
the  President's  progress  and his   decisions.     Adams'   actions,   on  the 
other hand,   reflected  less  upon the  Governor's  confidence in Nixon and 
more   upon his   confidence in himself.     It was not  Adams*   immediate   or 
intended  goal to keep Nixon  from becoming President   - he simply   did not 
want  anyone but Eisenhower to be in the White House prior to 21 January  1961. 
2     Id.,   p.   147. 
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Thus,   as has  been ascertained,   his  actions wDuld have  been  the  same 
toward   anyone who  might  have   been the  Vice  President.    His   immediate 
concern was   Eisenhower's  running for  a  second  term   in 1956.      If  the   President 
ran,   Adams  would   remain;   if   Eisenhower   retired,   Nixon would  be  the 
probable  candidate  anyway.     So  Adams'   goal  was  not   to  stop  Nixon  but 
to  boost   Eisenhower  thereby assuring   in the meantime   (and  for   the  next 
four years)   his   own place of preeminent   power   in the government.     Hixon 
fought   the  tendency of Adams'   power  to   fill   the vacuum while  Adams   fought 
the   tendency of   his  power  to drain away  and become   a vacuum.     It  must 
be  remembered,   however,   that  all of Nixon's  subsequent actions were 
made with the   nearby universal   premise   in mind  that   Eisenhower  could 
not   under any circumstances   be  persuaded   to  run again,   yet   balanced  by 
his   personal  experience with Adams  and   his  comprehension of   the Governor's 
influence  with  the  President.     At any rate,   he  could put  up  with Adams 
until   after  the   National  Convention. 
With   the  Nixon policy of   "normalcy"   instituted,   some of  the 
Cabinet   expressed  reservations   about   carrying on the business  of   the 
government   at   too   usual   a   fashion.     Treasury Secretary Humphry was 
concerned  about   his   leaving  the   country  for economic  talks   in Ottawa, 
and  Dulles  and   Benson,   along with Commerce  Secretary Sinclair Weeks were 
scheduled  to discuss   trade   and  economic   problems  with their  Canadian 
counterparts.     Nixon urged  Humphrey that   they should all  go   to  Canada 
as  scheduled  to   "avoid   any   impression  that  the business of   the government 
was   grinding  to   a  standstill  while  the   President  was   ill" or   that   the 
government  was   withdrawing   into  a shell   of timidity. 
3     Id.,   p.   141. 
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Once   again Nixon had exhibited profound political sagacity 
for a man  of   forty-two years.    This   time he served  a  twofold purpose. 
It was extremely fortunate  for the Administration that any impression 
such  as Nixon  described was  avoided.     Much  political hay was  later made 
of Eisenhower's  disability   (and Nixon's   "running"  of   the  government)   anyway. 
Second,   Nixon  at least   got  most  of  the  inner circle  away  from Washington, 
as   it  had been  in  the beginning.     Again,  whether this was  so that he 
could  occupy   the limelight  or whether he was actually   concerned with   the 
public's   opinion of the  Administration  is  hazy.     A good guess would be   that 
the  Vice  President was   concerned with both.     If the  Administration  looked 
bad, he   looked bad.     And if he were  to  run  for President when  and if 
Eisenhower bowed  out, his  record would have  to sparkle during this 
period of  crisis.     And the best  setting  for that  performance was   in 
Washington.     He cancelled his proposed  goodwill tour  of the Near East. 
It was   a  logical move. 
Presiding over the Cabinet   and the National  Security   Council 
was not new to Nixon.    He had done it several times  previously when 
Eisenhower had been away  from Washington.     In fact he was the first Vice 
President in history to have done so.    As  the special meeting of  30 
September  1955  approached, however,   the situation was electric with 
tension.     The  Cabinet was  meeting on  its   own.     Its   chief lay  in a hospital 
1,150  miles  away,   still in  danger  from a heart   attack not yet  a week old. 
The White House was bustling with official activity  for the  first time 
since   the President had   left  in August.     The Cabinet   room was  crowded 
56 
with thirty-four officials in addition to the Cabinet members. All were 
in a serious mood. The Vice President made no attempt at an "entrance," 
sat in his own chair, leaving the President's, directly across from his, 
empty. There was no agenda and the large mahogony table was uncluttered 
with  papers . 
The Vice   President  called   the meeting   to order  at   9:30  a.m.   and 
asked  for  silent prayer.     After  a minute he   read  the morning medical 
bulletin  from Denver.     The  President was   improving  and had  spent   an 
"excellent" night.     It  was   his   first night  out of  the oxygen  tent. 
Nixon  followed  the   usual  procedure and   turned  to  the   Secretary 
of  State  for   a  report on  the   foreign problems  which   faced  the Administration 
while   the  President was   ill.     The  most  critical   situation was   in  the 
Middle   East  and  Dulles   explained   in his   accustomed  manner   (though 
probably holding  back since  Eisenhower,was  not   there   to   hear)   about   the 
difficulties  with  the Arabs. 
Immediately thereafter the   Cabinet moved   into   a discussion of 
what  Adminstration policy should   be  during  the  President's   illness. 
Although Nixon had  been   in  communication with  each Cabinet member 
individually during  the   week,   this   was   the first   time   that  they 
had had  an  opportunity  bo  exchange  views  as   a  policy-making  body.     The 
situation was   largely resolved  in  advance. 
The   gathering now turned from a Oabinet meeting   into   a  Republican 
Caucus.     First,   Nixon  reminded them that  questions  about   the outlook 
4     Id.,   p.   148;   Adams,  op.   cit.,   p.   222;   "Acting Captain," op.   cit., 
p.   25;   Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   370-71. 
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for the  partywould   be  inevitable.     He suggested   that   they should 
be fended off  with as   little  comment  as  possible  and with expressions 
of concern for  the  President's  recovery.     He   also  suggested   that   they 
might  make  comments   about  Eisenhower's  skill   and   wisdom on  selecting 
such an effective   administrative organization. 
At  this  point  Dulles   volunteered,   without  mentioning   any names, 
that while   the  President  was   absent from Washington  "there  might   be 
certain  people outside  the  government who  would  try to   set   themselves 
up as   authoritative   spokesmen for  the   President on various   public   issues." 
He suggested   that  the best  way to   avoid  this   situation was   to   set   up 
only one official   channel   from Denver.     That  channel:     Sherman Adams. 
His  reasoning,   as Adams himself  reports,   was   that   the Assistant   to   the 
President   "had  become  recognized nationally as   a public figure  closely 
identified with the   President."     Nixon hesitantly seconded   this   idea  - 
there   being   little   else   under   the  circumstances  he  could do.       With  Adams 
in Denver  the  senior member of  the White House  Staff   in Washington would 
be Jerry Persons   and  it  was   resolved  that dl   communications   should  be 
handled   through him. 
If  politics   were on Governor Adams'   side   in this   case so  was   logic. 
Any communication of  the Adams-Eisenhower  type  handled   through   the 
Vice President would   immediately have   upset   the power  structure   in  the 
5 Donovan.,   op.   cit.,   p.   374. 
6 Adams   reports   tp.   186)   that Nixon questioned   this   arrangement 
and wanted Adams   to   stay   in Washington as  head  of the White House  Staff. 
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capital   causing more  difficulty than benefit.     It   is   to  be  pointed out, 
however,   as Adams   does  point out,   that  Dulles had  ulterior  motives.     There 
was  no one   in the   Cabinet  who   had a higher opinion of Nixon  than did 
Dulles.     It was   almost   a  father-son  relatdonship     and  the   respect was 
mutual.     Yet   Dulles  suggested  a  communications   system that  completely 
by-paased   "his   boy."    This  was   simply a matter of  self-preservation on 
Dulles'   part  -   as   was   the  quick vote of  confidence on the  part of  the 
entire  Cabinet.Dulles  wanted his own position as  the  maker of foreign 
policy completely  insulated  from any outside   interference.     As Adams 
pointed out,   "He  wanted   to  make  sure   that  nobody would get   between 
the   President  and  himself  with  suggestions   for changing the   foreign 
program or with  some  troublesome public  statement   that the  President 
woijld   be   unable   to  disavow."' 
The  Cabinet   subsequently   agreed  upon  a statement  to   be   issued 
after  the meeting  to   the   eifect  that   "there  are  no   obstacles   to   the 
orderly and   uninterrupted  conduct of   foreign  and domestic   affairs 
of the  nation during the  period of  test ordered  by   the President's 
physicians."    The  statement went on to  say that   the   President's  policies 
were   "well  established   along definite   lines  and are well   known."     Actions 
taken during   the  President's   absence  would  be  within  the   framework  set 
up  by the President himself  and  new policies would  be postponed  until   his 
return. 8 
lat 
7 Id.,   pp.   186-87.     When Adams was   in Denver he   implemented  his   policies 
by exercising his   unique   peerogative   as   the sole   spokesman  for   the  Pres- 
ident,   buttonholing officials   and saying,   "It   is   the President's wish  thl 
you do   this," or   "The  President hopes  you  will   do   thus  and  so."    Donovan, 
op.   cit. ,   p.   378. 
8 Benson,   op.   cit.,   pp.   271-72  and Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   373. 
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After the discussion of several other minor matters   the  following 
procedure was   agreed  upon: 
1) Actions  that were usually decided upon by members 
of the Cabinet   themselves, without   consultation of 
the President   or their colleagues,  would be   carried 
out  as usual. 
2) Questions  normally brought before  the  Cabinet   for 
consideration would  continue  to be discussed  there. 
3) Questions   on which the President usually had  the 
ultimate decision would   first   go to the  Cabinet 
or the NSC  for  thorough  discussion  and  then   to 
Denver via Governor Adams  for the  President's 
consideration. 
4) The  proper  channel  to the President would  always 
be  first   through General  Persons  at  the White House 
and  then  through Governor Adams  in  Denver.9 
It  is  conspicuous  - albeit logical  and politically  apropos -  that 
the Vice President was bypassed  altogether. 
With   the  usual incidentals,   the meeting ended at noon.     In 
closing however,   Dulles,   noting the  intense  strain under which  the 
Vice President had so admirably  operated  during the week,  said  as 
the  Senior Member on  behalf of  the   Cabinet, 
Mr.   Vice  President,   I  realize  that  you have been under 
a heavy burden during these   past   few days  and  I   know  I 
express  the  opinion of everybody here   that you have  conducted 
yourself superbly.     We want   to express   our appreciation 
for   the way you have carried  out  your  responsibilities   during 
the  past week.     You have   ...   given  the   country   the  assurance 
it  needed.     And  I  want you  to know we   are  proud   to be  on  this 
team and proud  to be serving  this   Cabinet under your  leader- 
ship.10 
9    Feerick, op.  cit., pp.  218-19. 
10    Donovan,   op.   cit.,  p.   376;   Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   149;   and 
Benson,   op.   cit.,   p.   272. 
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Nixon   thanked  him and   adjourned  the  meeting with  the  first   kind 
word  he  had  received  sinde   the   attack. 
By way of  summary,   the official   press  statement  released 
after   the  Cabinet  meeting  is   worth reproduction here: 
After  full   discussion of   pending matters,   it  was 
concluded  that   there   are  no  obstacles   to  the orderly 
and   uninterrupted  conduct of  the   foreign and  domestic 
affairs  of   the nation during the   period of   rest ordered 
by the  President's  physician. 
Governor  Sherman Adams,   the Assistant to   the   President, 
will   leave  for  Denver  today and will   be available  there, 
in consultation with   the  President's   physicians,   when- 
ever   it  may   later become   appropriate  to predent  any 
matters   to   the  President. 
The  pdlicies   and programs  of   the  administration as  determined 
and   approved  by  the   President  are  will  established  along 
definite   lines   and are   well   known.     Coordination of   the 
activities  of  the  several  departments of the   government 
within  the  framework of   these  policies will   be   continued 
by the   full   co-operation  among the   responsible officers 
of  these  departments   so   that   the  functions of  the 
government will   be   carried  forward   in  an effective manner 
during  the  absence of   the  President.11 
The  release was   made not  by  the   "Acting Captain"  but  by the Attorney 
General   and no   references   at   all  was  made   to the Vice  President of 
the  United States.12 
Nixon  presided over   subsequent  Cabinet meetings with much   the 
same   results.     Emmet John Hughes,   an occasional   speechwriter  for 
Eisenhower,   noted   that  Nixon was   "articulate  and  forceful"  at   the 
11 Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.   219;   Adams,  op.   cit.,   p.   186;   and 
Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   373. 
12 The statement had been drawn up by Rogers at the request 
of the NSC for its meeting the day before and was to be approved by 
the   Cabinet. 
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meetings   "as he   almost  always  appeared at Cabinet" and did not play 
the   role  of a meek moderator.13    In  a subsequent  Cabinet meeting,   however, 
when  a heated discussion arose  over the budget,  Arthur Flemming,   then 
the Defense Mobilizer,  recalls that Nixon made no effort  to quell the 
participants.     When some  Cabinet  members  spoke   longer than  they would 
have  if Eisenhower  (who disliked wordiness)  had been  there,  Nixon  told 
him that   "it  isn't my Cabinet;   it   is  the President's   Cabinet.     I  am 
just   the presiding officer."1* 
Despite  all of Nixon's efforts, however,  it was impossible to 
maintain complete harmony within  such a situation when men were motivated, 
almost   obsessively,   to maintaining the status  quo.     For instance it  was 
virtually  impossible  for Nixon to venture   outside his house  or office 
without   running  into reporters.     They had  the   responsibility   to  cover 
him and he had  a responsibility  to be as noncommittal  as  possible.     Still, 
after  the NSC meeting the   day before  the  Cabinet  meeting   (Thursday)   two 
Cabinet  officials  called Nixon,   very upset,   because   they   thought  he had 
sought   out  the  press  in violation of an agreement  at the meeting not 
to have  press   conferences   during this period. 
All in  all, however,   most  of  the  "Palace  Guard" were  completely 
satisfied with  Nixon's  conduct.     This was  probably  motivated by the  fact 
that he did not   attempt   to change   the status  quo in  any direct way.     One 
of   the  most  ironic notes,   it  turned  out  later,   came   from Nelson Rockefeller, 
13 Emmet John Hughes,   THE ORDEAL OF POWER:     A POLITICAL MEMOIR 
OF THE EISENHOWER YEARS   (New York)   Atheneum,   1963),   p.   117. 
14 Mazo,  op.  cit.,  p.  193. 
15 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   pp.   1A8-49. 
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then  a   special   assistant   to  the  President.     "All of  as   in the   administration,' 
he wrote Nixon,   "are  proud  indeed to  be  associated with you  as   the   leader 
who   is   carrying an   in  the  President's  absence."16     The extent  of 
Nixon's   static   success  was  noted   later by Emmet John Hughes: 
At   his   intellectual  best   in offering tactical   counsel, 
he  came  to   appear more and more  the  kind of  politician 
who,   but  for  some   accident of  partisan affiliation, 
could  have   rendered  such   service  just  as healthily  to 
the  Democratic   party.     Significantly and   logically,   then, 
the  most  effective   period of his  vice presidency had  come 
with   the  awkward   political   suspense following  Eisenhower's 
heart   attack   ...   Then,   poised  and   restrained,   he had 
given  an exemplary  performance  as   a man  close  to   great 
power   got  being  presurjfcuously or prematurely  asserive.     This 
descreetly empty  time was   surely his finest   political   hour. 
Nixon   spent   the   rest of   the   intensive week following  a  schedule 
that   stretched   from twelve  to   sixteen hours a day.     It  entailed 
several  hours   with  the White House Staff.       While  in the White House, 
Nixon   used   a   conference  room and  steered  clear  entirely of  the   President's 
empty office.     For  the  first time  since   the President  was stricken, 
he  signed  some  non-legal,   ceremonial   papers with his own name   but  always 
"in behalf  of   the President."18    Having at  least  displayed his   competency 
to  be   Chief  of   State,   it  was  the  closest   Richard M.   Nixon would  come  to   the 
Presidency of   the United  States. 
16 Quoted  in Mazo,  op.   cit.,   p.   188. 
17 Hughes,   op.   cit.,   p.   317. 
18 Feerick,   op.   cit.,   p.222   and  Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   148.     In 
addition to   advice  such  as   the   telegram from Senator  Bridges,   Nixon was   urged 
to  demonstrate   token  assertion of   authority by moving   in and  working  in  the 
BlairrHouse,   Washington's official  guest   house,   across   the  street  from  the 
Executive Mansion.     Nixon did  not  even consider making  such  a  move.     See 
Blair,   "Cabinet Meeting Called  By Nixon," op.   cit.,   p.   26. 
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A month   and  a  day after he  had  entered  the hospital,   President 
Eisenhower  made his   first  appearance   to   reporters.    Wearing   loud 
maroon pajamas   with  the   response  "Much  Better Thanks" embroidered 
on the  shirt  pocket,   sent  to  him by the White House press   corps,   and 
a wild western tie   bearing  the five   stars of his   rank   (plus  one the 
doctors  had  given him for  "good behavior"),  he   was wheeled out on  the 
sundeck of  Fitzsimmons Hospital.     This  meeting with  the press was 
carefully planned  by Jim Hagerty - probably the   coolest head  during 
the  entire   crisis.     Only ten photographers  were   admitted.     They were 
instructed   to  work  quickly,   to  give  no   "shouted orders,"  and to   come 
no  closer  than  twelve   feet   to  the  President.    Only one   correspondent 
was   allowed   to  view the occasion.1     The   President was  very  genial   but 
made  no conversation of  any   importance during the brief meeting  with the 
press. 
Eisenhower could have  left  the   hospital   in October  but  decided 
to wait   until   he  could  walk  out  rather  than being carried out  a month  sooner. 
He   began to   make plans   to  depart  in  early November and was   assured   by his 
1     James  E.   Pollard,   THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS,   TRUMAN TO 
JOHNSON  (Washington,   D.   0.:   Public Affairs   Press,   1964),   p.   82.     When  the 
President  went outside on the sundeck  the   security was   tightened   and  the 
entire  grounds  were   closed.     Security officials   and Jim Hagerty were   in- 
censed when  in early October CBS photographers   in a helicppter  and  an 
unidentified  plane   flew over  the  sundeck when the  President  made  his   in- 
augural  visit   there.     Hagerty was  described as   "livid"  at   this   distnnbance 
to  the  President  and  to   the  other patients   in the hospital.     The   Secret 
Service  confiscated   the   film and CBS   apologized.     Hence  the measures 
described   above  for  photographing the  President.     See Russell   Baker, 
"President   Spends   30 Minutes   in Sun on Hospital   Deck," NEW YORK TIMES, 
11  Oct.   1955,   pp.   1   and  29. 
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doctors   that   after  a period of  recuperation he  would  be   ready to 
attend   regular meetings of   the  Cabinet and  the NSC by January. 
His  plans  were   to   go  from Denver  to Washington,   where  he  would 
make  a  brief   stop   at the White House,   and   then to his   farm in Gettys- 
burg,  where  he would remain   until  he was  strong enough  to  resume 
his duties.     His   doctors would have  preferred  a warmer  climate   - 
winter  was   coming   to   Pennsylvania  - such as  Florida or Arizona, 
but   Eisenhower  was   becoming   impatient.     He  was   ready to   get  back 
into   the  harness   and those   locales wore   too   far  removed   from 
Washington.     He would  establish a  temporary office   in Gettysburg 
so   that his  staff   and  Cabinet  members  and other officials  could 
consult  with  him. 
Significantly enough,   General   Eisenhower walked out of 
Fitzsimmons Army  Hospital  on Veterans  Day,   11   November   1955, 
nearly two  months   in advance of  the  time  Dr.  White had predicted 
he  would  be  ready  to   leave.     He made  a  few  remarks,   saying that 
the hospital   staff had earned his   "eternal   gratitude",   thanking 
the  people of   the  nation for  their  "prayers   for  a sick person"  and 
said   thank you  and  goodbye   to   the people of Denver.     He   flew to Washington 
where  he  was   greeted  at  the   airport   by Vice  President  Nixon,   former 
President Hoover   and Major   and Mrs.  John  Eisenhower  with their  children. 
The  President   remarked  to   the   airport  crowd  that  hedhad   taken   "a   little 
longer  than we had planned"   to   return  and  that he was happy that   the 
doctors   had  given  him "a parole   if  not   a  pardon."    He was  dandid 
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about   his   condition.     "I expect   to   be  back at  my accustomed duties," 
he  informed   them,   but  the doctors  said,   "I must   ease my way   into 
•em and not  bulldoze my way  into   them."    He was   under   intense 
scrutinization  the   entire   time,   as   the  nation watched  on  television. 
Every word,   every movement  was   closely examined.     His   loss  of  weight 
was  readily observable  and   the New York Times   even observed   that   his 
wave   to   the  crowd was   "not   a   typical   Eisenhower wave"   since  he  did 
not  raise   his  hands  over his  head.     After  the   speech at  the  airport 
the President   and Mrs.   Eisenhower were   spontaneously received  by 
crowds   all   along  Pennsylvania Avenue on  the ride   back   to   the White 
House.     All   governmental  employees were off for Armistice Day and 
200,000  people   lined   the  streets with placards   proclaiming  "Welcome 
Home   Ike,"  "Glad You're Back,"  "I Like   Ike -  Back Home."2     Now 
ended   the  partial   moratorium on his   health;   now  began   in earnest 
the political   speculation;   now the Lame Duck was   recuperated  and 
fair  game. 
2     Russell   Baker,   'Vaves  and  Says,   'Good-By Folks',"  NEW YORK 
TIMES,   12 Nov.   1955,   pp.   1   and  8.     In the  same  edition   see Joseph A. 
Loftus,   "President  Flies  Back  to  Capital;   Shows   No Fatigue,"  and Alvin 
Shuster,   "Happy Crowd Greets  President On Flag-Draped Capital   Route," 
on pages   1   and   9.     See also Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   189-90  and  Nixon, 
op cit.,   p.   151. 
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The Monday   after his  return to   the White House   the  President 
left Washington for Gettysburg and his   farm  for convalescence  from 
what   back   in August had  started out   to   be   a  summer  vacation.     Contrary 
to  many reports  the  farm  at Gettysburg was  not  given  to   Eisenhower  by 
businessmen or  governmental   associate  after he  became  President.      It 
was   bought   in sections  during  the  time   span from December   1950  (189 
acres   at  $24,000)   to July  1955   (one   acre  at $4,200)   and   its   present 
496   acres   represented  a  total   investment   in  excess  of  $267,500  (which 
included  the   complete  renovation of   the old  farmhouse).     It   was  paid 
for mostly from  the proceeds   from his   best-selling  account of  his World 
War   II   years,   Crusade   in  Europe. 
The   brook   that meandered   through  the President's   farm was 
almost   frozen over   upon his  arrival   in Gettysburg.     The   big  rebuilt 
rambling old  brick,   wood  and  stone  farmhouse   stood  amidst   craggy  trees 
that  had   long since dropped  their   last   auburn   leaves.     On   14 October 
3     "When Washington Moves   to  Gettysburg," U.S.   NEWS,XXXIX 
(14  Oct.   1955),   22-3  and  "When  the White House Moves   to  Gettysburg," 
U.S.   NEWS,   XXXIX   (25 Nov.   1955),   58-61. 
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in Lincoln Square   in  Gettysburg the  local populace of   7200  welcomed 
the Eisenhowers  from their eighty-eight  mile motor trip  from 
Washington with  a  tremendous   reception.     It was not  only   the 
President's homecoming but  it was  also the  First  Lady's   fifty- 
ninth birthday.     President  and Mrs.   Eisenhower  thanked  them, 
said it was   good to be back,   and went   immediately to their  farm 
on Emmitsburg  Road. 
The  President was not  at home   for more   than two weeks before 
Dr.   Snyder,  who moved in with   the Eisenhowers,   remarked  that   "he's 
beginning to  fret   a  little  at not having enough   to do."     Eisenhower 
would walk  around   the house using a putter as   a walking stick and 
worry  about   the  government.     The doctors would not   let   him wander 
around  the   farm too much and his  putting green  in back was not 
only  incomplete but was  also likely  to be   frozen over. 
By  prearrangement,   in Gettysburg the  local postmaster, 
Lawrence Oyler, was  voluntarily moved out of his office  and the 
General Services Administration went   to work  on  a temporary office 
for the President.     The small room (11 x 18 feet) was  completely 
renovated.     The  glass  door was  replaced by a solid one made of 
wood bearing  the  initials   "D.   D.   E."   in small   letters.     Inside, 
the walls were repainted a "federal light green," and the  floor 
covered by a wall-to-wall  gray carpeting.    New Venetian blinds 
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shaded  windows   in which the  panes  had been replaced with two-inch 
thick bullet-proof   glass  that   looked  directly onto   the   street 
eight   steps   away.     Two  phones  were   installed:     one  for   local 
calls   (Gettysburg,   1505,   Ext.   35)  and  the other marked  with  a 
bright   red  tape,   was   a direct   line   to   the White House.     The 
President's   chair was   flanked   by the  American  and Presidential 
flags   and  between  them on the  wall  hung the   Presidential   seal. 
The  President  said  he   thought   it was   "nearly as nice  as   the one 
in Washington."     A  guard  stood  at  the  door at   all   times  while 
the  President  was   in  the office.     In the  rear of   the  huge  con- 
crete   Post Office   Building  a   "White House Communications  Room" 
was  set   up  by the   Signal  Corps.     Pilots  were   instructed not   to 
fly within a   two-mile  radius,   photographers were   asked   to  pack 
away their   long-range   lenses   and at   the  farm nearby sightseeing 
tours   through  the   adjoining Gettysburg Park Battlefield  were 
closed   as was   a   park observation tower which  afforded   a  view of 
the Eisenhower  home.     At  night  floodlights   bathed   the   acres   in 
light   and  the Secret  Service   constantly patrolled  the   area.     An 
electric-eye  circuit  had  been   linked  up  around  the  perimeter of 
the  farm so   that   any  intruders   could  be detected   immediately. 
When  the hunting   season opened  the Gettysburg Times,   as   usual, 
carried  a   legal   notice:     "All   persons   are warned  not  to   trespass 
on the  premises  of   the undersigned with dog,   gun or trap..." 
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Among the 126 signatories:  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Route 2. 
Although the restless President had been told that he could take 
part in regular Cabinet meetings by January, he was anxious to see his 
official family again and to give the impression that he was officially 
taking back the reigns of government. Accordingly a Cabinet meeting was 
called for 21 November to be held at Camp David, the official Presidential 
retreat in the Maryland Mountains.  There was no official business but the 
doctors allowed it because the President would improve his psychological 
disposition and get some rest at the camp retreat. 
The meeting at Laurel Lodge at Camp David was a moving scene for 
all concerned.  As the Cabinet officials arrived by plane, car and heli- 
copter and went into the lodge, each studied the President carefully, 
looking for a change in his attitude or appearance.  Although he was 
somewhat thinner, and not as glowing as usual, he was sharp and energetic 
in his comments and opinions.  Many were astonished by his fast recovery 
and his quick, decisive and keen manner.  The President thanked the 
Cabinet for their "perfect" performance of their extraordinary responsi- 
bilities during his absence, but as far as anyone has reported he made 
4  "At Gettysburg ... the President 'Frets a Little,' Wants to 
Do More," NEWSWEEK, XLVI (28 Nov. 1955), 32-3; "Quickening Pace," 
NEWSWEEK, XLVI (12 Dec. 1955), 34 and "Big Day at Gettysburg," NEWSWEEK, 
XLVII (13 Feb. 1956), 27.  See also Charles E. Eagan, "President Picks 
Gettysburg Site for Office Work, "NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 
70; Alan Drury, "Gettysburg: "Temporary Capitol' of the U.S.," NEW YORK 
TIMES, 14 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 8 and his "Gettysburg Gives Eisenhowers 
Joyous Welcome, NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Nov. 1955, pp. 1 and 18. A pictoral 
account is "Eyes on Gettysburg," NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (20 Nov. 1955), 
10-11. 
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no   individual   thank-you's.     He   felt  that  they  all  had done what 
was expected  of them.     Vice  President   Nixon had flown back from 
a vacation  from the  strain of   the previous  weeks.     It was  his 
first visit   to   the Presidential   retreat.     For him,   though he had 
walked  the   delicate   line of tension during  this   entire   crisis,   there 
was no  acknowledgment.     He  had,   after  all,   done only what   a Vice 
President was  supposed  to do.     The President   suggested  with a smile 
that  the  Cabinet   actually had worked  better without  him.     "The 
only thing  that  surprised me," he  said,   "was   that | some  commentators 
should have   been  surprised  that   this   Cabinet   could continue   to work 
harmoniously and   successfully  in pursuing  a practical  middle course 
between too   little  and  too  much  government.     I knew you   could do   it 
5 
because   all   of you  are  dedicated  to   this  policy at home   and  abroad. 
Richard  Nixon sat  silent  -  and  so  did  the  others. 
5     Indeed,   on Nixon's  visit   to   Denver,   the President   expressed 
his pride  and satisfaction with the Cabinet's  performance  saying that 
"he was  sure   that   in the whole of American history there had never   been 
another Cabinet   like this one."    Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   382.     A compre- 
hensive  picture of  the  Camp  David Cabinet  meeting   is   "At   Ike's Cabinet 
Meeting:     Camp David,"  U.S.   NEWS,   XXXIX (2   Dec.   1956),   42-3.    An NSC 
meeting had   been held   the  previous  day,   Eisenhower drove  the  twenty-five 
miles  from Gettysburg   to  Thurmond,  Maryland,   near the   camp,   renamed 
after his  grandson.     Four helicopters  and  two   small   aircraft  flew   in the 
dignitaries,   many of  whom grumbled  about   the  trip over   the mountains. 
The President spent  the two   nights  at  the  Presidential   Lodge at   the   camp. 
See Alan Drury's   articles   in  the  NEW YORK TIMES,   "Eisenhower Maps  Talks 
This Week With Top Leaders,"   16  Nov.   1955,   pp.   1   and   16;     Top Aides 
Brief  President;    'Copters  Fly Some  to  Camp,"  22 Nov.   1955     pp and  18, 
and "President Meets   Cabinet   at Camp," 23  Nov.   1955,   pp.   1  and   13. 
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Back   in Gettysburg   after  the  Camp  David Meeting,   the President 
began   to   receive   visitors   in his   temporary office   in  the Post  Office 
Building.     His   attitude was changed  somewhat  but his   spirits   rose 
only slightly.     The   visitors only provided momentary relief  from the 
depression of   the   post-attack period  that was   beginning  to   set   in by 
early December.     As  Christmas   approached he was  cheered by  the   gift 
of  a  tractor-cultivator   ("Gee,   that's  nice.")  from  the townspeople of 
Gettysburg.     The   year  1955 was  ending.     Next year was  an election year 
and   it would   be   the   most   tumultous  of  Eisenhower's  presidential   career 
..Far-reaching decisions   -  political   decisions,   the   kind  Eisenhower  up 
to this   point  did not  relish  -   lay ahead  and the   President   became  even 
more despondent.     Although  no one,   including  Eisenhower himself,   yet 
knew  it,   a  tremendous  and   profound  change was   coming over Eisenhower 
the President that  would  be evidenced only in degrees during   the coming 
months. 
On the   17th of December  Dr. White came   to  give the  President his 
Christmas  present   early.      It was one  he  appreciated most of   all   and 
6 
reflected  a doctor's  wisdom.     The present:     a  golf  ball. 
6     "The   President:     A Gift,"    NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (26 Dec.   1955), 
13-14. 
CHAPTER 3:     THE HAUNTED HOUSE  OF 
DWIGHT D.   EISENHOWER 
After  it was  all over and the  President was safely  out 
of  danger,   there were  two kinds  of uneasiness   about  the uncomfortable 
ramifications   of his   illness.     One was medical,  the other  political. 
Other illnesses were  traceable.     This  one was  not.     Just before   the 
attack,   Eisenhower's heart had been  pronounced   "sound."    He had  looked 
and  acted   the  picture   of health  and  then suddenly he was   courting death. 
The underlying question was   "What  caused  it?"     He had not  been overactive 
and did not have   a high   ch{16testerol  count.    The mystery  of  the  origins 
of  the thrombosis   led  to a bigger question:     "Could  it happen again?" 
Not  even  the   doctors  knew.     When asked whether  the Presidency would 
have  a negative  effect   on Eisenhower's   recovery,  Dr.   White  pointedly 
replied,   "I haven't  seen  any Presidents with  coronary thrombosis. „1 
The   primary concern,   of course,  was whether the President 
would be  able   to  run again.     It could be subsequently debated  and 
decided whether he would run again.     The doctors could answer only 
the  first  question.     Dwight D.   Eisenhower could answer only the second. 
1    "Ike's  Convalescence,"    TIME,  LXVI  (10 Oct.  1955), 90. 
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"Many things   are  possible   that may not  be   advisable," said Dr.   White only 
a week  after   the  attack.     "He may or  may not have complete recovery   ... 
If I were   in his  shoes   I  wouldn't  want  to   run again having seen the 
strain."    The   Doctor's  statements  threw a  damper on  the  hopes of   those 
who were  envisioning that  Eisenhower might   be well  enoqgh to   be  persuaded 
to  run again   in  1956,   and reinforced   the opinions of   those who  assumed 
9 
that he would  not  run  in  any case.        In  addition  it  was   learned  that 
Dr.   Snyder didn't   think the  President  should deliver  his  State of   the 
Union Message   in person after Congress  convened on  3  January.     Snyder 
was  in  favor of  the  President's waiting  until   at  least  the middle of 
February  before making  a  decision  as   to  whether his   recovery was   com- 
plete  enough  to  warrant   a  campaign for re-election.-5 
2 "The  Doctors   and Mr.   Eisenhower's  Decision,"    NEW REPUBLIC, 
CXXXIV  (2  Jan.   1956),   3.     This   in  spite of   Dr.  White's   subsequent   comment 
at  the  press  conference  that  "such questions  are   inanswerable"  and   that   "If 
the President   has  a  good   recovery as he  seems  to   be   establishing,   and   if 
he desires   to   continue  his   career,   which would of course be  to   the  benefit 
of this   country and  the  world at  large,   I  would have  no  objections  whatever 
to  his   running  again.     But   that  remains  for   the future   to  decide," he 
added.     Id. 
3 "Ike:     Precautions  Only,"    NEWSWEEK,   XLtfl   (19  Dec.   1955),   19. 
As   it   turned  out,   Eisenhower was  convalescing in Key West,  Florida, 
when Congress   convened and did not   deliver his  State of   the Union 
Message   to  Congress   in person.     The  clerk of   each  house  routinely 
read  the message   to  his   respective  chamber.     By not  delivering   the  message 
in person,   Eisenhower had  gone  back  to  the  precedent   broken by Woodrow 
Wilson who  was   the  first   President  to  appear  before   Congress   regularly 
to   deliver   special  messages  to   that   body.     The  President did make   a 
short   (7|  minutes)   address   to  the  nation on   television  about   the message, 
however,     See   below,   pp.81-4.See W.  H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Calls 
Upon Congress   To  Strengthen U.  S.  And  Its  Allies;   Opposes   any Tax Reduction 
Now,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   6  Jan.   1956,   pp.   1,   *Q and   11. 
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Meanwhile,  Dr. White's  reports became more encouraging.     It 
is  probable  that  their glowing outlook was partially  prompted by 
Eisenhower's  associates  as well as the medical findings and other 
factors.     In December,  after visiting the President for Christmas, 
White philosophized  about  his  illustrious  patient's  future.     It   rested, 
he said,   "in   the  lap  of  the gods,   as  it more or  less  does with  all 
of us   ..."     With  "average  good  luck,  and  common sense  care,"    however, 
it would be possible   for the President   "to live  for years   and be   fully 
active,   as have many   others  among my own  patients who have   recovered 
similarly   at   this stage  of  their convalescence."^ 
At   this  point   it becomes   apparent   that  Dr.  White's   role 
extended beyond the bounds  of any ordinary  consulting physician's. 
First  of  all he was motivated politically.     He was a Republican. 
And more   than   that,  he was  pressured by  the Inner Circle not   to allow 
the  press   to back him into saying that   the President  ought  not   to  run. 
If he were  not   fit   to run,  he was not   fit  to remain President.     Common 
sense  argued  that  it was not   the  Doctor's  place   to throw a  roadblock 
in  front   of  any potential  plans   the President might have  or make.     Con- 
tinually,   therefore,   Dr.   White urged a professional opinion coupled 
always with   a statement   to  the effect that the ultimate decision 
would be Eisenhower's.    He would not, medically or politically,  turn 
Eisenhower  into a  "lame duck" before his   time.     In  another vein,   White 
4    "The President:    A Gift,"    op.   cit.,  p.  14. 
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had a personal and professional motivation that  inspired his  pro- 
nouncements   about  Eisenhower.     A leading heart specialist,  he was  a 
proponent of methods   for  convalescing from coronaries  that were not 
completely   consoant with   those of  established medical procedures. 
He was  of  the  belief  that  heart   attack victims   could  be  restored 
almost  to  full usefulness by techniques which encouraged  their  gradual 
warming up  to  their pre-coronary   thrombosis activities.     White was 
eager  to make  an example  of  Eisenhower.     If his methods worked on 
the President  of  the United  States,   they would  certainly be valid 
practice  for   the  average  citizen.     Yet  it would be unfair  to  imply 
that  Dr.  White  took unnecessary  risks with Eisenhower's health.     While 
to many  it   appeared  as   if he ignored the   fantastic demands  of  the 
Presidency,   at no  time  is   it  apparent   that White  risked either 
Eisenhower's   life  or the  initiative   of  the Presidency.     Almost   certainly 
he would not   have  been able  to do so.     It was,  after all,   Eisenhower 
himself who was  the ultimate  judge  of what he  could or should  do.     At 
all  times   the  doctors were   insistent  upon Eisenhower's   resting in  pro- 
portion  to  the amount  of work he did.     Only when they observed  the  gradual 
increase  of  his   "vital  capacity" did they allow him to increase his work 
load almost   to normal by  the end of  December,   1955.     And only   to the 
extent that  the President  continued to prove the accuracy of White's 
theories  did White  allow his activities   to  continue  in that  vein.     To 
suggest otherwise would be grossly inaccurate and unfair.    For in addition 
to Dr. white,  at one time or another,  Dr.  Byron E.  Pollock, who commanded 
Fitzsimmons,   Maj .  General Leonard D. Heaton,  commanding officer af 
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Walter Reed Army Hospital and Colonel Thomas W. Mattingly, heart 
specialist at Walter Reed, all ministered to the President.    And 
of  course  Dr.   Snyder was always  there.     So under their watchful eyes 
and those of Mrs.  Eisenhower,  the Secret Service and the President's 
staff,   did  the  President continue successfully along the  road  to recovery.5 
In   late December the President went  to Key West,   Florida,   to conclude 
the vacation  that  had  started in August.       On 8 January he held 
his  first  "on the record" news conference since 4 August and the first 
news   conference he had ever held  outside of Washington.     He  announced 
that he   felt  completely  recovered  after  "a very splendid period of just 
sheer  recreation"  and  that he was   going back  to the White House  the 
next day   "as   ready to  go to work as a person could  be  after  the physical 
experience  I have been  through."    He refused to comment  at  that  time 
about his   decision or the process  of his  decision on  a second  term. 
It was  almost  certain  that he  could run,   but would he?     When  the 
representatives   of the press  continued to insist upon trying to draw him 
out  in  the  open,  he  told them calmly,   "I have no desire whatsoever to  confuse 
the American  people or to escape  anything you are  putting in  front  of me. 
5 PUBLIC PAPERS,  op.   cit.,   p.   32.     See Childs,   op.   cit.,   p.   221 
for a note on Dr.  White's  role in the President's  convalescence. 
6 W.   H.   Lawrence,  in the NEW YORK TIMES,   "Eisenhower  Flies  to 
Florida Today  for 2-Week Rest," 28 Dec.   1955,  pp.   1  and  12 and   "Eisenhower's 
Tour the  Florida Keys on Quiet Holiday," 2 Jan.  1956, pp.  1 and 15. 
7 See W.   H.   Lawrence's  articles  in the NEW  YORK TIMES,   "President 
To Discuss Health At News Conference Today," 8 Jan.   1956,  pp.  1 and 78 and 
"President  Hints  He Has  Decided Whether To Run," 9  Jan.   1956,   pp.   1  and 12. 
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But you can well imagine the pressures that are brought to bear 
upon me   every  day   [here the work  of Adams and company was beginning 
to show]  and I have to isolate myself from them at times as much 
as I can."    Significantly he told them later that he would "make 
the announcement   as  quickly as a  decision is   firmly  fixed  in my own mind." 
He would not  be  pressured by  the  Knowland candidacy or anything else  - 
but he did not   indicate as   to what   exactly  that decision pertained  to, 
whether deciding  to  run or deciding when to  announce  that he would 
Q 
(or would not)   run. 
On  20 January the President,   speaking  from Washington,   told  thousands 
of Republicans   via closed  circuit  television  at  a  $100-a-plate  "Salute 
to Eisenhower"  dinner that  "it  appears  that  this  is  a question that   first 
I  alone must  answer."       That  answer  involved  a great  deal of politics 
and persuasion   - and a great deal of soul-searching,  not  only on  the 
part  of  Dwight  D.   Eisenhower and his   family  but  also on the  part  of  the 
leaders   of  the   Republican  Party.     There is,   however,   evidence to  indicate 
that by this  time that ordeal had already been weathered.     But 
while  it was   in  progress not the   least uncomfortable of principals   in 
it was  Leonard Hall. 
8 W.   H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Warns   G.O.P.  Not To Pin All On 
One Man;   States  His  Faith  in Dulles,  NEW YORK TIMES,   20 Jan.   1956,   pp.   1 
and 10.     Emphasis  added. 
9 W    H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Says  2D Term Decision Must  Be 
His Own,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   21 Jan.   1956,  pp.   1 and  10.     In  the same 
edition see Richard Amper,   "President Hailed At Garden Rally,    pp.  1 
and 12.     See  also Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   398. 
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II 
Although he  loved his job  as National  Republican Chairman 
Len Hall was   in the  quandary of his  career.     An astute politician, 
he admitted  in  the  confidence  of his associates  that he did not  know 
what  to  do.     The Monday  after  the  heart   attack,  even  as  the President 
fought   for survival  under an  oxygen tent,   Hall astounded   the country 
in  an   address   to the   Union League  Club  by stating that there was 
no change  in   the party's  plans   for  1956   so  far as  he was   concerned. 
Not  only would Eisenhower be  the   candidate   for the  Presidency, 
Nixon would   also be   the  candidate   for the Vice Presidency,     It 
was  incredible!     If  Eisenhower by  some  miracle did  decide   to run, 
reasoned Hall,   then  so much  the better.     If not,  he would,   as he said, 
"jump  off  that bridge when I  come   to it."     In either  case  there would 
be no  profitable purpose served by his  pressing the   issue   on the Presi- 
dent.     Any   decision  should be put  off as   long as possible   both   for the 
President's   and the   party's health.     Plans were too well-laid in any 
event   for 1956   to junk them categorically so  long as  there was   the barest 
possibility  of Eisenhower's   candidacy.     But   this  did not stop the press 
from pressing Hall. 
1     Richard Amper,   "Hall Says  Illness  of President  Has Not 
Changed   1956   Strategy,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   21 Sept.   1955,   p.   1.     See 
also Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   147;  Mazo,   op.   cit.,   p.   191  and   "Consternation 
Within," NEW  REPUBLIC,   CXXXILL   (3  Oct.   1955),   7.     In  Denver previous 
to the heart  attack,  Hall had visited Eisenhower to  talk about  the 
subject of a second  term and had not found the President  altogether 
receptivee   to the idea,   see below,   pp.   79-81. 
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Some  journals  were  already suggesting that   it would  be 
"callous   and  reckless  to   press   upon Mr.   Eisenhower  the heaviest 
of  human burdens   for  another five  years."    The   partisans,   after 
first  dutifully expressing  their admiration for   the   aging President, 
were deductively  suggesting  that  a second  term would be out of 
the question.     One  suggested  in  a roundabout way that  the  President 
2 
ought  to   resign! 
The first  time Hall   saw Eisenhower after   the   heart  attack 
was on  28 November  when he  met with the  President   in his   temporary 
office  in  the  Post  Office   in Gettysburg.   His was   the major   in  a 
series of   political meets   scheduled  for November  and December.     Before 
Hall  saw   Eisenhower,   Jim Hagerty told the  press  he   "wouldn't   think" 
they would discuss   the possibility of  the   President's running   again. 
But   the   reporters   knew better. 
Hall   found  the President   in one of his  post-attack  moods of 
depression such as  he was   still  experiencing at  Gettysburg before 
he   left   for   Key West.     Hagerty and Adams  had drawn  the Chairman aside 
and told   him despondently,   "This man   isn't  going  to   go."    Hall  mustered 
all  his   political   finesse  and delicately approached  the President.        In 
their  forty-five minute  private conversation,  Hall   expressed   hopes   for  the 
party and  the  nation  that   the  President might  yet   see  fit   to   serve   another 
term,   reinforcing  his  plea with polls  that showed  that   Eisenhower  could 
2     "The President  From Today  to January,   1956," NEW REPUBLIC, 
CXXXII   (3 Oct.   1955),   3-4. 
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re-elected   without   a  strenuous campaign.     The  President,   referring 
to himself   as   "'an old dodo*"   for whom "the years  had   caught  up" did 
not give Hall   the   hint of any affirmative  response   for which he  had 
hoped.     Their discussion was  gloomy. 
"Okay," said Hall,   "let's  talk about what I'm going to  say  to 
the Pressswhen I walk out of   here.     Everyone else who visits you 
can say that   they did  not talk politics,   but  if  I  said  that  they'd  call 
me a  liar." 
"Go  out and   say what  you think you  should   say,"   replied   Eisenhower, 
"I don't want  to know what you are  going  to say."    Eisenhower,   while  at 
Gettysburg,   was  in   no mood   to make  any decision about  a  second term. 
He  sought   to  avoid   it, for he was  caught   in  an  awful  moral  dilemma.     He 
had  an abl igation  to the party he  had   sought  so earnestly to  rebuild. 
He also felt   a  similar obligation  to 1he   country at   large.     Yet he  had 
an equal   obligation  not   to  serve   if he did  not  think he  could  do   so 
with  the   necessary  vitality  and   initiative  for which  he  seddenly realized 
the   job  called.     He  also had   a moral   obligation  to his  wife  and   family 
not to push  himself with any more deliberate   speed  towards  the  end  of 
his  life. 
Hall   left  the  Post Office Conference   feeling  that Eisenhower's 
caddidacy  was   all   but a dead   letter.     He  told   the  truth   to  the   reporters, 
that  the  President   had   not made  any decision and  had   not   in any way 
affirmatively  indicated   to him that he would   run again.     "I   can only give 
you my opinion,"   he   said,   "I  did  not get  anything directly or   indirectly. 
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He  did  not   say  ''yes'   and  he  did not  say   'no.'     I   feel   encouraged," he 
remarked cryptically.3 
But  Leonard Hall was   a  political   realist.     While  the  hopes 
for  an   Eisenhower  candidacy were dim,   hedid  not   count   them out  alto- 
gether.    And  neither did  the  professionals   and  the  expert political 
commentators.     Millions of   words   and hours of editorial   cliff-hanging 
continued over   the prospects  of   Eisenhower  and  the  Republicans. 
And   as  Eric  Sevareid  was   later   to   remark,  reporters  had  long since 
"learned the  hard way  to  pay more   attention to Mr.   Hall   than to 
Mr.   Eisenhower   in discovering political   realities   ..."    The  record, 
he  said,   "indicates  Mr.  Hall   and his  group  always   get   their way «ith 
the  President  whenever  the   chips   go down. „* 
The   chips   began  to   go   up  after   Eisenhower   left  for  Key West 
on  27nDecember.     After getting  away from work and   the   gloomy atmosphere 
and  reinforced   reaction to   Gettysburg,   the  President's   spirits  rose 
mightily.     It  was,   however,   a  personal,   rather  than  a  political   phenomenon. 
At   that news   conference on   8  January  1956,   the day before he  returned   "full 
time"   to  the  White House,   the  President   answered   a question as   to whether 
3    See Alan Drury's   articles   in   the NEW YORK TIMES,   "Eisenhower 
Acts  To  Resume  Role   as   Party Leader,"     2k Nov.   1955,   pp.   1   and   34;   "President 
Sees  Hall   Today   In First  Political   Parlays,"    28   Nov.   1955,   pp.   1   and  8  and 
"Eisenhower  To  Run If He Feels'Able'   G.   0.   P. Head  Thinks,"  29.,Nov.   1955, 
pp.   1   and  20.     See   also  Nixon,   op.  cit.,   p.   155   and   "If He  Feels  He's Able," 
TIME,   LXVI   (12   Dec.   1955),    19.     For a   detailed discussion of  Eisenhower 
at  Gettysburg,   see   below,pp.     110.-1**'5» 
k     Eric   Sevareid, "The  Coming Campaign," REPORTER,   XIV,   (22 Mar. 
1955),   17. 
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or not  he  considered   the   Presidency  "the  most   physically taxing" 
job he had  ever   had.     In   typical   Eisenhowerese he  said: 
Well,   I  don't   know whether   you  can  give  a  straight 
yes or no   answer   to   that,   and   I'm  sorry -  but  you 
do  have   this situation:     every problem that   you take 
up has   inevitably   a   terrific meaning  for many millions 
of  people,   so   there   is  no   problem  that  comes   up  in the 
Presidency  - even   some  that   appear   trivial   that   is  handled 
as  easily   as  you would  handle   your own daily  living,   or even 
something   in  the military,   or   in other activities   in which 
I have  been   engaged. 
I would  say that   the  Presidency  is   probably   the most 
taxing  job,   as   far   as   tiring of  the mind  and  spirit; 
but   it  also  has,   as   I have  said  before,   its   inspirations 
which  tend   to   counteract  each other. 
So   I   really can't   say.     There have   been  times   in war where 
I  thought   nothing   could   be quite   as  wearing   and  tearing 
as   that  with  lives   directly   involved.     But   I  would   say, 
on  the whole,   this   is  the   most wearing,   although not   neces- 
ssarily,   as   I say,   the most  tiring. 
Eisenhower  was,   then,   not   tired  with  the   Presidendy.     But  he  admitted 
that   it  was  wearing him down.      If     he  were   planning  another   term at 
this  point,   such   a  statement was  not  as   politically  astute   as  he might 
otherwise have  made   it.     The press   there   at   Key West  polled   themselves 
and  concluded   (12-2)   that   these  were  the  words of   a   retiring elder 
statesman. 
The  President   said  he was   "going back   into   the  full   duties 
of  the  Presidency  tomorrow morning"  but   that  those   duties  would 
not  be what  might  have  been  considered  "normal"  previously.     Here- 
to   fore,   he   said,   he   "didn't  have   that  sense of  fatigue,  or  have  any 
5    PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   cit.,   p.   3U. 
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feeling at   all   I had   to   care  for  myself"  and consequently  he  had 
"done many things   that were  unnecessary."     Both  he and  his   staff, 
he   said,   would   "scrutinize   the   problems,   but   as   far as   the  duties  of 
the  Presidency  are   concerned,   I  will   be   in   full   swing." 
The  day  after   the Key West   news   conference,   the   President 
left   to   return  to   a   capital  wrapped   in   sub-freezing weather. 
On  1*» February his  doctors   announced  that   his  health  continued  to 
be   "satisfactory."     Dr.   White   said  that  his   presentcoondition was   that 
his heart   had   a   "well-healed  scar" and  his   general   health   "favorable." 
He  said also   that   "the   chances   are"  that   the  President   "should   ... 
be  able   to   carry on his  present   active   life   satisfactorily   ...   for   five 
to   ten years,   knowing   full   well   ...   the hazards   and  uncertainties  of 
the   future."     Again,   it was   not   for  the  White House  physicians   to   close   the 
door on politics.     Eisenhower  could run and whether or  not   he  would  was   up 
to him.     Asked   if  he  would vote  for Eisenhower   if he   should  decide   to 
seek another   term,  White   said  he   would. 
If   there  were   no   doubts   (officially  at   least)   in  the   doctors' 
minds  about   the  President's  fitness  there was   still   doubt   in his  own 
mind.     Characteristic  of  most  heart  attack victims,   he   was   hesitant  about 
exerting himself.     He  had not  done  so   at  Gettysburg or   at   Key West. 
6 Id.,   pp.   36-6;   Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   398  and   Lawrence, 
"President  Hints  He  Has  Decided Whether To   Run," op.   cit.,   p.   12. 
7 W.   H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower   Is   Fit  To   Run Doctors   Say After 
Tests;   Stress   That   'Choice  Is  His,'"     NEW YORK  TIMES,   15   Feb.   1956,   pp. 
1   and 21.     Emphasis   added. 
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While he  had   swung a  golf   club at   Key West  he  had  not  played  a  full   round 
of   golf  since   the day before  the  attack and he  was  anxious   to  do   so.     On 
the  day before   the Doctors'    14 February news  conference   in Washington, 
Eisenhower   left   for Thomasville,   Georgia,   with his   Secretary of  the 
Treasury,   George  Humphrey,   to   shoot  quail  on the   latter's   sixty-acre 
plantation  and   also   to   use   the   golf   ball   Dr.  White had   given him for 
Christmas.   There   in Georgia  he   tested his   strength  at   somewhere 
near full   capacity for  the  first   time   in five months.     "He  plunged 
into   it with  what  you might   call   a   'I'11-show-'em  attitude,'   "one 
of his  companions   later  recalled.     Although previous  to  his  first   round 
of  golf   the   President   admitted  he was   "a   little   scared"  (now instead 
of   just   the   immediate  party  watching him tee off   the  entire world was   so 
doing)  he   finished  his  first   round  just  a   little   (11   strokes)   above his 
usual   score.     While  hunting  he plunged  through  the  waist-high  grass 
as   the Secret   Service  stood  by horrified of   the  rattlesnakes  therein. 
After bagging   the   legal   limit   of  quail  he  returned  to   the  house saying 
proudly,   'Veil,   I'm feeling pretty good.     I didn't  get   tired out.      It 
didn't  bother  me."     Polls   showed  Eisenhower could   beat  Stevenson 
by  a ratio  of   5-3.        No   doubt   about   it   -  he  was   back   in  form.     Leonard 
Hall's hopes   soared. 
8    The  polls   also   showed Nixon would   lose   59-41%.     See James   Reston, 
"President Goes   South This  Week to  Make   Up Mind   In   'Seclusion,'"  NEW YORK 
TIMES,   13 Feb.   1956,   pp.   1   and   19.     See   also   in  the  TIMES, W.   H.   Lawrence, 
"President Flies  South   to   Determine Whether To  Run,"   16  Feb.   1956;   "Eisen- 
hower Golfs   In Georgia  Drizzle;   Does   9 Holes   in 47,"   18 Feb.   1956,   pp.   1 
and  7,   and W.   H.   Lawrence,      "President  Tests   Endurance Again," 24   Feb.   1956, 
pp.   1  and   13.      In the news  magazines   see,   "Big Decision After A  Rest   in 
Georgia,"  U.S.   NEWS,   XL   (17   Feb.   1956),   16   and   "Ike:   Now  the Answer: 
Style and Time   to  Decide," NEWSWEEK,   XLVII   (27  Feb.   1956),   21-2,   along 
with Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   402-03. 
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A fortnight   before  the  President's  heart  attack,   Vice President 
Nixon was  asked whether or not  he thought Eisenhower,  who had not 
yet  announced, would   run again.     Was he   "the  indispensable  man?" 
Nixon  said it was his  opinion  that  the  President would be  the  last 
to say he was  "indispensable,"     I don't  believe  those of  us   in the 
Administration would  say that   the President  or anybody else   is  indis- 
pensable," he said.     He was   the   "best   man"  for the  country,   however. 
But would he run?     "I would say   that   ...   people who know  the  President 
and who desire very  much  that  he   runs   again   ...   are more   optimistic 
today   than  they have   been  at   any  time   since he has  been inaugurated   ..." 
Nixon said.     Eisenhower,  he  pointed  out,   was  a man with  "a very 
high  sense   of duty"   and would  see  that   the nation   and the world needed 
q 
him for another  four years.        Then  came   the heart   attack and  that very 
same   "high  sense   of   duty"  seemed  to be   the   factor that would  keep Eisen- 
hower out of the  1956 race. 
Yet   the  plain   political   truth was   that   for the Republicans   Eisen- 
hower was  the  "indispensable  man."    They had impressed  that  upon  the 
public's  mind in  two partisan  political campaigns   in   1952   and  1954. 
Leonard Hall was not   truthful  in mid-February when he said  that   "not 
one iota of  pressure" was being put  on  Eisenhower to run. As  early as 
9     "Nixon  Sizes  Up   '56," U.S.   NEWS,  XXXIX   (16  Sept.   1955),   119 
and Eric Sevareid,   "Is Any  Man  Indispensable?"  REPORTER,   XIII   (20  Oct. 
1955),   26. 
10     Reston,   "President   Goes   South This Week To Make   Up Hind   In 
'Seclusion.",   op.   cit.,   p.   19. 
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5 September  there was   still   doubt   in  the  minds of  Nixon and others   - 
with  the  heart   attack  crisis   still  ahead of   them -  as   to   whether or 
not   Eisenhower would  seek another term.     The  pressure   had  been  actually 
increased   since  the   thrombosis.     To   find  why  this  was  necessary,one need 
only to   look  back  to   Eisenhower's political  origins. 
Ill 
"I'm a   soldier  and   I'm positive  no   one  thinks  of me   as  a 
politician,"   said   the  Commander of SHAPE.     He  would   under no 
circumstances   be  a   candidate  for   the   Presidency in   1948.       Four years 
later when he  was   President of  Columbia University  his  office  issued 
a  statement   from then President   Eisenhower  saying   in part,   "I have no 
desire   to   go   anywhere  else   if   I   can help  to  do  what   I want   here   in 
Columbia.     This   is   the  place  for me.     I  don't   know why people  are   always 
2 
nagging me  to   run  for  President.     I  think   I've  gotten  too  old."       Richard 
H.   Rovere  contemporaneously supported Mr.   Eisenhower,   but  with a different 
outlook: 
Why on  earth   [he  asked J should   anyone   think   Eisenhower 
would  make   a   good President?    What   does  he   know about 
the  United  States?    What   does   he   know  about   anything 
1     John Gunther,   EISENHOWER;     MAN AND THE SYMBOL  (   New York: 
Harper & Brothers,   1951),   p.   133.     Indeed,   Marquis   Childs  wonders 
seriously why General   Eisenhower   didn't   attempt   to   capture  the nominations 
of  both major  parties   and  unify   the  nation politically.     Childs,   op.   cit., 
p. 128. 
2     Id.,   129. 
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that  is   related  to   the  presidency except   the   running 
of the military  establishment?    Why should  so many 
Americans   think  that  this man,  untrained  and  untested 
in politics   and until recently quite uninterested  in 
the subject,   could make  a suitable  chief magistrate? 
Is  the presidency  a demanding job   or isn't   it?    Does 
it  require  special knowledge   and special  abilities, 
or is   it   an  office   that  any   literate and halfway  con- 
scientious   American   can handle?     If   it  is  as   demanding 
as we   generally believe  it   to be,   then clearly Eisen- 
hower has no qualifications worth  discussing and those 
who  are  so eager   to have him  for  President   are either 
contemptuous   of   the   office  or themselves   ridiculously 
ignorant.     That,   at  any  rate,   must be the   verdict  of 
simple   logic. 
Yet  simple   logic will not  do. 
Indeed  it would not.     The  same  arguments   could have been made 
against every  military  candidate   from Washington   and Jackson 
and civilian   candidates   such  as  James  Buchanan,   Woodrow Wilson 
and even Harry Truman.     Eisenhower was  a man   fantastically suited 
to the  times.     He   represented prosperity,   status   quo,   moralism, 
standard Americanism.     His   personality was structured,   distrustful 
of  fine distictions,   accentuated,   impatient with   theory,   ever-ready 
to translate  ideas   into action.     He was   in short   the ideal  candidate 
to bewitch  and bewilder the  mobs.        For this   reason  the   liberal 
Republicans wanted him in   1952.     They  realized  that   the  future of  their 
party was  at  stake  and  felt   the  same  about  the nation as   a whole.     Abroad 
Europeans were   confident   that   "General  Ike" would not  drop  atomic bombs 
3 Rovere,   op.   cit.,   pp.   4-5. 
4 During  the  campaign  the  General was  cognizant  of  this 
effect   on  the  people.     One  day as he was  scrutinizing the  draft 
of a speech written by Emmet  John Hughes,  he  remarked sardonically 
to Hughes,   "We need maybe   a few more   "cheer  lines"  in this  speech   . 
a mob   like  this   doesn't want   to   think -  they just  want  to yowl," 
Quoted in Hughes,   op.   cit.,   p.   193. 
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on them.     The old Warrior   represented peace   to   the whole 
world. 
Eisenhower's   tenure  at  Columbia  was   aborted  by  the 
Republicans   in   1952.     Precisely what made  him decide   to   become 
a candidate   is   unclear.     Years   later  it  was   reported   that  had  he 
known Adlai   Stevenson would have   been  the   Democratic   standard-bearer 
he would  not  have  opposed  him.     He   is   said   to  have   believed Stevenson 
would have made   a  good  President.6    What  had in fact   goaded   Eisenhower 
into  the  political   arena,   it  was   said,   was   the  prospect of  another 
four years of Harry Truman. 
Although   in   later years,  when political   animosities   colored his 
thinking,   Eisenhower  remarked   that  he would  have   liked  to have  had   the 
opportunity of   beating Truman,   it   is  much more   likely  that   in   1952   the state 
of   the   Republican Party was his   impetus   for   running.     True,   he   was   con- 
cerned  with the   belief   that   the   left-leaning Democratic  Party was  passing 
irretrievably  under   the   control  of   those  politicians   who  advocated   strong 
centralized power   and   inflation.     But  more   than  that  Eisenhower was   con- 
cerned   that   the   Republicans   as   a  consequence of   their  twenty years  out 
5 See T.   R.   B.,   "Washington Wire,"  NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXIII  (3 Oct.   1955), 
2  and   Rovere,   op.   cit.,   p.   17   along with Gunther,   op.   cit.,   pp.   143  and  42. 
6 If   this  were   indeed   true  -  and   it   is  doubtful  -   Eisenhower's 
attitude  toward   Governor  Stevenson changed   in subsequent months.    Almost 
from the   beginning of   the  campaign he  developed   a manifest  dislike  and 
personal   antipathy  toward  him.     He would dismiss   SteveaBon's   charges, 
saying  coldly,   "It's  not   going to   do me  any good   to   study what   that  monkey's 
saying,   since   I  have  no   intention of  answering him anyway."    Cited  and 
quoted   in Hughes,   op.   cit.,   p.   195.   Later on his   attitude  acquired more 
vigor  and he   admitted   bluntly,   "I'm not  one  who   finds   it difficult   to  hate 
my enemies,"    Quoted   in Gunther,   op.   cit.,   p.   19. 
89 
of power were degenerating into a negative party of opposition. 
The baffled, sterile extreme right wing was about to take control 
of the party which would even further widen the gulf between them and 
the moderates and independents.  In short, he was convinced that only 
a moderate could save the party from such a fate.  So more than Harry 
Truman, it was Robert Taft who drew Eisenhower into the presidential 
contest in 1952.7 
His goal, then, was to remove the "curse" which the Republican 
Party had been enduring for two decades and reform it from a negative 
to a positive attitude.  Party leaders assured him that one smashing 
victory in 1952 would accomplish this goal.  For Eisenhower was even 
at that time an old man.  He was tired of public life and quite justly 
so; he felt that he had served his country as much as he should have. 
He made the race for the Presidency confident that by 1956 there would 
be a younger man of moderate stance to whom he could turn over the 
reigns. 
After the election, as he was drafting his inaugural address 
lie was wondering, and wanting to put into it the idea that he would 
not seek a second term.  Horrified Republicans were quick to point out 
that if he did so party warfare would be continued and encouraged rather 
than stifled.  And besides that he would be a lame duck on the day 
he went to work.  He yielded to their persuasion then - but reluctantly. 
In the years that followed, as he chafed under the burdens of the 
Presidency, he expressed his wish many times in private that he should 
have ignored the politicians. 
7  Rovere, op. cit., pp. 342-43 and C. J. V. Murphey.  "The Eisen- 
hower Shift,"  FORTUNE, LIII (Apr. 1956), 114, Part IV. 
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But   Eisenhower   the political   amateur had  been  unrealistic. 
He  thought   that   in four years  he   could   unify the party  that  had   taken 
five times   that   long  to   become   splintered,   balance  the  national   budget, 
institute  what   he   called a   "free   economy"   and halt   the  drift  to  what he 
8 
considered   a   "welfare   state."       Now after   the  heart   attack he was   faced 
with  the   same problems   with  which  he entered  the White House.     Two  weeks 
previous   to   the   attack   in Denver   he   impatiently told  Leonard Hall  when the 
National   Chairman had   come   to  encourge  his  candidacy,   "What more  do   they 
want   from me   ...   I've   given  all of my  adult   life  to   the  country...   What 
more must   I  do?"     He   listed   five  or  six names  of men he said were  younger 
and  just  as   capable  to   run on his   record   and  carry on his  mode of   government.' 
But  they couldn't  win.     And Eisenhower  deep   in his  heart  had  to   admit   it: 
he had failed   in  that   respect;   there was   no  younger man who   could  be 
counted on   to   lead  the   party to   victory  again.     At   the Cabinet   as   late 
as   13 February  1956 he   renewed  his  desire   to   serve only one   term.     He 
had,   he  said,   done his   share of   the work.     Those  who  had  talked  him out 
of preemptorily  refusing a   second  term were   hard  put   to   refute his   argument 
now that   the Twenty-Second  Amendment  had   turned   any second   term   into   the 
same  thing   they had argued   against:     he   could  not   run   for   a  third  term 
8     George  Johnson,   EISENHOWER:     THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A GREAT 
GENERAL,   PRESIDENT AND STATESMAN,   (Derby,   Connecticut:     Monarch  Books, 
Inc., 1962),   p.   123;   Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   396;   and Nixon,   op.   cit., 
p.   152. 
9     Id.,   p.   153. 
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and he would be  a   lame  duck the day  he went   to work on  21 January  1957. 
It irked him now   that   the   people who were  beseeching him  to run  again 
were  the same  ones with   the  same  reasons who had assured him in  1952 
that  a singe  tremendous  victory would be  sufficient   for a  re-establishment 
of  the  Republican  Party. 
Eisenhower's   frustration was  beginning to show.     He had  failed 
and  the party had   failed.     They had   rested  on his popularity  and continued 
party  bickering  during his   term in   office.     And he knew he was  partially 
to blame.     For   four years   now he had prided himself  on being  "above 
politics."     He was   slowly   coming to   the  realization   that  he had erred  if 
he wished  the  party  to be   remoulded   in his   own  image.     Popularity was  not 
enough  and he  had no  taste   for getting down  into the   "frey."     Now it 
appeared  an  impossible  task   and  the  heart   attack made   it  seem even more 
frustrating and   out  of reach.     The   party   chiefs   came   at him with  the  same 
argument  they  had  used  in   1952;   he was needed by  the  party,   the nation 
and  the world;   only he  could win.     For the  President   it  suddenly seemed 
as if it had  all been  to no  avail.     Dwight  Eisenhower's   political house 
was haunted by   the spectre   of  failure.     At  Normandy   in  1944 he had written 
out a communique  before   the   invasion   landed  accepting sole  responsibility 
for its   failure.     He was   just  as   ready   to   admit   failure now.     It was   time 
to  quit. 
10     Adams,   op.   cit.,   p.   228   and Murphy,   op.   cit.,   p.   144. 
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To   those  not   acquainted  with the  fluctuating Presidential 
state of mind   it   seemed as   though  recovery had been so   rapid  and 
complete   that  his   candidacy   for  a  second  term became less of   an 
absurdity and more of   a monopolizing possibility.     As   time passed 
and as  he   was  constantly subjected  to  persuasions   from one side 
and   the other,   the   President   began  to  give  serious  consideration 
to the  counterweights   to his  desire   to   leave  office in   1957.     Sometimes 
he would   be  completely  resolved   to   return   and  partisans  who  talked with 
him than  came   away  discouraged.     Other  times   he was seriously  considering 
dropping his   categorical decision  and devote   himself  anew to  his   task 
which was   so obviously   incomplete.     With the  convention  in August   the  time 
when he  would have   to   announce,   however,   was   still   sufficiently  far 
away so   that  a  final   decision would not have   to  be  reached until   as   late 
as February or March.11     If   he  were   going  to   run  then  nothing would   be 
changed.      If  not,   a   cutthroat  fight   for  the   nomination   could  be  averted 
until   the   last minute.     His  frustration was   always  there and  throughout 
it  all he  maintained  the attitude,   "Hell,   if   the people were   to  decide  not 
..12 
to  re-elect me,   I  sure   couldn't   feel  desperately unhappy about   it. 
Yet  there was  more   involved  than his  own personal  feeling. 
Here  was   the   awe-inspiring spectacle of Dwight  D.   Eisenhower 
grappling  not  only with the   prospects of  his  own continued   life   and  the 
future of his   family,   but   also with   the   immediate destinies of   150 
11 Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   387  and   397. 
12 Hughes,   op.   cit. ,   p.   192. 
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million  Americans,   the  attitudes  of  even  more  millions  of  America's 
allies   and  the possible  future   of one of   the nation's   two  great political 
parties.     Eisenhower's  modesty  was  not  so broad  that  it would allow him 
to overlook or   to  ignore  the   fact that he was  ipso facto  all these  things 
to all  these   people.     The  issue was heavily weighted by his health 
and at   times   the burden added   to his  other extraordinary   responsibilities 
discouraged his  even   trying  to  lift   it.     He  could have  bowed out  before 
this.     Now  the politics  of paradox  took  hold.     Instead of   retirement, 
the heart attack demanded  that he  go on.     The  nation had   almost  lost 
him - and he  it.     Now he was back and  grateful   to have back what was 
almost   gone   -   the  must   of  the   time  -   they would  not   let  him leave 
again  lest   things   change somehow for  the worse.     How  could  he say no? 
As   long as  his  health held up  the  possibilities   for a second 
term were strong indeed.     But   he would not  hold back.     They wanted  the 
truth  and he would  give  it  to   them.     He   told   the press he  would  "be just 
as   truthful  as   I   can  be" about   his  health.     He went  on to say,   "   ...   I 
believe this:     I   think even people who would classify  themselves  probably 
as my  political enemies  do believe   I  am honest   -  they may   call me  stupid  - 
but  I   think  they   think I  am honest."13    He would  level with   them.     He 
knew what he wanted.     Perhaps   the truth  might   give him an honorable way 
to achieve  it.     Perhaps   they would  realize that   the  risk was  too 
great   - that maybe  he should quit -   that,   really,   they had no right  to ask 
more  of him,   even   if he were  healthy.     Perhaps   ...   and yet  he was   loathe 
13    PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   cit.,   pp.   268-69   and "How  the President 
Answered the  Big Question,"     U.   S.  NEWS,   XL  (9  Mar.   1956),   66. 
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to leave  the   center of  power  and action.     If he   could be  a  part-time 
President  - but   that would not do.     Now he was   back,  berated by  the same 
ghosts   that   haunted him in  1952. 
Thus,   if Eisenhower was   to be  completely  honest  about  his 
health he would open  the  door on  the exploitation of the health 
issue.     But   he did not   care.     Meanwhile  it was  no secret   that   the 
President was  dismayed  over his  own  post-recovery  condition.     His 
depression was   accentuated by   the memory  of his   friend General Brehon 
B. Somervell who had died suddenly of  a heart  attack,   and when heart 
attacks  struck some   of   the  businessmen  and  friends who had been guests 
of his White House  get-togethers.     His  pre-attack  reluctance   to  run for 
a second  term was  strengthened. The  see-saw  tipped  the  other way  and 
virtually  everyone  counted him out.     The  political pundits   seemed to be 
equally divided  among the  possibilities   of his   candidacy,   a  "wide-open 
battle"   for   the  nomination,   and Nixon's  sure  role as  "heir  apparent." 
But   the  political   professionals  - Adams,   Hall,   Brownell,   Summerfield, 
and other men of   this   type  -  conceded nothing.     Their persuasiveness   for 
his second   candidacy,   of  course,  was   inevitable.     Their jobs  depended 
upon  it.     But now  they knew   that   the same old straight  "the-country- 
needs-you"   line would  not work by   itself.     While Hall was  audaciously 
proclaiming  in public   that   there was no  change  in the  Republicans'  plans 
and that Eisenhower was still  to be  the  candidate even  though no pressure 
was being put  on him to do so,   Adams  and  the Palace Guard went   to work 
14     "Will  Ike's  Brother Stop Nixon,"    U.S. NEWS,   XXXIX   (28 
Oct.   1955),   21-2   and Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   145. 
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behind  the scenes  with a psychological   campaign  to   capture   the 
President's mind.     They knew they had him  at   a moral  disadvantage. 
But   if   they could  persuade   the  doctors   to  postpone   a final   verdict, 
and   if   they could  demonstrate   to  him that many of  the distasteful 
chores  of   the   Presidency could  be   lessened or delegated  then he 
would go.     They knew  their  man.     And they  knew he quickly  suffered 
from claustrophobia  and confinement.     They had   until Mazch to  exploit 
that. They would  dot  succeed   -   and yet   they would win. 
IV 
Eisenhower himself  had opened   the   health   issue   from  the 
minute he directed   that Hggerty and  Snyder should be open   and 
frank  about  his  condition.     He   added  to   his   burden when he   con- 
tinually told   the  press  that  he  would be  honest   to   the  public 
about his  health.     "I  will   tell   you people  very frankly," he  said 
after being pressed on  the   issue   at  a news   conference,"I have nothing 
to  hide  here.     I   am   certainly not   trying   to   be   coy."    This  of course 
made   it   an   inevitably partisan   issue.     Democrats  renewed  their  charges 
with new and  dramatic   fervor  that   Eisenhower was   a  part-time  President. 
They took his  Crusade   in Europe  down from  the  shelves   and  quoted   it   to 
its author: 
The doctors   took charge   [he wrote   in  an  account of   a  serious 
illness which   struck him  while  he was   the  Supreme Allied 
Commander   in Europe!. 
15  Id.;   Donovan,  op.   cit.,   p.   397   and   Eric  Servareid, 
"Preliminary Boute,"   REPORTER,   XIII   (15   Dec.   1955),   4. 
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For four  days   they would not   let me move  and during 
that  time   I not   only recovered my health,   I   learned 
a   lesson  I  did not   thereafter  violate:     A full measure 
of  health   is   basic  to   successful   command. 
Now with Eisenhower   in  a condition that would not   allow him medically 
to   enter OCS he  was  barraged   by much of   the press   imploring him not 
to   run again. 
Walter  Lippmann  called   the  discussion of  the President's 
health  a  "horrid   duty."     If   it wore  not openly discussed,   he   contended, 
"The  result  would  be  to  make   the election tarn on  a vast  whispering 
..3 campaign. 
As  early  as March,   1955,  H.   L.   Varney had written  in the 
American Mercury  as   a  consequence of   the  recent off-year  elections, 
"No  fact   is  more   undeniable   in the  political   situation than that  the 
Eisenhower spell   is   broken."4     If   that  were   the   case,   the  heart attack 
ended   it.     For   if   the  Eisenhower spell   was  broken  temporarily the 
prospects of   losing Ike   renewed  it.     People   liked   Ike  and  the   immediate 
outpouring of   sympathy  after   his  heart   attack renewed  their  hope  and his 
recovery reinforced   their  faith.     Still,  many  really did  not   think  that 
he would   (or  should)   be   a candidate   for  another  term.    They  liked  him  too 
much  to   see  him kill   himself.     And   as   late  as   November   1956,   in the  final 
stages of   the   campaign,   David  Lawrence wrote,   "If   Ike wins   this  campaign, 
2 Quoted  in John J.   Sparkman,   "Do We  Desire A Part-Time  President?' 
VITAL SPEECHES,   XXII   (15 Mar.   1956),   349.     See   also   "The  Presidency," 
NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXIV   (15 Mar.   1956),   U. 
3 Quoted   in  "The  President's  Health,"    NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXV  (3  Sept. 
1956),   9. 
«.    H.   L.   Varney,   "Eisenhower Midway," AMERICAN MERCURY,   LSXX  (Mar. 1955), 
9. 
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it will be  a  close  vote.     If he   loses,   it  may be  that the Democratic 
tide will be  of  landslide proportions.     There  is no chance  of  land- 
slide   for Eisenhower."       There was an unspoken  feeling  (fully exploited 
by  the  Democrats)   among many  that had its  roots  in  the beginning of  the 
Eisenhower Era.     For  four years   now there had been  in  the  public mind 
no direct   tie between Eisenhower  and  the  Republican Party.     Now  there 
was.     The  Republican politicians,  many   felt,  were  exploiting 
Ike  for their own benefit.     Many would not  allow  them to  ride his 
hearse   to power.     Thus   there was  even at   that   late  a strong  feeling 
that  a vote   for   the   Democrats was a vote   for Eisenhower. 
The strongly   anti-Eisenhower New Republic was noting by  the second 
week in  October,   1955,   that  it was   "no  longer assumed that   Eisenhower 
will  run again and win again and  remain President   for five years."6     "The 
unavailability  of  candidate Eisenhower  puts   Democratic hopes  in new 
prospective,"  it noted  the   following week,     and by  the end of  the month 
was   predicting that   "the  Democrats have  a 50-50  chance  of winning the 
next year's  election."8    With   the turn of  the year  it had  launched on its 
5 Robert   Bendiner,   "What Happened  to  the  Sure Thing?"     REPORTER, 
XV  (1 Nov.   1956),   9. 
6 "Who Makes   the  Fateful Decisions  for Peace?" NEW REPUBLIC, 
CXXXII   (10  Oct.   1955),  8.     Indeed the bitter partisan yellow journal 
ran Adlal  Stevenson   for president  twelve months  a year by  offering each 
week a  full  page  advertisement   bearing  the availability of  a 24-page 
booklet  entitled  STEVENSON  SPEAKS:     THE MAN WHO MAY BE PRESIDENT.     It 
allowed readers  to order them by the thousand and offered them at bulk 
rates   at  Christmastime. 
7 "1956  -   Return   ..."     NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXIII   (17 Oct.   1955),   11.     The 
New Republic seldom  referred  to  him as   President  Eisenhower. 
8 T.   R.   B.,   "Washington  Wite,"    NEW  REPUBLIC,  CXXXIV  (31 Oct.   1955),   2. 
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incessant   theme,   insisting that   the  people would not stand for allowing 
the Republicans   "to tailor the Presidency   to  the man."     It  pointed out 
that  "The  Republicans next year would nominate  a man of 66 who has 
suffered a heart   attack,  for one  of  the world's   toughest  jobs knowing 
that no  insurance   company would   give him a policy.     They  are not  afraid 
of Presidential insignificance  -   they seek  it."9     It  was  content   to 
rest upon  its   original  observation  that   "the victory  of  the  Democrats 
in 14)56   [is]   about  as   certain  as  anything  political can be."10 
Commonweal came   to  the  conclusion  that  a second  term for Eisenhower 
would be   less  successful   than  the   first.     "The problems   they now see 
crowding the horizon,"  it   found,   "cannot be stalled  off  for another four 
years   ...   and yet,   they  are  problems which  a President   on  a limited work 
schedule may be  able  to  contend with but  not   to surmount." During 
Eisenhower's   convalescence  at  Gettysburg,   Richard  H.   Rovere   found it 
"doubtful  in  the extreme   that Vice-President Nixon  or Leonard Hall has 
advised Mr.  Eisenhower   that  his   presence  is  sorely missing in Washington.. 
.."    Rovere noted that   a  "growing number" of  the President's  subordinate 
officials  were   "grumbling quite   openly about  the difficulties   of  leading 
9 T.R.B.,   'Vashington Wire,"    NEW  REPUBLIC,   CXXXIV   (2 Jan.   1956),   2 
10 "Consternation Within," op.   cit.,   p.   7. 
11 William V.   Shannon,   "The Eisenhower Paradox,"     COMMONWEAL,   LXIII 
(23 Mar. 1956).  641. 
99 
a great   republic...   with no President  on hand   ,..."12     Newsweek shortly 
after the   attack was   ready   to  admit   that   "it's now almost  certain he 
won't  run   for re-election   regardless  of how good a recovery he makes."13 
And C.J.V.   Murphy wrote  later  in  Fortune  that  Eisenhower's  ineligibility 
for a third term made   the President  believe his  candidacy ineffective. 
Nation magazine,  which had been   for him in 1952,  now called upon 
Eisenhower not   to  run   again because  the  Presidency,   it  said,   could not be 
"cut  and   tailored  to   fit   the  personal  limitations which have  resulted 
from his  heart   attack   ....""    With  "deep  regret" it had reached   the 
conclusion  that   "The   time has   come   for President Eisenhower  to evidence 
the  full  measure   of  his   respect  for the   office  of  the Presidency   and 
announce  his  retirement   from public   life."16    The Washington Press Corps 
was polled  and  88%  said that   Eisenhower would not  run  again. 
21. 
12 Rovere,   op.   cit.,   p.   313. 
13 "The President: ..A Difficult  Time." NEWSWEEK,  XLVI   (3  Oct.   1955) 
14 Murphy,   op.   cit.,   p.   115. 
15 Quoted in  Johnson,   op.   cit.,   p.   145. 
16 "The Office  and  the Man," NATION,   CLXXXII   (30 June 1956),   541. 
17 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   154.     47%  of  the  reporters   thought the ^ 
G.O.P.  could not win without  Eisenhower while  46%  thought it   could.     7% 
did not hazard a guess.     They  picked  the   1956  ticket   as Nixon and Governor 
Christian  Herter of  Massachusetts  and said that Adlai  Stevenson   and Estes 
Kefauver would lead   the Democrats.     "Capital  Reporters  Doubt  Eisenhower 
Will Run," NEW YORK TIMES,   12 Nov.   1955.   p.   8. 
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Harry Truman said   that  the  Democrats  were   "going to   give the 
American people   a  chance   to  vote   for  a  President   and not   a   regency 
1 ft 
or a  part-time   chairman of  the  board." Sherman Adams  was   reported 
to  have  "said   repeatedly  that  he  doesn't   believe Mr.   Eisenhower will 
be  available  for   re-election." Mrs.   Eisenhower was  against  a second 
term;   John opposed  it;   Milton did not  like the   idea at   all.     If  re- 
elected  Ike  would be   seventy years old at  the  end of his   second term. 
No other American President  had   ever     lived to   be   that  age  while   in 
office.    Why hurry  toward  the end of   the  road   burdened  by  the obliga- 
tions   and  responsibilities  of   the most   important   job in the  world? 
Yes,   he had  told  himself   at  first.   He was only mortal;   he  had done his 
share.     Perhaps,   if  this   heart   attack thing had  come   ....   but  not  now. 
He wanted to   live   - and  yet not   as   a  quitter,   not   as  an  invalid. 
For on  the   positive  side  of the   ledger  there were   some  good 
points.     Perhaps,   the major one  was   voiced by Newsweek magazine when 
it pointed out   that   "This  gruesome  suggestion   |_of  President   Eisenhower's 
imminent demise] is not   regarded  by  sophisticated people   as  a  real   bid 
20 
for  voters   ...." The   people   trusted  Eisenhower.     If  he   said he was 
18 Quoted   in  "Eisenhower  As  A Candidate,  What They Say," NEWSWEEK, 
XLVII   (13 Feb.   1956),   27.     Senator Magaret Chase  Smith was  quoted  in the 
same   article  predicting   a Nixon-Claire  Booth  Luce  ticket   if  President 
Eisenhower  did  not  choose to   run. 
19 Smith,   op.   cit.,   pp.   291-92. 
20 "Knowland,   Nixon and   Knight," NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (19   Sept.   1956), 
128. 
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capable  then  they would believe him. 
Other   factors had good  indications.    Eisenhower was  and had been 
an enormously  popular President.     He had a record to which he could 
point with justifiable  pride:     a  foreign policy   that  had  thus   far averted 
war,   tremendous  strides   in prosperity which  included  traditional sympathy 
to business while  at the same   time blunting Democratic  charges by  continu- 
ing many  of   their welfare programs.     On   the issue  of  civil rights   the 
Republicans   felt   they had done more than  the  Democrats  ever had   (indeed,   most 
opposition came   from within   the Democratic Party).     On a partisan   level, 
Eisenhower's   dream of a  reorganized "moderate"   Republican Party was  at 
least  partially  fulfilled.     Some  thirty-nine new state  chairmen had been 
elected.     They were  "positive"  rather than "negative"  Republicans,   and 
they were young.     Nevertheless,   the extent of   the   reformation was  disap- 
pointing to Eisenhower.     But,   since this  much had been done  in  four years, 
21 it stood to   reason  that more   could be done in eight. 
A significant   factor was Eisenhower's   temper and  low threshold 
of arousal.     One  partisan reasoned. 
Sure,   Ike doesn't want   to run now and probably won't 
want   to run  in  1956.     But,   just  wait until  they  put 
his  feet to the  fire.     Wait  until  they   feed him lines 
like   'You can;t   turn your back on America now'   and 
'Adlai  Stevenson says   you're afraid to  stand on your 
own record.'     They'll bring him  around,   and  I   don't 
care   if his   friends   try  to stop   it with  fifty  Black 
21    "The President  - A Shoo-in,   But  -," NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (25 Aug. 
1955),   34. 
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Angus bulls   and a private   golf course  for the Gettys- 
burg farm.    He'll run.22 
Governor Dewey   agreed,   saying,   "I  don't  think Mr.   Eisenhower wants   to 
run,  but   I'm sure he will   ....   I   don't blame him for wanting to retire, 
but he can't."23     it was well known  that  Sherman Adams   could persuade 
Eisenhower in just  such  a manner  and that   Dewey swung much weight with 
the President.     Ambassador Lodge had elaborated in June of   1955,  ex- 
plaining: 
I would say this,   that  the guiding rule of President 
Eisenhower's   life  has  been duty.     I  believe   that in 
1956,   he will  think it  is his duty   to accept   the 
nomination. 
Under his   Administration,  we have   achieved   two unique 
things which  have  seldom  if  ever been  achieved by  any 
President  in modern  times.     The   first  is that we have 
kept  ourselves   at  peace.     The second   factor is  that we 
have  done   this with prosperity  and have not  only   retained 
but  expanded our prosperity. 
22 Smith,   op.   cit.,   p.   293.     The   inside-the-White  House 
Eisenhower was   astonishingly  different   from the  public-Eisenhower. 
In public, his words were nursed and almost  too carefully weighed 
to the point where his   syntax often defied   analysis.     In private 
the old soldier was  not   above  using barracks-room language.     When 
a job was neglected  or poorly   done  or when he encountered what he 
considered baseless  criticism,   his   face would  flame   and his   temper 
would explode   in  a violent burst   of language and  activity.     One of 
his   closest   associates,   after witnessing such a scene,   gasped,     My 
God,  how do you compute  the amount  of adrenalin expended in   those 
thirty seconds?     I  don't  know why   long since he hasn't  had  a kilJ-er 
of a heart   attack."     Cited and quoted in Hughes,   op.   cit.,   p.   149. 
As will be seen   later,   the President's  volcanic energy would play 
a  large   role  in his  decision on   a second  term. 
23 Quoted in   "The President  and Politics," NEWSWEEK,   XLV 
(25  Aug.   1955),   34. 
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I  believe  that   these  facts  will   become  more   and more 
impressed on the  public mind   and on his  mind,   and  I 
think  that  he will,   therefore,   feel   it   to   be  his duty 
to make   himself   available   for  future  service   as President. 
24 
A  great   factor   in   influencing  the  President  was Mrs.   Eisenhower's 
feelings.     Ever  since  the  doctors   told her that   a  second  attack would   be 
fatal   to her husband  she  had opposed a  second  term.     But  now  that his 
recovery had   been so   rapid  and  so   complete  and   she  had seen  the  passing 
of his  depression  as  he   returned   to  work,   she  became   less   and   less   adamant 
about   the   idea  of   re-election.     Indeed,   the  President himself   reported 
that   "Mamie,   above  all  others,   never accepted the   assumption   that   I had 
incurred  a disabling   illness....     She perhaps  more  than  any other,   re- 
25 
tained   the   conviction  that   my job   as  President  was   not  yet  finished." 
Her health,   too  had   improved  and  she did not  press  her husband;   she did 
not,   in  the  final   analysis,   want  her own  feelings   to   be   involved  in her 
26 
husband's  decision. 
In  the   long  run  Eisenhower's  partisans   viewed   it   this  way:     his 
health was  good  and  continuing to   improve as   he  took care of   himself. 
The  state of   the  world  was   sufficiently foreboding   and   the prospects 
of  the   party without  him sufficiently dim,   so   that   Eisenhower could   be 
persuaded  to   shoulder   the  burden   for another  four  years.     With this   in 
mind his   close  advisors   set  about   the work  they had  begun   in earnest   soon 
24 Quoted   in  "What   Eisenhower's   Friends Say,"  U.S.   NEWS,   XXXVIII 
(17  June 1955),   22. 
25 Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   542. 
26 Eric Sevareid,   "Will   the  President  Run Again?"  REPORTER,   XII 
(10 Mar. 1956),   30. 
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after the  gloom-dispelling vacation  to   Key West. 
General  Lucius  Clay,   a close  friend  and  political   advisor   to   the 
President,  was   telling  any gathering around  the   country that   would 
listen  that  the   President would  run  again  if   he   believed   it  his  duty 
to do  so.     Few believed that Eisenhower would  find  it outside his 
realm of   service   to do   so   if he were  called upon by  a  sufficient  number 
of people.    The  President   did  not   ask General   Clay to   stop what  he was 
27 
saying. 
Meanwhile,   the   frustrating  partisan  aspect   loomed  ever-present   in 
Eisenhower's mind.     This  was   the   issue  to  which his  obstinancy was  most 
vulnerable.     The  plain fact  was   that  the  Republicans  vwuld  lose and  the 
"old crowd" would be   back   in power   if he did  not  run again.     Around 
Washington the  assumption was   that   if  Eisenhower did not   run  again,   his 
forty-year-old Vice   President would be the man  to   beat  at   the Cow Palace 
Convention  in San  Francisco   in August.     In  the  months   after  the  President 
was  stricken few believe  this   could  be done   if   Nixon had  Eisenhower's 
blessing.     The  first  Gallup Poll   taken  after  the  President was  stricken 
asked Republicans whom  they favored   in  the  event  Eisenhower did not   run. 
The results  showed   33% for  Nixon,   15% for Dewey and   13% for  Dulles.     No 
no 
other potential   candidate   received more  than  5%. A poll  of   53 Republican 
27 Id.,   and Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.  400-01. 
28 "Broken Glass   and Tacks on Nixon's   Path," NEW REPUBLIC, 
CXXXIII   (17 Oct.   1956),   3.     See   also   "Those Who Could or Would  Be 
President," NEW  REPUBLIC,   CXXIV   (2 Jan.   1956),   4-5. 
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state  chairmen  in December   1955,   showed  that Nixon was   clearly the 
29 
preference   if  Eisenhower didn't   run. 
The  Nixon  boom was,   no doubt,   inspired  by the Vice President's 
conduct during Eisenhower's   absence  from Washington.     It  capped  a 
rising wave  of   support   for   Chief  Justice  Earl Warren  for  the   nomina- 
tion.    Warren  led  Nixon 25% to   19% in April  of   1955,       but  the Chief 
Justice  took  the  tide out   when he   completely and  absolutely withdrew 
in  the post-coronary speculation of  October.    Warren  had not  been 
interested   in  the  Presidency,  he   said,   since  he had   gone  to   the High 
Court.    The   fact   that  his   name was   being  used   in connection with  the 
Republican  nomination for  President  was   "a matter of  embarrassment" 
to  him as   Chief Justice.      "When   I   accepted  that   position,   it was   with 
the   fixed  purpose of   leaving politics   permanently for   service on   the 
court," he   insisted.     "That   is  still my purpose.     It   is   irrevocable. 
..31 
I will  not   change   it   under   any circumstances.... 
29 See  "Ike   in   '56?    A Poll  of GOP Chairmen,"  NEWSWEEK,   XLVI 
(12  Dec.   1955),   33-4. 
30 See  "The  President  and  Politics," op.   cit.,   p.   34. 
31 "What Warren Said,"     NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (10 Oct.   1955),   38. 
Warren had  been a  candidate  for   the  Vice  Presidency on  the  unsuccess- 
ful   1948  Republican Ticket   headed   by Thomas  E.   Dewey.     In   1952,   after 
the   resignation of  Chief  Justice  Fred M.  Vinson,   President   Eisenhower 
appointed   former Governor Warren Chief Justice.     He  had not   been   in- 
volved   in politics   since   that   time.     See  also  James   Reston,   "Profound 
Effect on   1956   Is   Expected   in Capital," NEW YORK TIMES,   25  Sept.   1955, 
p.   8. 
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Although   in public  President   Eisenhower  had warned  against 
"too   great   a  confusion between politics   and the  Supreme Court" 
Nixon  tells   us   that he  was   irritated  at Warren   for  renouncing  any 
political   involvements.     Perhaps,   the President was   envious  of 
the  Chief Justice's ability and position to do   so.     "I don't   see 
why he  couldn't   just  have   said nothing,"  Eisenhower complained. 
The  party had   been good  to Warren,   he  thought,   and Warren owed   it   as 
much  as  to   keep   the door open  and respond   if  he were  called   upon. 
Eisenhower was,   no doubt,   influenced  by  the previous polls   showing 
Warren to  be  favored over  Nixon and  by the most   recent ones   showing 
the  Chief Justice with  14% to   11% for the Vice President.     He  men- 
tioned  to  Nixon  that he had  seen another  poll   where  the Vice  President 
32 
had   run substantially behind  Stevenson. 
Eisenhower's  frank discussion with Nixon  about  the   apparent   in- 
advisability of   the  latter's   candidacy at  this   point   is   revealing. 
Nixon was  young  and  able,   but old  wounds   inflicted  by Nixon  for  both 
of   them during  the time  when Eisenhower  had  been   loathe   to   indulge   in 
partisanship were  still   aching.     Nixon's   "rock   'em,   sock   'em"  campaign 
tactics   irritated many people.     Some called   it   "repressed McCarthyism. 
The  President's   suggestion to  Nixon  that Warren would make   a  better 
candidate demonstrates   his   fixation on one goal:     Republican victory. 
33 
32 W.  H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Lauds Nixon And Opposed  Draft of 
Warren," NEW YORK TIMES,   26 Jan.   1956,   pp.   1   and   12,   and Nixon,  op.   cit., 
p.   159. 
33 See   Irving Howe,   "Poor  Richard Nixon," NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXIV 
(7 May   1956),   7-9. 
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Eisenhower was   for whoever  could win.     For   if Warren  ran,   the party's 
chances   would   be  much   improved  and  victory a relative  certainty.     If 
this were   the   case,   Eisenhower  had   an out.     Warren's   candidacy would 
allow him to quit   the  race,   retire  honorably to  Gettysburg,   secure  in 
his  record  and   in  the  prospects  of   a   Republican victory as   a  vindication 
of  that   record.     Then Nixon would have  his   time.     When Warren  cut off 
Eisenhower's most  desirable   avenue of  escape,   the   President  was  greatly 
agitated. 
With Warren's   withdrawal  political  pressure   soon came  to   bear 
more   intensely  from all directions.     As   a   result of   the potential Nixon 
candidacy,   the  Vice  President's   intra-party adversary,   Senate Minority 
Leader William Knowland of   Nixon's   home  state of  California   (which had 
seventy  convention votes   and  where   an  erstwhile   anti-Nixon alliance  had 
34 
sprung   up  between Senator  Knowland   and Governor  Goodwin  Knight)      was 
34     See  Gladwin Hill,   "Nixon Can't Win.     Knight  Maintains." 
NEW YORK TIMES,   14 Oct.   1955,   pp.   1   and  20.     Also   see   "Nixon-Knowland- 
Eisenhower Triangle." NEW  REPUBLIC,   CXXXII   (13 June   1955),   2;   "Three 
Cornered Chess,"  NATION,   CLXXXIV (19  Jan   1956),   50-1;   Raymond Moley, 
"Knowland,   Nixon  and  Knight," op.   cit.,   p.   128 and H.H. Miller,   "Three- 
Handed  Checkers,"NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXVI   (28 Jan.   1956),   8-11.     In addi- 
tion Nixon had serious opposition from the   Eastern Establishment.    This 
led to   a  growing  apprehension over Eisenhower's   candidacy.     See   "After 
Eisenhower Bows  Out   - An  EasternBloc Will  Try to   Stop Nixon," U.S.NEWS, 
XXXIX (21  Oct.   1955),   24-5   and James   Reston,   "Nixon  Is Opposed  By Some 
In G.O.P.," NEW YORK TIMES,   15 Feb.   1956,   p.   21.     See  also  Alvin Shuster, 
"Knowland Says   He'll  Wait   Until   Feb.   15 On Candidacy," NEW YORK TIMES, 
16 Jan.   1956,   pp.   1   and  9.     Knowland  was  going ahead with his   plans   to 
run even when the President  was   vacationing with  Secretary Humphrey  in 
Georgia,   "Knowland Feels   Rising Pressure," NEW YORK TIMES,   16   Feb.   1956, 
p.   23. 
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reported on   1 November   to  have decided  that  he would  announce his own 
candidacy by early March if   the  still-hospitalized  Eisenhower decided 
not   to  run.     On 8 December  he  moved  the  date   up  to   31  January and  later 
he  put   it   at   15 February.     Meanwhile,   the  President's physicians   had 
urged him  to  put off   any decision  until   the middle of February  at  the 
earliest.     On 30  December  it  was   announced   that   a  poll  taken of   134 
Republican   governors,   state  chairmen and  national   committeemen now showed 
that over half of   them believed   that Eisenhower would  lead the   ticket   if 
35 
physically   able. The much-dreaded  strife   in the  party was   imminent   in 
the higher   echelons. 
Knowland was  telling  Republicans  as   early  as  October   1955   that  he 
didn't   consider   "a Pepsodent  smile,   a ready quip,   an actor's  perfection 
with  lines,   nor  an ability to   avoid   issues   as qualifications  for high 
office."    Whether  Knowland was   talking  about  Nixon,   Knight or  Stevenson, 
he  didn't   say. 36 
On   15  November   (the  day after  the   Eisenhowers   arrived at   Gettysburg 
37 
from Fitzsimmons) Adlai  Stevenson  announced his  candidacy. 
In  the meantime   the   situation stood   like this:     Republicans wanted 
35 Eisenhower,   op,   cit.,   p.   570.     See  also   '"56  Could Center on 
Californians," NEW YORK TIMES,   26   Sept.   1955.   p.   16. 
36 "Nixon's The Target,"  NEWSWEEK,   XLVI   (24  Oct.   1955),   26.     See 
also   "Consternation Within." op.   cit.,   p.   7. 
37 Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   570   and W.  H.   Lawrence,   "Stevenson 
Seeks Nomination  in   '56'   Hits  G.O.P.   Record," NEW YORK TIMES,   16  Nov.   1955, 
pp.   1   and   24. 
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Eisenhower   to   run  if  he were   able.     If  he were  not  able,   since Chief 
Justice Warren  had  taken himself out  of   the picture,   Nixon was   their 
man.     But   Knowland  and   Knight  controlled California's  seventy convention 
votes   and   that was  a  powerful   threat   to   Eisenhower's  erstwhile  united 
party.     The   threat  that  his  own Vice   President  would be  repudiated   by 
the  National   Convention made  Eisenhower maintain a detached  attitude 
toward Nixon.     The Vice  President  himself,   knowing firsthand   the  tactics 
that would  come  to  bear on  the  President,   later  said,   "If   I had bet   at 
38 
that  time,   I   would have wagered   that   he would seek a second  term." 
The  Inner Circle - Adams Hall,   Snyder,   Brownell,   et  al   - who   at  first 
were  urging  the   President   to   announce   for  a second term,   now  took on a 
different   line of  persuasion.     Fearful   that his   announcement  would   be 
a flat  refusal   they now were   urging  him to   put off  a final   decision for 
at   least   two  more months,   until   February or March.    And  for   a   long while 
there  was  heard only silence   and  equivocation from The Man.     And  for 
once  Eisenhower's  fervid  advocates   agreed with his   bitter  critics:     no 
39 
news   from  Eisenhower  was   good news. 
38 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   15*4  and   "70 Convention Votes   and  a Feud 
With Nixon." U.S.   NEWS,   (28 Oct.   1955),   60-3. 
39 See Alan Drury,   "The  Enigma of Gettysburg," REPORTER,   XII 
(29   Dec.   1955),   20-1. 
CHAPTER 4:     THE BATTLE  OF GETTYSBURG 
When  Leonard Hall was   asked,   after the Post Office  Conference 
in Gettysburg back in November, when he   thought  the President would 
announce  and whether or not they had discussed  the timing of  the 
announcement   (whatever  it might be),   he  said,   "I  did not.     I  never 
felt  that  is   important."-'-    That,  of  course,  was not  true.     Timing 
was  the most   important   aspect  of  the President's  announcement  outside 
of its  content.     In the   first   place,   if  the President was   going to 
run,   too early  an  announcement would  allow partisans   to  launch their 
campaign of   "part-time   President"  sooner.     If, however,   the President 
decided not   to seek another term,   the  later he postponed his  announce- 
ment   the  longer the party could be  kept   intact. 
Now,   the Warren balloon burst,   the Knowland  candidacy was  in   the 
embryonic stages   and the Nixon inheritance was shakily but steadily 
filling the  vacuum.    Eisenhower was wrestling with his  fate  and the 
press was   clamoring for some  kind  of decision.     If the President were 
going to step  aside,   other candidates would have  to know as  early  as 
23 January,   in  time to   file   for the   Illinois  primary,   or at   least  by 
5 February,  with the deadline  for  filing in New Hampshire, West  Virginia, 
1     "Party  Chairman's   Views   of President's Plans,"  U.S.  NEWS,   XXXIX 
(9   Dec.   1955),   26. 
Ill 
and Alaska.     By mid-February,   filing dates  for   the primaries   in Ohio 
and Minnesota would  have passed.     Within  a week  after  the  Key West 
news  conference of  8 January,   the President's   friends   and advisors 
made   the move   and one by one   intently urged him to  run  for   a  second 
2 
term. 
The President  was   gravitating  toward making an ultimate  decision 
on his own   initiative,   however.     It  appears   that   at  this  early date,  he 
was  definitely  but   reluctantly  considering an affirmative  answer.     It 
would  not  be   all   that  he  wanted,   but  at   least  a  second  term could  be 
made   bearable.     His   wish had   been summed   up   in what he had  told  the 
Madison Square Garden Rally   in   late January:     "I  could devoutly wish," 
he  said,   "that  there were some method  by which   the American people 
3 
could,   under   the  circumstances  point out  the  path of  my true  duty."" 
Then he got a letter from a former governmental official - among hun- 
dreds of thousands of other pieces of advice he received - suggesting 
that he let Republican voters decide for him whether or not he should 
run for re-election. At least three purposes would be therein served. 
First, he would not have to decide a priori, that is, on his own. If 
the voters in the primaries supported him, the decision would be that 
much easier  and more  plausible.     If  they voted  him down,   he would have 
2 "When Ike Must Decide," U.   S.   NEWS,   XXXIX (30 Dec.   1955),   19. 
3 W.   H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Says   2D Term Decision Must   Be 
His  Own," op,   cit.,   p.   10.   Emphasis   added. 
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a good  albeit  a disappointing,   reason  for not  running again.     Of 
course,   the   fact  that he would be unopposed indicated not only 
the overwhelming probability  of his   "election" but also the  gist 
of his   affirmative  decision even  at   this early  date.     Second, 
the   announcement   of the  decision could be postponed until after 
the  primaries   instead of being forced prior to  them and a possible 
intra-party  battle thereby averted.     Third,   if he won he would have 
done so on his   own  and without   the  support of the  party professionals 
that had been necessary   for his nomination and  victory in   1952.     It 
would,   in short,   mean  that  their roles  would be   reversed.     While he 
could  not   lose he would be  giving the   "people"  the opportunity of 
voting him up   or down.     Here was  a painless way  out of saying "yes" 
or  "no" to  a second  term on  the spot. 
Yet,  how this was  to be manipulated without appearing to 
enter  the  primary on his   own  initiative, which would have been 
tantamount   to announcing his   candidacy,   was  a  difficult problem. 
Any appearance   that   a  final decision had been  reached had to be 
avoided,   lest he   risk   the  appearance  of   repudiation if he   lost. 
This,   in   fact,   had been  the problem underlying the entire   issue 
of  a decision  on  a second term. 
A     "Ike's Health  and  the Voters," NEWSWEEK,  XLVII   (30 Jan.   1956), 
23.     For James   Res ton's  views  of   the considerations  that weighed  upon 
the President's  mind,   see his   three  consecutive   articles,   "The Big 
Question,"  in  the NEW YORK TIMES,   10,   11 and  12 Jan.   1956,   pp.   14,   12 
and  14,   respectively.     See also Arthur Krock,   "'   Will He  Or Won t  He 
Keeps  G.O.P.   On Edge," NEW YORK TIMES,   15 Jan.   1956,   p.  B3. 
113 
That   same  week,   the third week  in January,   the President 
received   a   telegram from  the  Deputy  Secretary of   State  for New 
Hampshire,   Henry E.   Jackson,   saying   that  unless   the  President 
objected,   his  name   would be entered on the   ballot   for the primary 
on   13 March.     Here was   the opportunity that Eisenhower had  awaited. 
At   his   news   conference  on  19 January he announced  the  receipt of 
the Jackson  telegram and   issued  the   text of  his   reply.    He had 
written Jackson on  14  February,   thanking him for his  courteous 
interest,   but   interposing no  objections  to   his  name being entered 
on the   ballot.     The   section of   the  President's   telegram to 
Mr.  Jackson that  excited  the most   interest  read  as   follows: 
It would   be   idle  to  pretend   that my health can  be 
wholly restored  to   the  excellent   state   in which  the 
doctors   believed   it  to   be   in mid-September.     At  the 
same   time,   my doctors   report   to me  that   the  progress 
I  am making  toward  a  reasonable  level of  strength  is 
normal   and  satisfactory.     My future   life must   be 
carefully regulated  to   avoid  excessive fatigue.    My 
reasons   for obedience   to  the  medical   authorities are 
not   solely personal;   I must  obey them out of  respect 
for  the   responsibilities   I   carry. 
H emphasized,   however,   that   his   lack of objections did not  con- 
stitute   a  final   decision  in favor of  seeking  re-election.     "I 
hope that   all  who  vote   in your Republican  primaries will 
carefully weigh all   the possibilities  and personalities  that 
may be   involved,"  he  added.     He was   explicit   in emphasizing 
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that the   "accident   of my illness"  should not stand in the way of a 
free choice. 
As  he  had been along with   the question of his health,   the 
President was being completely honest with  the people.     But  he 
was  also being politically  astute.     For they were one and  the 
same.     His honesty  on  the health   issue would preserve  and strengthen 
the kind of  position  he wanted  to  retain.     If he   could not have  a 
second term of his   own terms,  he   did not want it.     His honesty was 
what made him politically.     As he said  to Emmet  John Hughes  after 
reading a  tribute  to himself  in   an editorial: 
This   is what   I  mean   to people  -  sense and honesty 
and   fairness   and a decent   amount of  progress.     I 
don't   think  the people want to be  listening to a 
Roosevelt  sounding as   if he were one of  the Apostles, 
or  the  partisan yipping of a Truman.    This business 
of  rolling  the drums   to  rally your own party  troops 
has   its  place,  but  -  damn  it  - everyone  that   comes 
5     PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   cit.,  p.   56;   "Ike Discusses His Health, 
His Job,  His  Secretary of  State," U.S.   NEWS,  XL   (27 Jan.   1956),   94; 
and Adams,   op.   cit.,   p.   227.     Of  course,   the President was unopposed 
in  the New Hampshire  Primary.     The surprising results were  in  the 
write-in  votes   for Nixon for  Vice President.     Nixon had  recently 
been through   an  agonizing decision as   to whether or not  to seek 
another term himself  and had also been  the  object  of a  "Dump Nixon 
movement   led by Harold Stassen,  who contended that   Eisenhower would 
run stronger with  someone else  other  than Nixon on   the  ticket,   pre- 
ferably   Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts.     Nixon  received 
a spontaneous  9,436 write-ins.     Other  candidates whose names were 
written in   for the  Vice Presidency were Governor Herter   (1,111), 
Senator Styles  Bridges   (813),   Senator William Knowland   (219).and 
Chief Justice Earl Warren   (185).     See  John  Fenton,   "Nixon    Kefauver 
Score  Victories   In New Hampshire  Primary,"    NEW YORK TIMES,   14 Mar. 
1956,   pp.   1  and 26. 
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into  this office  tells  me that   I am the only thing 
that   can pull   this  party through.     So   there's no 
use  my making any compromises with  the  truth, 
supposedly for  the  party,   because   if   I were  caught 
in one   falsehood,   and what   I  stand for   in the people's 
eyes   got   tarnished,   then not   just me  but  the whole 
Republic  an gang would  be finished., 
o 
So  Eisenhower  was  also   trying  to   save  the party from itself.     The 
constant   urgings of  the   Palace Guard had their  effect on Eisenhower, 
but  not   in  the   same way  as   they had perhaps   intended.     They had 
educated  him;   they had  produced  a  politician.     He would now  realize 
what  he   could  do   and   crystalize his   kind of   leadership.     It was 
a new dawning on the  Eisenhower Administration and all  of  a   sudden 
the   President  experienced  a   fervent   desire  to   exercize   it.     But, 
first he   had   to  keep   the door open so  as   to  produce  a draft. 
Just   before  the  news  of  the Jackson Telegram was  made   public 
the   President's  heart was  again in the throat of   the  nation.     The 
New  Republic on the   liberal   side published a  "Five Year  Recovery of 
Patients  Who   Survived   Initial   Coronary Occlusion,"  by comparing 
studies  of  various   cardiologists   and   life   insurance companies.     The 
results   seemed  to   indicate  that  the  chances   were  somewhat   less   than 
6     Quoted  in Hughes,   op.   cit.,   pp.   194-95. 
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50% that  the  President  would   live another five  years. 
The  ardently conservative U.S.   NEWS released the   results of   a 
controversial   poll  of  heart specialists   it  had  conducted8   showing  evi- 
dence   to   the  contrary.     When asked   if  they thought  a heart   attack victim 
could  be   regarded  as  physically able   to  serve as  President,   64.4% (152) 
said  yes while   35.6% (84)  said no.     In response   to  a question about 
President Eisenhower's   particular  illness,   60.3% (141)  said they thought 
he was   physically able   to serve a  second term,   while   39.7% (93)   said 
9 
they did not   think so. 
7 "Five  Year Recovery of  Patients Who   Survive   Initial  Coronary 
Occlusion," NEW  REPUBLIC, CXXXIII  (3 Jan.   1956),   3.     Results   in the 
various   comparisons   ranged from as   low as   15.2% to   76%.     The  implications 
seemed  to   be   that   if   this were the case with groups of ordinary citizens, 
the  pressures  of   the   Presidency on  a  66-year-old man who  had  suffered  a 
coronary occlusion  less   than a year previously reduced his  chances   to 
somewhere near   the  bottom of  the scale.    As   late  as  the week before   the 
election the   NEW  REPUBLIC published  an article   showing that the  average 
age of  the  Presidents  was only 65.     Eisenhower was  at   best   living on 
borrowed time.     Louis  H.   Bean,   "How Long Do  Presidents  Live?" NEW  REPUBLIC, 
CXXXV   (29 Oct.   1956),   12-13. 
8 U.S.   NEWS  did not conduct   the poll   in  its own name  but   had  a 
private firm do   so.     Questionnaires  were sent   to   the 444 doctors   certified 
as heart   specialists   by the American  Board of Medical   Specialists,   pub- 
lished  by A.N.   Marquis  Company of Chicago.     Answers  were   received   from 275 
respondents  or   61.9%.     Of  these,   236   answered  the  first  question  and  234, 
the   second.     "What Heart Specialists   Say," U.S.   NEWS,   XL  (13 Jan.   1956),   21. 
9 Some  did  not   answer either yes or no,   but  made  comments.     Many 
protested that   they could not  answer without having examined the   patient 
and  suggested  that  the   poll was  therefore   ineffective,   inconclusive   and 
useless.     One  doctor  reasoned that   in his opinion the   "meddlesome project 
should   be   abandoned."    Another considered  the  poll   "a  travesty on  Lincoln 
while yet   another  answered the questions and  returned  the  questionnaire 
with   the  comment   "My fee for  this  service will   be $100.00."    Alternate 
suggestions  were  made   such as   "He  should run for Vice  President   and his 
brother Milton  should   run for President."     Id.,   pp.   28     29,   Zb,   and  iM 
respectively.     The American Medical   Association blasted  the poll   as     politi- 
cally slanted"  and declared  that   "consultation without,«■*»■*** J«*! ££ 
See William S.   White,   "Capital Doubts  That   Eisenhower Will   Be Candidate  for 
2d Term," NEW YORK TIMES,   20 Jan.   1956,  pp.   1  and  15. 
117 
In the   latter poll,   Eisenhower's  greatest   "support" came  from 
doctors   in the   traditionally Republican Middle Atlantic  States   and  the 
East  North Central   States.     No  conclusions  can  be drawn  from  this, 
however,   since  questionnaires were  not sent out or returned   in pro- 
portion  to   population nor were there   any distinctions made   in  the  results 
as   to   the  correlation between received  ballots   and area population. 
Neither  poll,  of  course,   really proved   anything.     The  New Republic 
survey was  a conglomeration of  studies on individuals   and  groups of 
individuals  from   1941-54   and  in no way applied   to  Eisenhower personally. 
The  U.S.   News   poll,   while  specifically mentioning the  President,  could 
not  be deemed   conclusive   since,  of  course,   it   could not  give   the  doctors 
questioned  the  opportunity  to  examine   the  President   and since   there  was 
no  uniformity   in what evidence the   individual   doctors   considered.     The 
New Republic   survey was   totally apolitical  while the U.S.  News   study 
did not  allow  for  personal   political   preferences  and  aversions.     Indeed, 
the Washington  Post  and  Times Herald noted with some  pointed  conclusive- 
ness   that  the  only thing  the   latter poll  conclusively demonstrated  was 
that   "heart  specialists   tend  to   be Republicans   by a   preponderance of 
about   3  to   2." Although   both  studies  caused great   controversy,   neither, 
then,   was   strictly pertinent  to   the  subject  at  hand   except   for suggestive 
propaganda purposes  for   the  political   factions. 
10    Quoted   in  "The   Press   and   the  President," TIME LXVII  (23  Jan. 
1956),   69. 
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Of more significance  as  a  factor  on  the President's   decision 
about  seeking re-election were   the  results  of a study  conducted  by 
his   own  doctors.     On  11 February,   after he  arrived back in Washington 
from Key West,   the President was examined at Walter Reed Hospital. 
The physicians   took x-rays   of his heart   and  compared  them with  x-rays 
taken  of the heart  before  the   attack.     The key  to the  entire situation 
was   the  relative  size  of the hearts.     If the post-attack heart had en- 
larged significantly  then  the President's  condition   remained dangerous. 
If,   however,   the  heart was   relatively  the same  size   after the President 
had   resumed  an  almost normal schedule   of activity,   then his  chances  of 
running and  surviving were vastly  improved.     As   the  doctors  bent   forward 
to examine  the  two superimposed x-rays   they  found the  outlines   of the 
two hearts   almost   precisely  contiguous  with  one  another.     At   that news 
conference   on  14   February when they  announced  that  the President was   good 
for another   five   to ten years,   they were  frank  to admit,   "We don't know 
that  he won't have  another  cardiac accident."    Nevertheless,   it   was  a 
decisive   factor  in  the  President's  medical  as well as  political  outlook. 
11 
11     See  the NEW YORK TIMES  for  "Eisenhower Gets Check-Up To 
Guide  Decision   On   Race,"   12  Feb.   1956,   pp.   1 and 59;   and W.H.   Lawrence s 
articles,   "Doctors   Report   To President Today,"   14 Feb.   1956,   pp.   1  and 
25   and   "Eisenhower  Is  Fit To Run Doctors  Say After Tests;   Stress That 
"Choice   Is  His',"  op.   cit.,   pp.   1 and 21.     See   also James   Reston,     Open 
Uoor On 2d Term,"   15  Feb.   1956,   p.   21. 
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How much   it   eased   the   heart  conditions of  Leonard Hall   and  Sherman 
Adams,  et   al_,   has  not   been recorded. 
The next day  the President   left  for Georgia. 
The  comparison of  the x-rays  coupled with Eisenhower's plan 
to   allow his   name   to   be  entered   in the  New Hampshire  primary were 
two   major factors   in determining his   inclination to run for  a second 
term.    While   the honesty of  the  reply to   the Jackson Telegram was 
typically  Eisenhower,   the Political   strategy was not.     Heretofore, 
political   angling had  been left  to   Nixon,   Adams   and Hall.     Now the 
President   -   entirely of  his own accord  - made   the  first of   a series of 
incidents  which mark the  advent of   the   "new  Eisenhower,"   a politically 
astute Eisenhower,   an   Eisenhower who  was  beginning to  enjoy his   job and 
to   realize what   it  called for.     The  prospects   for a  second  term not 
only were   looking good   to  his partisans,   they were also   brightening 
for  him.     The   reply  to   the Jackson  Telegram and  the  timely publication 
of   the  results  of   the  x-ray comparisons were political   strokes of  the 
first magnitude.     Eisenhower had  been constantly barraged  by his   ad- 
visors   and friends   and  associates  with appeals   for his  candidacy.     Now, 
he   responded,   although not   in the manner   in which many of   them thought 
he  would.     Eisenhower was  beginning  to   realize   that he  could institute 
his  kind of   leadership   in a manner that  could  not have  been possible 
had his  heart   attack  not occurred.     For the health situation gave him 
an opportunity to   project  further his  most  potent political  asset: 
his honesty.     Even his  enemies,   he had  said,   who  regarded  him as   "stupid" 
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did not   think he was  dishonest.     But   those enemies   failed to   recog- 
nize  the  possibilities  of  this   Eisenhower  image   as   they continued  to 
try to  exploit  the health  issue.     Now  Eisenhower had the opportunity 
to make   it  backfire on   them.     The honesty with which he  treated the 
people of  New Hampshire,   for   instance,   was  to  give him the opening he 
wanted  to  go   before  the   nation with  the   same  candor and  have   them 
clamor  for his   candidacy.     The health   issue could  be made to   backfire 
on the Democrats  with  the  results of   increasing  Eisenhower's   popularity 
and   influence   and  giving him  a  running  start on any  lame duck status 
he  would  accrue on 21   January 1957.     The question was  no   longer one of 
putting off   the decision on  the  people but of maneuvering  them into 
the  position of  endorsing him  in spite of his  admitted disability. 
For on  the one  hand he  was disabled  and  would  have  to  have  his schedule 
reduced,   but  on the other,   he was   recovering and   the x-rays  demonstrated 
that he was   "normal."     If   they could   be  maneuvered  into wanting him - 
even on a part-time  basis,   as  the Democrats  charged -  his  presidential 
power would   be  vastly   increased  for  the  application in those  areas  he 
was   learning   it   should  be  applied.     But  making  the Democratic charges 
seem  untrue   was  dependent  entirely upon his being   100% honest about  his 
health   -  in   short,   upon his   admitting that  they were  true   insofar  as  he 
was  not  the   same man   as he had been   in September   1955,   but   also   in 
proving that   he was   the same  President.   His  goal  was   to make widespread 
the  opinion of   a  partisan  that  "Half   an  Eisenhower  is   better than two 
12 
Democrats   any day." 
12 Quoted   in  "Candidate   Eisenhower," COMMONWEAL,   LXIII  (16 Mar. 
1956;   607. 
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And  the more   the   Democrats   pointed out   the   shortcomings of half   an 
Eisenhower  the   bigger his   abilities   to handle the  nation's  problems 
as  President  seemed   to  become. 
But   before   the people were  convinced,   the politicians  had  to 
be  convinced  -   on Dwight  Eisenhower's   grounds. 
II 
At  Key West   the President had   said   in  re consideration of  a 
second  term,   "Naturally I  will  want   to   confer with some of my trusted 
advisers,   and   this   particular  thing has not   been greatly talked  about 
by me with my own  people."      What  he meant  was  that his   advisers  had 
been doing all   the   talking.    For mutual   conversation he resorted  to   an 
established White  House  practice  that had  been in use  since he  had 
become   President. 
Part  of   the   President's policy of  attempting to   bring new 
ideas  and   unified,   young,   aggressive   leadership of the moderate 
outlook   into   the  Republican Party was  to   institute  a  series  of   "stag 
dinners"   in   the White House.     He wanted to   agitate Republicans  thinking 
by bringing   together businessmen,   editors,   politicians,   educators,   labor 
leaders   and other  varied   personalities.     Oftentimes  these gatherings  were 
no more   than   get-togethers of old  cronies   but more often  they were  to 
provide   a  setting   for which  leaders  of  different  philosophies  could 
rally around   the  banner of  Eisenhower's own  belief   in middle-of-the-road 
philosophy. 
1     W.H.   Lawrence,   "President   Hints He has  Decided Whether To   Run," 
op.   cit.,   p.12. 
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By   the  time  January came,   the  President   realized that he  had 
much more  of   a  responsibility  than he had heretofore conceived,   both 
to the party and to   the nation.   By allowing his   name  to   be entered 
in the New Hampshire   and other  primaries,  he  was well on the  road 
to  having   the people  convince   themselves of   the desirability of  his 
candidacy.     To   convince his  associates   - and  himself  -  that  the   second 
candidacy must   be  different   from the  first,   he  scheduled  a  special 
stag dinner  for Tuesday,   10 January.     He was   irritated when word of 
it   leaked  out  and with the  greatest   secrecy he   rescheduled  it  for 
that  following Friday night   -   the thirteenth.     He went   to   such pains 
to  keep   it   secret   that  he  personally  brought   the  place  cards over  to 
the Mansion from his office   in the West Wing. 
Although what   transpired at  that historic dinner has  never 
been recorded,   it   is   known that   this   was  the   first  time  the   President 
got down  to   a personal   brass   tacks discussion with his  associates   and 
advisors   about his   candidacy for a second term.     There were  thirteen 
men present   at   the   Friday the  Thirteenth Dinner.     In  addition  to   the 
President,   the   list   included  Secretary of  State  Dulles,   Ambassador 
Henry Cabot  Lodge,   Sherman Adams,   Secretary of  the  Treasury George 
Humphrey,   Defense  Co-Ordinator Arthur  Summerfield,   Press  Secretary 
Jim Hagerty,   Howard  Pyle and Tom Stephens,   two of  the  President's   aides, 
Major General  Wilton B.   ("Slick" or  "Jerry")   Persons,   National   Chairman 
Leonard Hall,  Attorney General   Herb  Brownell,   and Dr.  Milton Eisenhower. 
2     C.J.V.   Murphy,   op.   cit.,   p.   115;   Donovan,   op.   cit.,   p.   394; 
Adams,  op.   cit.,   p.   225;   Johnson, op.   cit.,   p.   141;   and  Eisenhower, 
op.   cit.,   p.   571. 
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Vice President Nixon was not  invited.     The  President had told him that 
during this  critical period during which he was pondering over  the 
possibilities   of  a second  term,   it would be necessary  to hold conferences 
on   the political situation without Nixon's  being present.    This was 
necessary,   he  told Nixon,   because  the Vice President would,   of course, 
be  one  of   those whom they would discuss.-* 
Mrs.   Eisenhower joined the  distinguished group  of gentlemen   for 
a very pleasant dinner,   after which  the men  retired upstairs   to  the 
President's   study   - what  he  called his  "trophy   room" because he  kept 
his  World War 11 mementoes   there.     On the east  and west walls hung 
full-length  portraits   of both  the President's  parents.     The  President  sat 
down with  his back   to the   fireplace  and the modd changed to a very 
serious   one.     Usually, when the President   got   a group   such  as  this  one 
together he had no   agenda and encouraged  free expression.     This   time, 
however,   he had  a very definite program.     With  the men  sitting around 
in  a circle,   the  President  said that soon  he would have  to make   a very 
serious   decision.      Still  awaiting the  results  of decisive medical   tests 
(the ones with the  x-rays  scheduled for 11  February)   and the  final word 
from his  doctors,   he wanted  in the  meantime  to discuss with these  men 
present   the  possible eventuality   that  those   tests would allow him to 
run  for a second   term.     From them he wanted,   freely and off the  record, 
their  individual   arguments   for or against   running again. 
3 Johnson,   op.   cit.,   p.   141 and Nixon,  op.  cit.,  p.   157. 
4 Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   393-94;   Johnson,  op.   cit.,  p.   141  and 
Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   225-26. 
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One  by one  each had his  say.     Dulles   told the President   in his 
own inimitable   Presbyterian style  that  Eisenhower had a God-given 
ability  to   reconcile  differences   among nations  and he  should  remain 
in a  position to   exercise   it  fully.     He emphasized  the deterioration 
of  international   relations which would result without  Eisenhower  in 
the White  House  and   stressed  the  possibilities of nuclear war which 
would  threaten  the  very existence of mankind.    Adams,  Hall  and others 
said   that   the  President  had provided  the  party with a new,   appealing 
identity  and  that only he  among all  Republicans  could hope  to   continue 
it  to   another  victory.     Lodge  stressed  the  national   unity and  prosperity 
that had  characterized   Eisenhower's   years   in office  and urged   that he 
remain  there   to   sustain  it. 
When everyone  had  given his  arguments   in favor of  the  President's 
running  again,   the would-be  candidate  asked his   brother Milton to  sum 
up  the  arguments   for   and  against  a  second  term.     He did not   ask Milton 
to  give  his own opinion.     As   the other "President"   Eisenhower   related   it, 
the  negative   side  was   unconvincing.     If   the  President retired his   influence 
on world  peace would   be  correspondingly reduced.     As   it had   been pre- 
sented,   the   President   had  a  position  to   exert  a great   influence on 
international   peace  -   so   long  as   he  was   in  the White House.     The  in- 
centive of public  responsibility enabled him to   unify the  nation and 
the  party.     Only he  could win  in the   1956   election for the   Republican 
Party and  if   he  did  not run the  Democrats  would  return to   power  and  re- 
verse  all  his   efforts.     The  choice he  faced,   therefore,  was   either   run 
for   a  second   term or   lose  everything he had worked for during his   term 
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in office.     Finally,   it  was   agreed  that   it  was  entirely the  President's 
own decision  to make  and   that   all   those  present would abide by  it 
whether  it  was   yes  or no. 
"I didn't  know you  all  would be  against me," the President 
rejoined.     He  remarked  that only Milton  seemed to   be on his  side.     As 
the gathering broke   up,   the  President   left  the members with no hint 
as to what  his  decision was or might  be. 
It   is   highly   improbable  that  the   President  expected  any negative 
persuasion from  the  members of  such a group as he  brought   together  at 
the White House on Friday the  Thirteenth of  January   1956.     Cabinet 
Members  administration  aides,   and party officials  would have  been the 
last  people   in the world  to  play the devil's  advocate and discourage 
a second  term.     The one member of  the  group who might have  been ex- 
pected  to   present   cogent  reasons  for his  brother's   retirement   that 
might have   swayed   the  President was not  asked by him to  elucidate.     If 
the  President  were   looking for serious   reasons for  retiring he  would 
not  have  consulted  his  own  appointees.     What   the  President  evidently 
wanted to   do   was   to   reinforce  his own  thinking and  to  convince  them and 
himself  that   he  should  run  again. 
5     Donovan,   op.   cit.,   pp.   394-95;   Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   226-27; 
and  Eisenhower,  op.   cit.,   pp.   571-72. 
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The  crux of   the matter was   this:     Eisenhower had  seen that  he 
was once   again   in a   position to   provide what  he   called  "dynamic  con- 
servative"   leadership.     Yet  he was   unsure whether or not  the nation 
would   be   ready to   accept   leadership from  an alleged  invalid.     He, 
therefore,   contrived   the   New Hampshire  primary coup.     Second,   he  was 
only too   aware of  the   gnawing failure  to provide new moderate and 
young   leadership  for  the  party.     The hard political  facts  were  that 
only he   could win the   1956   election on the  Republican ticket.     That 
being the  case he was  not   ready under  any circumstances   to   let   all  he 
had worked  for  go down the   drain with  a Democratic victory  in   1956  - 
especially when   it   looked  as   if Adlai Stevenson would be  the candidate 
and otherwise  President-designate.    When the  doctors  reported on  that 
14 February  that he  would  "be  able to  carry on  an active   life  satis- 
6 
factonly for  another  five   to  ten years"    Eisenhower was medically 
taken off  borrowed  time. 
Ill 
President   Eisenhower wrote  to  his   brother Milton  in December 
1953,   on the   topic of  a   second   term,   "If ever   I  should show any signs 
of yielding  to   persuasion,   please call   in the   psychiatrist   - or even 
better,   the   sheriff      I feel   there can be no   showing made that my 
6     D.D.   Rutstein,   "Doctors  and  Politics," ATLANTIC,   CXCVIII 
(Aug.   1956),   32;   "What Doctors  Say About   Ike,   'Active  Life For   5   to 
10 Years',"  U.S.  NEWS,   XL  (24 Feb.   1956),   107-08 and  "Doctors Say 
He's Able;   Is He Willing?"  LIFE,   XL (27 Feb.   1956)  38-9.     See above,pp. 
?/*-75. 
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■duty'   extends  beyond a one   time performance."    Even then,   two years 
before the heart  attack, he regarded himself as  "too old"  (62)  and 
"this  almost  precluded  any thought   of my occupying the Presidency  for 
eight years."    But anyone trying to lead the nation into the new era 
of the sixties would need  to have  at   least  two  terms  in the White 
House  to make   a significant  start.1    As   already noted,   this  determina- 
tion   to  limit his  political  career on his own  behalf to four years was 
to have been  a  part   of his   first  inaugural.     But he had yielded to the 
political persuasion  and had  left   the door open  for a second  term.     Then 
he was  Eisenhower the novice politician;   Eisenhower the healthy  conquer- 
ing warrior,   man  of peace.     Now he was   Eisenhower the professional,   the 
cardiac  case   - but still  the  man of peace. 
In  1955-56,   the  politicos went   to work again,  but   this  time  on 
a different  Eisenhower.     Now  they  faced  a man who had undergone  an 
intense,   albeit  brief,   political baptism of  fire.     He had   faced a 
Democratic  Congress   for three years  and he had also faced  death.     If  it 
were  possible,   even more  of  the  lessons   of  life had been  crammed into 
his  sixty-five  years.     The nation had  reached unprecedented  peaks   of 
prosperity.     The Korean  conflict had been brought  to a close and a 
postwar  recession successfully dealt with.     Red  China was still in 
check in  the  Far East while   the tense   relations with  Russia were 
temporarily eased by   the disarmament proposal at Geneva in  1955.     At 
the present   time there were only   faint   forebodings of the impending 
1 Cited   and quoted in Eisenhower,  op.   cit.,  pp.   556-57. 
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trouble  in  the Middle  East  and  the prospects for the Republican Party 
were  good   -   if  Eisenhower stayed   at  the helm.     The President  could have 
left office   at   that   time with  the  grateful   thanks of millions of world 
citizens  but  with the   feeling that more might have  been accomplished  if 
he had remained  at  the   forefront.     The   time of  complete  satisfaction 
had not  yet   come   to  Eisenhower  as   it  never  comes   to   any President. 
Now more  seriously than ever before he  weighed  these considerations   in 
his mind:     Was   it  true   that the  tense world  situation could  better  be 
handled  by him  than by anyone  else on  the American political   scene? 
Were  his  domestic policies serving the  best   interests of America  as  a 
whole?    Could  he  continue   in office without seriously  impairing his 
health  and   consequently his  effectiveness,   both medically and  politically 
in spite of   the  heart   attack  and  the Twenty-Second Amendment?    The 
answer  to   all   three  questions   seemed   in his mind  to   be yes.     But  the 
main question was   this:     Would  the Republicans   lose   and  the   return of 
the  Democrats   reverse   everything he had  thus  far done?    Here was   the 
decisive   affirmative   answer.     "He hated the thought of  turning over his 
moderate   and  conservative policies to   a Democratic  administration," Adams 
tells   us.     "For   that   reason alone,  whether he had had the heart   attack or 
not,   I  believe  he could  have  been persuaded to  become  the   Republican 
Candidate   in   1956"       And who   should  know but Sherman Adams? 
2    Adams,   op.   cit.,   pp.   220-21 
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On  the home  front Mrs.   Eisenhower,   John and Milton became 
reconciled  to   the  fact  that  the  President's  recovery did not make 
his  prospects   for a  second   term as ominous  as originally they 
appeared  to   be.     General   Snyder  began to   advance  the   suggestion to 
them that   the   President's  restless  energy and  aversion to   inertia 
might  do   his  health more  harm in  retirement  than would another active 
3 
term   in the White House. 
For  Eisenhower's   own part,   the decision had  resolved   itself. 
His main  concern now was   for  the nation   and  the office.     For  if  the 
nation could  not  be  convinced that   it was  to   its  best  interest  to 
continue him  in office,   or  if   they  came  to  believe that a heart  attack 
victim  in  the White House would diminish  the   Presidency,   then he   risked 
defeat.     One of his   greatest  strengths   lay  in the   fact that  his   kind of 
leadership had  brought   back a  certain element  of   respect   to  that office 
which had   been  lost  during the   latter Truman  years.     Now   if he  threaten- 
ed its   effectiveness   as well,   then he certainly could not   run again. 
"The  problem," he   told   a  news   conference  a month before his  announcement, 
"is what  will   be  the   effect on the  Presidency "    Yet  the   issue  re- 
mained:     if   he were   the  only Republican who   could win - and he   lost    
then  the  party would  be out of  contention for  an  incalculable period of 
3     Id. ,   p.   222. 
U     "Eisenhower  Gets  Check-Up To  Guide Decision on Race   " op.   cit. 
p.   59,   and   "Ike Talks  About  - The  Big Decision,   His Health,  Warren,   the 
Coming  Campaign," U.S.   NEWS,   XL  (17 Feb.   1956),   81. 
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time.     His vision,   therefore,  had  to  extend  beyond   the primaries 
and  into   the   general  election when  the  voters  would be subject   to 
the full   onslaught of the   Democratic  propaganda machine. 
Evidence exists   to   show that  Eisenhower had  come to   the   con- 
clusion   at  a  very  early date   that  the heart  attack,   the position of 
the party,  the  state of   the nation and of  the world,   and  the position 
of his   associates   called  for another  term  in the White House.     He made 
the  significant  admission  that   "I  think  I  will  probably trust  my own 
feelings more  than  I will   the doctors'   reports."     Even at this   late 
date   (mid-February)   the  President was   still  observing  the disparity 
between  medical   and political   practicalities,   between the  could  and 
the  should of  his   candidacy.     "Now a doctor's   sole  care   is with his 
patient," he  explained.     "He doesn't have  to   think about   the  things 
I do   in  trying  to   solve  this problem."    He  said he had always   tried 
to  be on the   "cautionary side  rather  than on  the optimistic  side" hoping, 
as he   said,   that   if  he  ultimately decided   "that  I  don't  believe I  should 
„5 
try to   do  this"   that  there would be no national   "shock. 
5  PUBLIC  PAPERS,   op.   cit.   pp.   33-4.     Emphasis  added.     When asked 
at  this   point   if   this  statement meant  that he  had  not yet made  up his 
mind about  seeking  re-election,   the  President  drew   laughter when he 
replied,   "It  means   as of  this moment   I have not made  up my mind  to  make 
any announcement   as of   this moment."     Id.     Cf.   Eisenhower's   statement 
of  29  February at  his   final  announcement   (quoted   in Introduction,   p.vin) 
that  he  was   "arguing about"  the decision   until  the previous morning. 
He meant he  was   arguing  - not discussing. 
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At   a  news   conference on 8 February,   the   President  said that  he 
would   like   to   make his   announcement   at   a press  conference.     Although 
one may question his  motives  were as  he  stated  them to   be,   the   later 
events proved   to  be exactly in  line with his  apparently set  decision 
when he  said,   "...   here  is  where  I would   like to make   it.     For   ...   I 
have had  relations  with  this   group that   I have   treasured,   and  this  would 
be  the   logical   place   to make   it."    He went on to  say,   however,   that   "it 
will  probably need some explanation,   and the   longer  explanation will 
not be here   ...   if   it   can work out that way."      That   is  precisely how 
it happened. 
Outside of Nixon,  Hagerty,   Adams,   Persons,  Hall   and Milton 
Eisenhower,   only a  few persons  knew of   the  President's decision.     On 
29  February  the  President   "leaped"  into   the  political   arena  -  the  two 
months   (to   the  day)   that his   advisors  had  asked  for.     He  scheduled  a 
press  conference for   that  day and word went out  that   this  was   it   since 
he  had previously promised  an  answer  "within the month."     Before   leaving 
his office   he   held  a   thirty-five minute briefing with Hagerty  and Murray 
Snyder.     Snyder prepared a cue card with  inch-high words   reading: 
Red Cross 
Italian 
Farm Bill 
Upper Colorado 
Personal 
6   Id. 
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Picking  it   up,   the President   left  his office shortly after  10:00 a.m. 
to walk to   the  Executive Office Building   across  the  street from the 
West   Wing of   the White House.     Since early that morning reporters  had 
been   lining   up  for  the  press   conference outside  the  Indian Treaty Room 
on the   fourth  floor where   the President   always  conducted his   news   con- 
ferences   from behind a  large  desk  in front of   the   room.     Three hundred 
and   eleven  reporters   and  cameramen jammed  into  the  ornate  room.     At 
10:31   the  President  walked   in,   dressed   in a  tan suit  and vest with his 
head   slightly bowed   in thought.     As  the   assemblage   rose,   great  suspense 
filled the   teeming room. 
Eisenhower yielded  to   an  irresistible  temptation  to   tantalize 
the   reporters.     For  six  suspense-filled minutes he   routinely discussed 
his  hope  that  the  people  would support   the Red Cross  Drive,   announced 
his   pleasure  over  the   arrival  of  President Giovanni  Gronchi of   Italy 
for  a   state  visit,   voiced his opposition to  the   rigid  price  supports 
which  had  been written  into   the  farm bill pending   in the   Senate,   and 
dragged his   impatient   listeners   into   the Upper Colorado  River Basin 
project,   which was   then  up   for  consideration in the House.     He was  for 
it.     He   unbuttoned his   coat  and  thrust   his   left  hand   into  his  trousers 
pocket.     It was   10:37. 
-Now my next   announcement will   be of  interest  to  you,   as  so many 
questions   have   been asked  about   it." 
He   said  he had promised  that   body that when he had  reached  a 
decision as   to   his   "own personal   future," he would  let  them know. 
133 
Now he had  reached  that  decision,   he said,   but  "there were   so many 
factors   and  considerations   involved,   that  I  saw the  answer could not 
be  expressed  just   in simple  terms of  yes and no."     Some  explanation 
to   the nation was  necessary,   he  said,   and he would ask for time on 
national   radio   and   television to  explain to   them those factors   so   that 
they understood  them fully.     The   reporters  were panicky with anticipation. 
Just   as  he would  not  go  before the  nation without   this  explana- 
tion clear  to   them,   he  continued,   neither would he  go  before  the   Republican 
National  Convention  unless  all  Republicans   "understood,   so  that  they 
would not  be  nominating  some   individual other than  they thought   they were 
nominating."     It might   be,   after   their having heard what  he had  to   say 
that  neither  the Republicans or   the nation wanted him,   he  hinted.     But 
if   they called   upon him,   he   said,   "My answer will  be positive;   that   is, 
affirmative." 
The  President  broke   into   a wide grin as  a horde of  reporters 
broke  for   the   exits   and   jammed  the  telephone booths  to   get   the  scoop 
on   the wires.     The news   hit   the New York Stock Exchange  at   10:52   a.m. 
7     Adams,  op.   cit.,   p.   229;   Donovan,  op.   cit.,   p.   404;   "Something 
Personal," NEWSWEEK,   XLVII  (12 Mar.   1956),   28-9;   PUBLIC  PAPERS    op.  cit., 
p.   265;   and   "Here's How   Ike  Broke   the News," U.S.   NEWS,   XL (9 Mar.   1956)^ 
46-9; W.H.   Lawrence,   "Eisenhower Word on Second Term Expected Today,     NEW 
YORK TIMES,   29 Feb.   1956,   pp.   1   and  14  and James   Reston,     Eisenhower  Says 
He Will  See A  2D Term;   Confident of Health;   Bars   •Barnstorming   ;   Praises 
Nixon But   Does  Not   Endorse Him," NEW YORK TIMES,   1 Mar.   1956,  PP;1.   » 
and   35.     An   interesting  pictoral   account of the   announcement   is     Drama 
of   the  President's  Yes,"  LIFE,   XL (12 Mar.   1956),   18-25. 
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The air was   tense   and the  galleries  were   jammed.     Somebody shouted, 
"He's   going to run!"    A roar went op and  people on   the  floor and  in 
the  galleries   cheered,  whooped and slapped each other  on the back. 
Orders  to buy came   in so incredibly   fast  that  the  tape   fell an hour 
behind as   prices  surged.8    A good Democrat would have  expected  as 
much   from Wall Street. 
His   immediate staff  and family along with  the  Vice President 
were  invited  to  the White House that evening to hear  the President's 
televised address   to the nation.     Eisenhower was  a natural  for  television, 
He came   across  on   the screen   like no other modern political  figure save 
John  F.   Kennedy.     He  learned his style with help  from actor Robert 
Montgomery  and his   ruddy  face  and  contagious  grin  projected the 
very  image  of  clean,  wholesome,  serious  American statesmanship. 
At   10:00  p.m.  Eisenhower went on  the air  from his  office   in the 
White House.     He  explained   the goals he had sought  in his  first   term: 
international peace  and national security;  harmonious   federal-state 
relationships;   a  dynamic economy;   co-operation of  the  Executive  and 
Legislative branches;   solving the  problems of the nation's   farmers; 
building highways,   schools,   and other needed public works  and extending 
8     "When   the News  of   Ike's   Decision Hit the Stock Market," 
U.S.  NEWS,   XL  (Mar.   1956),   37. 
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social   welfare along with many other  factors of  similar  importance. 
"To   this  clarification of  issues," he  said,   "I  devoted much time   and 
effort.     In many  cases   these  things   can now be  done  equally well   by 
my close  associates,   but   in others   I   shall   continue  to  perform  these 
important   tasks."     As   President Kennedy did with  the   religious  question 
when  he was   a candidate   in 1960,   President  Eisenhower met  the health 
question head on: 
So   far as  my own  personal   sense of well-being  is con- 
cerned,   I   am as   well   as  before  the   attack occurred. 
It   is,  however,   true  that   the opinions   and  conclusions 
of   the doctors   that  I  can   continue to   carry the burdens 
of   the Presidency contemplate  for me   a  regime of ordered 
work   activity,   interspersed  with regular  amounts of  exer- 
dise,   recreation and  rest.     A  further word about this 
prescribed   regime.     I must   keep my weight   at   a  proper   level. 
I must  take  a   short midday breather.     I must  normally retire 
at   a   reasonable   hour,   and  I must  eliminate many of  the   less- 
important   social   and  ceremonial  activities. 
But  the   President  wanted to make one   thing clear:     "As of  this   moment 
there   is not  the   slightest doubt   that   I can  now perform,   as  well   as  I 
ever have,   all of   the   important  duties of  the   Presidency.     This   I  say 
9 
because   I   am  actually doing so  and have  been doing so   for many weeks." 
To   his partisans   and   to   the   independents  for   the  most   part 
Eisenhower's  speech was   balm  in Gilead.     There he was,   smiling,   radiat- 
ing health   and  confidence  and  implicit trust.     He could do his   job,  he 
9     "The  President  Tells   the   Nation," U.S.  NEWS,   XL (9 Mar.   1956), 
67-8  and  PUBLIC  PAPERS,   op.   cit.,   pp.   274-75   and  276-77. 
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said,   and if   they wanted him for another term he would  consent   to it. 
If they wanted  him!     What humility:     thought  the masses   as  they sat 
on the edge  of  their seats  in  front   of the  television  screens.     Ike 
had won again  and was  a hero anew.     He had beaten the Nazis,   the 
Communists,   the  politicians,   the Democrats,   the  corruptors,   and now 
he had beaten   Death   itself.     They had almost   lost him and now they 
had him back.     Of course   they would have him! 
What  rubbish!     thought   the Democrats.     "As  it happens with 
most   fine  print,   the  public didn't   read it" in Eisenhower's  speech, 
noted Marquis   Childs.     "A regime  of ordered work activity,   interspersed 
with   regular amounts   of exercise,   recreation and rest" meant  even more 
golfing holidays,   and  less   time   on  the job.     If he  had not been considered 
as   "taking it   easy"  before  the heart   attack, what  could be expected  of 
him now?     And  as   for his being able  to "perform,  as well as  he ever had, 
all of the important   duties of  the Presidency,"  that was hardly  any 
consolation  to   those who had never believed he was doing those duties 
well  in  the   first  place.     But he had announced, had so much  as asked 
for  the Presidency  again  and the people would well up   in  a surge  of 
sympathy  and send get-well notes   to him in the   form of  Republican ballots. 
The professionals were hard-put to decide which fact was more 
remarkable: the President's steadfast post-attack resolve to retire 
or his present consuming zeal to seek another term. He had made his 
decision   to  run again in  the affirmative   thanks   to  the   favorable  doctors' 
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reports,   the   favorable effects of the  Key West   and Thomasville  outings, 
his  new conception of his  office  and duties,   the retreat of his   family's 
objections,   and the persuasion of his  associates.     True,  he would have 
been persuaded with the   lack of   another candidate  anyway.     But  now he 
seemed  eager   to   run -  something   he had not  been  in   1952 or anytime since. 
All  except   the   closest   associates  were   baffled  as   to why.     But  now his 
.... 10 "personal  political  Rubicon was  crossed," as he  said   later. And those 
who   knew why   looked for  the  reason back  across   the  dreary plains of 
Gettysburg. 
IV 
In  later  years  President   Eisenhower once  remarked  to  Sherman 
Adams,   "You  know,   if   it  hadn't  been for  that  heart   attack,   I doubt 
if   I  would have  been a   candidate  again."       It was   undoubtedly true. 
In the   weeks   and months   following his   announcement   for a  second   term, 
the Democrats   continually pictured him  as  a weak,   spent,   used-up man, 
swindled out  of  his  needed and  coveted  retirement  by the heartless 
professional   Republicans.     They had  too  much  "sympathy" for him to 
believe   that   he  really wanted   to   undergo  another  -  perhaps  fatal   - 
ordeal   in  the White House.     Not only was this   characterization more 
10    William S.  White,   "Eisenhower Says He May Announce   Plans   By 
March   1," NEW YORK TIMES,   9 Feb.   1956,   pp.   1   and   18. 
1    Quoted   in Adams,  op.   cit.,   p.   220. 
138 
a benefit   to the Eisenhower   candidacy  than  it was  a debit because  it 
enabled people  to believe   that Ike  could do his  job well even while 
disabled,   but   it was  also untrue. 
To  those who stood  in  the sheer impact of his  physical 
presence   during the post-Gettysburg days,   Eisenhower seemed  to 
show unimagined zest   for  a second  term.     While it was   true  that  perhaps 
the most   decisive   factor in  his  decision was   the   lack  of another 
Republican  candidate,  Eisenhower  did not need the  Republicans   to persuade 
him  that   that was  true.     The  decision became completely personal  as   the 
Democrats   continued  to picture him as a tired,  sickly,   spent,   useless 
old man   for whom the burden  of office had proved   too much.     As  Adams 
tells  us,   the President had   always  taken pride  in  his  health  and stamina. 
Thus,  when such  charges were made   it  became  a personal  goal   to accept   a 
second  term.     Not   to do so was to accept  personal  defeat,   along with 
party  defeat.     Now  they became one  and  the  same.     "To   let  it be  said 
that such  duties  had worn him out,  that  the burden of   leadership  had 
become  too much  for him,   seemed more  and more repugnant," relates   the 
Assistant   to  the President.     He would wait   until  the doctors   gave   the 
final word,   but barring their flat no,  he had made  up his mind  in  the 
2 
last weeks   at   Gettysburg that he would  stay  in the White House. 
This  frame  of mind on Eisenhower's   part was  a  direct   result 
of  the  convalescence  at   the   farm.     "Far from longing  for 
2     Id.,   p.   221. 
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retirement," contends Hughes,  "his  taste of it,  through  the gray 
winter weeks   of   convalescence at  Gettysburg,  had decisively sharpened 
his  desire   for continued office."3    His premature departure  from the 
hospital  and  the Camp David meeting had at   first staved   off the post- 
attack depression.     Then came the winter and he was corralled  in  the 
house,   unable   to walk around,  constantly worried over governmental 
problems,   yet  unable  to   take an active part   in solving   them.     By   that 
time  "even  the worst days   in the White House   looked rather appealing 
by   contrast."^ 
It was  during the second half  of the stay  at Gettysburg  that 
the President's  advisors  set  out   on   the campaign  to convince  him to 
run  again.     This was  their most propitious  moment  and  they had  reasons 
other than  political in  nature.     "I  don't   care what happens  to the 
Republican  Party," said General Lucius Clay,  Eisenhower's long-time 
friend  and  advisor,   "but  if he quits,   it'll kill him."     Even 
Mrs.   Eisenhower had decided  that  her husband  "was not   ready  for 
3 Hughes,   op.   cit.,  p.   176 
4 Donovan,   op.   cit.,  p.   397.     Eisenhower's claustrophobia was 
evidenced by   the   fact  that  because he was  unable to walk a great deal, 
"he was   sometimes   forced  to ride  in  a jeep   for something to do.       See 
also   "Not   Ready   to Retire,"    NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXV  (9 July 1956),   2. 
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retirement,   and   several of   the  doctors  felt  that   "retirement  cou Id 
bring him frustration that  would be  a greater  strain on his  heart 
than the   burdens of   the Presidency." 
It   is   therefore the   irony of  history  that  the heart   attack, 
rather than  precluding  it,   came  to necessitate Eisenhower's  candidacy 
for  a second   term.     It   is   equally  ironic that  the  burdens   and responsibil- 
ities of   the  Presidency rather than being the   looming reasons  against 
running  again  became  the major  persuasion  used on  Eisenhower to   convince 
him  that   he   should  run.   Vice  President Nixon  later   contended that   "The 
basic considerations  which went   into   this decision were  the  same 
before  and  after September   1955  - with  the  exception of the  heart 
attack  -   and   I  believe   it  was   the heart  attack  itself which,  more  than 
anything else,   helped convince him  to   become  a  candidate  for re-election. 
After five weeks of  convalescence when  golf  was forbidden,   weather bad, 
and   boredom   rampant,   Eisenhower  got  tired of  painting,   reading his 
favorite  western  novels,   and  his  tortured morale   slumped.     The  battle 
5 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   162  and  "Not Ready to Retire,"  Id.     The 
effect of  this   line of   argument on the  President   is  evidenced  by his 
statement   in his   address   to   the nation on his  announcement   for  a second 
term:     "Incidentally,   some of my medical  advisors   believe   that adverse 
effects on my health will  be   less   in the  Presidency  than   in any other 
position I might  hold."     See  "The  President  Tells   the Nation," op.   cit., 
p.   68 and  PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   cit.,   p.   216. 
6 Nixon,   op.   cit.,   p.   152. 
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that  his   associates   thought  they would have  to wage  against  adamant 
retirement  was  turned   into   a  patient   seige   upon Eisenhower's 
restlessness.     "I  really don't  know the exact moment  when he  decided 
to   run again," said Jim Hagerty,   "but  I do  know that  history was 
7 
made   sometime   in  those weeks   at Gettysburg."       Eisenhower was,   in 
Q 
short,   bored   into   becoming a  candidate. 
7 Quoted   in Hughes,   op.   cit.,   p.   176.     See   also   "Persuading 
the  President,"  NEW REPUBLIC,   CXXXIV  (18 June  1956),   2. 
8 In  a news  conference on 25  January 1956,   Eisenhower denied 
that   this  was the major reason for his   seeking re-election.    When 
asked   if he   missed the bustle of the  Presidency when he was   at 
Gettysburg,   the President   replied: 
Well,   it  seems   to me  to  be  a  fair question,   although 
I don't know  if   it   is   terrifically  important. 
Anybody who has  been busy,   when he doesn't  have 
immediately something at hand,   has   a  little bit of 
a  strange  feeling.     But  to   say that   I was   bored  to 
death  at  Gettysburg  -  there  are  so  many things   that 
I have to   do.     I have  piled up  stacks of  books   I 
never  have had   a chance  to read,   and   I am  trying to 
get   through.      I,   as you  know,   daub with paints.     I 
like   the  actual   roaming around on a farm.     I   love 
animals.     I   like to   get out  and  see  them.   I have 
got   a thousand   things   to do   in this world,   so   I 
don't   think I  would  be bored,   no matter what   it was. 
But   the fact   is   that   the President,   as  noted,   got   tired of   reading, 
painting,   was  restricted  in his  "roaming around"  and was constantly 
subjected   to   the   boredom of   inactivity and  pressured  by his   associates 
about   a second  term.     After he  got  back to  the White House   it was a 
tremendous   relief   to   him and   it was  not politic  to   suggest   to   the 
public that   he was   running only because he had nothing else to   do. 
PUBLIC PAPERS,  op.   cit.,   p.   191. 
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This,   coupled with  the   lack of   a candidate,   the plight  of   the party, 
the retreat   of   his  family's    objections,   the   Key West experience,   the 
support of  his   associates   at   the Friday  the Thirteenth Dinner,   the 
New Hampshire   coup,   the  vacation with George Humphrey       at Thomasville, 
and the  decisive reports of   the doctors   left   little doubt   in Eisenhower's 
mind that he   could not quit now. 
Evidence  tends   to  demonstrate,   therefore,   that  Eisenhower's 
decision to   run again was   unobtrusively made during  the   latter party 
of  the Gettysburg convalescence.     It  can  be  narrowed down between  the 
two  points of   the  11  February x-rays   and  the 28 November meeting with 
Len Hall.     It  was obviously made prior to   the x-rays,   since they only 
substantiated  his  decision,   as he  admitted he would   trust  his own feelings 
more  than  the   reports.     On 8  February he   said he had  already received 
"as much   information  as  I  am going to   get," promised  an  answer   "before 
the month   is   out"  (it was made on 29 February)   and described  the  exact 
method   in which   it  would  be  made. It  was  therefore  made  before  early 
February. On 8 January at Key West he said that he merely had not made 
u£ his mind to announce the decision there. Since he left for Key West 
on 27   December,   the  decision was probably made  sometime  during  the   last 
9 It   was  reported by NEWSWEEK that  before his   29 February announce- 
ment  Eisenhower tried  to   persuade George Humphrey to   run for  the GOP 
nomination.     The Secretary of  the Treasury refused firmly on  the  grounds 
of his  age   (66,   seven months   Eisenhower's  senior)  and his   lack of  a 
political   background.     Eisenhower,   with the   same problems,  was   then 
decisively persuaded   to   run,   says NEWSWEEK.     No  corroborating evidence 
has  been found by the   author  to  substantiate  this  contention.     See 
"White House Whispers," NEWSWEEK,   XLVII   (25 June  1956),   15. 
10 PUBLIC PAPERS,   op.   ct.,   p.  631 
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week in December  ~   around Christmastime - at Gettysburg.    All   sub- 
sequent  events  merely reinforced his   desire  to   seek another term. 
He had determined   since   that   point that he  would   like   to  run again. 
He had not  determined  that  he  could or  should.     His associates  con- 
vinced him  that he   should and the doctors told him he  could.     Shortly 
after  learning  that   he  could   run,   the   President   set about determining 
whether he   could  win.     Thus   he entered the  New Hampshire  primary.     Polls 
sustained  his popularity.     But most decisive in these  areas were   the 
charges of   the  partisans  that he  should not  run   - that he had failed 
and should step   aside.     Unlike the Republicans,   they did not  know 
this man.     If  they had praised his  record,   commended him with whatever 
reservation,   and  demonstrated genuine   sympathy,   then perhaps  Eisenhower 
would have   been more  vulnerable  to  being eased out of   the  picture. 
Gettysburg was once   again a turning point   in history.     Throughout 
the post-convalescence weeks   it  crops  up again and again.     It  was  a 
heart   attack   that   encouraged  Eisenhower to  run  again;   it was partisan 
criticism  that   tempered his   mettle;   it was  a bitter  recovery that   con- 
vinced him that  he   could   last;   and   it was   a genuine  concern for  his 
party and  his  country that   convinced  him that   he should  try.     As  was 
traditional  with  Eisenhower,   when the decision was made,   there was  no 
turning  back.     In August   1956,  William McGaffin of   the Chicago   Dailv. 
News  asked   the   President  the  following question at  a news  conference: 
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Mr.   President,   this,   again,   is  one of   those personal 
questions   about your  health,   sir,   but   I   think  per- 
haps   you don't  realize  the  impact   it's   had on   the 
people of  the  country   ...   and  when we  were   all   in 
Gettysburg,   for   instance,   I went  around   and talked 
to   a  number of   your   friends   and  neighbors  to   ask 
them how they felt  about your  running  again. 
Well,   they   all   love   you,   as  you know,   and they  said 
they  are  going  to  vote for you;   but  really  they 
wished   that  you wouldn't  run  because   they feel   you 
have  done  enough  for  the nation,   you have made   so 
many sacrifices,   and   sir,   they   are afraid that   you 
won't   last  out,   they are  afraid  you won't   live  for 
another four years. 
The  resolution  and   zest  Eisenhower  had   for a  second   term was 
summed  up   in his   answer,   along with   an   insight   into   his  philosophy 
of   life: 
Well,   sir,   I would  tell   you  frankly,   I don't   think 
it   is   too   important   to  the   individual   how his   end 
comes,   and   certainly he  can;t   dictate   the   time. 
What   we   are  talking   about  here   is  the   importance   to 
the  country,   and   it   happens   that  at  this  moment   the 
Republican  Partty apparently thinks I   am  still   im- 
portant   to   them  and   to   the country.     And,   since   I 
believe  so  much   in the Republican Party,   and   I   be- 
lieve   that   it  needed   rebuilding   so badly,   an effort 
which  I have  been making,   as   you well   know,   I  said 
I would   continue  to   try. 
But   this   is   a decision that  the  American people   are 
going   to   have   to   face.     I  am  flattered  by what  you 
tell  me  about my friends   and  neighbors   at Gettysburg, 
but   I  have made  up  my mind this   is  the   thing  I   should 
try,   and we   will   see  what  the American people  have   to 
say  about   It.ii 
11   Eisenhower,   op.   cit.,   p.   575. 
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It  was   therefore,   as  early as  Christmas   1955   that  Eisenhower, 
staring out   across   the  fields  of  history and death  at  Gettysburg, 
decided entirely on his  own not  to   forsake  the   responsibility he   had 
-  the  responsibility that  had  been preserved ninety-two   years  earlier 
on that  very   spot.     Here  he   took new determination and new vision. 
Here he   came   to   realize  that  he  had   a   second  chance   and   that he   could 
not  let   it  go   to   waste,   that   he must   try.     Here  emerged   the   "New  Eisenhower." 
And   if   the  struggle  endured  by General   Eisenhower in  December  1955 was 
not  as  dramatic or  costly as   that  of July  1863,   it  was   still   significant 
enough to   speak of   in history  as   a  second  Battle of  Gettysburg. 
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